- (1.) THIS is a second appeal by one of the defendants, namely, Bhairavlal, against the judgement and decree of the learned Civil Judge, Baran, dated the 2nd February, 1953, affirming the decree of the Munsif Mangrol, dated the 23rd of April, 1952.
(2.) THE facts giving rise to it are that plaintiff-respondent No. 1 Ramgopal filed a suit for a declaration that the sale of two shops effected by defendant-respondent No. 2 Smt. Pushpa Bai in favour of the appellant and third respondent Nathulal was invalid and ineffective against him. It was stated by the plaintiff that the two shops in dispute which were situated in village Mangrol belonged to Ram Keshan, father-in-law of defendant respondent No. 2, Pushpa Bai. THEse shops were mortgaged by Ram Kishan with one Laxmanji, ancestor of defendant-appellant Bhairav Lal and defendant-respondent Nathu Lal. Defendant-respondent Pushpa Bai's husband Madanlal filed a suit for the redemption of the said two shops in the court of Munsif Mangrol. During the course of the trial of the said case Madanlal died leaving behind him his widow Mst. Pushpa Bai. Her name was brought on the record of that case as plaintiff. It was further stated that in that case 22nd February, 1950 was fixed for hearing, but even before that date Mst. Pushpa Bai on the one hand and Bhairavlal and Nathulal on the other came to a compromise whereby Mst. Pushpa Bai sold the equity of redemption in favour of the mortgagees and filed a deed of compromise in the court. THEreafter, the suit for redemption was dismissed in terms of the compromise. THE plaintiff's case was that he was the next reversioner of Madanlal's property, that Mst. Pushpa Bai had inherited only a limited estate from her husband, that the alienation made by her was collusive and therefore it was prayed that a declaratory decree be given in his favour to the effect that the sale made by Mst. Pushpabai in favour of Bhairavlal and Nathulal was invalid and ineffective against him. THE defendants contested the suit on several grounds which led the trial court to frame 5 issues. It is not necessary to set out all of them here, because, as it will be shown presently, the appeal has been argued on one point only. It would suffice to say that the trial court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was the next reversioner, that the sale of the property by Mst. Pushpa was not made for legal necessity and that it was therefore invalid and ineffective as against the plaintiff Aggrieved by this decree, the defendant filed an appeal which was heard by the learned Civil Judge, Baran. THE appellate court however dismissed the appeal and hence he has come to this Court. It is not contested by appellant's learned counsel that the plaintiff was the next reversioner of Madanlal's property at the time of the institution of the suit, but it is contended that after the enforcement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, he has lost all his rights as reversioner, that this Court should take note of this legislative change and the decree of the courts below should be set aside, because according to sec. 14 of the said Act Mst. Pushpa Bai was a full owner of the property. In support of his argument learned counsel has referred to Smt. Kamla Devi vs. Bachulal Gupta (1 ). In that case it was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that "there is no doubt that by reason of the expression" whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act' the section (i. e. sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956) is retrospective in effect". He has also referred to Ram Ayodhya Missir vs. Raghunath Missir (2 ). In that case a Hindu female had executed a sale-deed of certain immovable property. The plaintiff had brought a suit as a reversioner for a declaration that the sale-deed executed by that lady was Farzi without consideration and without any legal necessity and was therefore not binding upon him. The trial court decreed the plaintiffs claim which was upheld by two courts in appeal. During the pendency of Letters Patent appeal, the Hindu Succession Act came into force. It was held that in view of the change in law brought about by the said Act the plaintiff had lost his right as a reversioner in respect of the disputed property, that the plaintiffs suit was therefore not maintainable and hence the appeal was allowed and the judgment and decree of the learned Single Judge of that Court was set aside and the suit was also dismissed. This view was followed in another case by the same court in Mst. Janki Kuer vs. Chhathu Prasad (3 ). The same view has again been affirmed in Baijnath Potedar vs. Ramautar Choudhary (4 ). In Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul vs. Keshwa Lal Choudhuri (5 ). Gwyer C. J. had quoted with a approval the following remarks of Hughes C. J. in (1934) 294 U. S. 600 : "we have frequently held that in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction we have power not only to correct error in the judgment under review but to make such disposition of the case as justice requires. And in determining what justice does require, the Court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which has supervened since the judgment was entered. " In view of the above observation it is clear that this Court is bound to consider the change which has come about in law after the enforcement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It has already been pointed out above that it is settled by the authority of the Supreme Court, above, that sec. 14 of the said Act is retrospective in effect. This section clearly lays down that "any property possessed by a female Hindu whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. " Thus, it is clear that after the enforcement of the said Act Mst. Pushpa Bai became full owner of the property which was acquired by her even before its commencement and hence all the reversionary rights of the plaintiff came to an end after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. I respectfully agree with the view expressed in the three Patna cases referred above. In the changed circumstances the plaintiff-respondent Ramgopal has no right left to maintain his suit as a reversioner and therefore this appeal must be allowed. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the decrees of both the courts below are set aside. The parties are however left to bear their own costs in all the courts because on the date when the suit was instituted the plaintiff had certainly a right to maintain the suit. .;