- (1.) THIS second appeal has been filed by the unsuccessful plaintiff whose suit for ejectment was decreed by the trial court but was dismissed in appeal on the point of limitation by the first appellate court.
(2.) WE have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have examined the record as well. The only point involved for determination in this second appeal before us is as to whether the suit was instituted within the prescribed limitation or not. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants obtained wrongful possession of the land in dispute in Svt. 1982 (1925 A. D.) after the father of the plaintiffs had died in 1924 A. D. It is also alleged in the plaint that one of the plaintiffs was four years old at the time of his father's death. It has not been disputed before us that in 1925 A. D. no law of limitation was in force in the former State of Mewar. The first law of limitation was enforced on 1st July, 1932. Item 5 of the Schedule appended to the Quanun Miyad Raj Mewar Svt. 1988 prescribed 20 years period for recovery of possession over immovable property commencing from the date the right to recover possession accrued. Sec. 5 (a) of the Act provides that if the plaintiff was suffering from any disability at the time when the period of limitation commenced he would be entitled to bring his suit within the period allowed in the Schedule after the cessation of the disability he was suffering from. The result of this provision when applied to the present suit would be that as the plaintiffs were minors at the time when the cause of action accrued they were entitled to a period of 20 years commencing from 1938 A D. as Shri Onad Singh attained majority in that year. Thus under the Mewar law the plaintiff could have brought this suit till 1958 A. D. But the enforcement of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act, 1951 after the formation of the State of Rajasthan altered this situation. Item 10 Group B, Schdl. I of this Act provides a twelve years limitation for the ejectment of a trespasser taking possession of the land without lawful authority commencing from the time when the act of trespass is committed Thus the period of limitation provided in the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act, 1951, was shorter than that provided in Mewar Act. The case has, therefore, to be governed by sec. 9 of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act, 1951. This Section provides that the suits and applications specified in the first and second schedules shall be instituted and made within the time prescribed therein for them respectively provided that any such suit or application for which the period prescribed by the aforesaid schedules is shorter than the period prescribed by the law in force prior to the commencement of this Act then such suit or application may be instituted or made within six months next after the commencement of this Act or within the period of limitation prescribed by the aforesaid law whichever period expires first. The consequences that flow from reduction in the period of limitation by a subsequent law of limitation were examined by their Lordships of the Rajasthan High Court in Firm Bansilal Sukhlal vs. Qurban Hussain (1954 RLW50 ). It was pointed out therein that where there was a reduction in the period of limitation in relation to certain suits three disabilties would arise in such circumstances: - (1) the reduced period of limitation under that ordinance might have expired before it came into force, (2) the period of limitation under the old law might not have expired when the Ordinance came into force, but was going to expire in less than six months after coming into force of the former Rajasthan Ordinance. (3) the reduced period of limitation had not expired before the coming into force of the Ordinance, and was going to expire more than six months after coming into force of that Ordinance. In that case the reduced period of limitation had not expired when the Ordinance No. XXXIII of 1948 came into force on 28. 8. 1948 and the reduced period of limitation had still to run for more than 2 years and 10 months. The question that arose before their Lordships was as to whether it was the intention of the legislature even in such cases to cut down that period to a maximum of six months. Their Lordships were pleased to answer this question in negative and it was held that the proviso was enac:ed in order to save those cases where the reduced period of limitation had expired before the new legislation came into force and six months grace was allowed in such cases. Where the period under the old law had not expired and it was less than six months from the date of the Ordinance the legislature thought it fit not to give any grace at all. It could not have been the intention of the legislature where the period of limitation was being reduced from eight years to three years and where the reduced period was to run for a much longer period than six months to reduce it to still further and to enact that in such a case also the maximum period would be six months. It was, therefore, held in that case that as the reduced period of limitation had to run for more than six months alter the enforcement of the new limitation it would not be reduced further by the six months proviso and that this six months grace would apply only in those cases in which the reduced period had already run out prior to the enforcement of the new legislation. By applying this principle to the case that we have before us it would clearly follow that as the reduced period of 12 years had expired in 1950 the suit could have been brought within the six months grace allowed by sec. 9 of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act 1951. This suit was instituted in 1956 and it is obviously barred by limitation. In the result we confirm the result arrived at by the learned lower appellate court though for entirely different reasons. The appeal is thus without substance and is herely rejected. .;