- (1.) THIS revision has been filed against an appellate order of the Additional Commr , Jaipur, dated 21-2 57, reversing the decision of the trial court on the ground that the applicant being the wife of the tenant was not entitled to seek re-instatement.
(2.) WE have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have examined the record as well. It has not been denied before us that Gangadhar was admitted as a tenant of the land in dispute and that the applicant Mst. Champa is the wife of that tenant. The application for re-instatement was moved by Mst. Champa before the trial court with the allegations that her husband had proceeded to a distant place and that in his absence, the opposite party deliberately dispossessed her. It was also made clear in this application that though the written lease was in the name of her husband, the actual cultivation was being carried on by her since a number of years. The learned Additional Commissioner held that Mst. Champa never claimed a represen-tative capacity for herself and hence she was not eligible to seek reinstatement. Order 3 Rule 1 C. P. C lays down that an application to be made by a party may be made by the party in person or by his recognised agent on his behalf. Order 3 Rule 2 C. P. C. , lays down hat persons carrying on trade or business for and in the names of the parties not residents within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court are authorised to make applications on their behalf and they may be treated as recognised agents of the parties for such purpose. It has not been denied before us that Mst. Champa had been cultivating the land included in her husband's tenancy during the absence of her husband. By virtue of this provision, she is therefore, clearly entitled to seek re-instatement. If a different view were to prevail, it would lead to disastrous consequences. A tenant who is temporarily away from his holding which is being managed by his wife or sons in his absence will have to face serious complications in case the wife or sons are dispossessed wrongfully and the tenan-would be deprived of the advantages which have been conferred upon him by tent ancy laws. WE may refer to some decisions in support of this view. In S. D. 12 of 1912 (Selected Decisions) of the U. P. Board, it was held that the wife of an occupancy tenant who undoubtedly carries on her husband's business during his absence is entitled, in the absence of her husband to reply for him when a suit is brought to eject on the ground that the husband had sub-let for more than 5 years. It is true that in this case what was conceded to the wife was the right to defend, but the principle on which this right was allowed to her can apply with equal force and logic to a case where the wife seeks the relief to which her husband is entitled in the absence of her husband by virtue of the provisions contained in Order 3 Rule 2 C. P. C. In Bhoma vs. Parta, 1952 RLW Supplementary Reports 37 Revenue - this Board also took a similar view and held that the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance was an emergency legislation and where a disposessed tenant was an aged person his son was held competent to seek reinstatement under the Ordinance. In 1945 U. P. Revenue Decisions, page 308, a similar question arose for determination. S. D. 12 of 1912 was quoted with approval and it was held that the wife could eject the sub-tenant on behalf of her husband and could have continued the sub-letting by a registered lease but that she had done nothing of the kind and hence the suit was properly decreed against her. The learned counsil appearing for the opposite party has not been able to show us any decision or ruling contrary to these. Her only contention is that the person seeking reinstatement should be a tenant. This is obviously correct as far as it goes But the question involved in the present case is entirely different. It is this whether the wife of a tenant can apply for reinstatement in the absence of her husband or not. For the reasons given above, we answer this question in the affirmative. The other question which was considered by the lower appellate court relates to limitation. It has been observed by the learned Additional Commissioner that in the application submitted before the Gram Panchayat, the dispossession was alleged to have taken place on 20. 6. 55. No copy of the application presented before the Gram Panchayat exists on record. There is however, a certified copy of the decision of the Gram Panchayat. It is apparent therefrom that on 20. 6. 55. Mst. Champa instituted a complaint against the opposite party under sec. 506 I. P. C.- Criminal Intimidation. There is nothing in this judgment to show that Mst. Champa was disposed from the field on 20-6 55. The offence of criminal intimidation is not be confused with actual dispossession from land. Where insult, abuse or injury is threat-end it would amount to criminal intimidation. To constitute dispossession the person in possession ought to be actually removed from the occupation of the land. The learned Additional Commissioner has based his judgement on these points alone. He has not examined the evidence of the parties on other points involved in the case. The grounds on which the learned Additional Commissioner has based his judgment are clearly untenable. We. therefore, allow this revision, set aside the lower appellate court and remand the case back to it with the direction that the appeal filed before it be heard and disposed of on merits in accordance with law. .;