Wanchoo, C. J. - (1.) THIS is an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution by M. A. Saddique against the order of the Appellate Tribunal of the State Transport Authority, Rajasthan, in connection with the grant of a permit.
(2.) THE brief facts which have led to this application are that the Regional Transport Authority Jaipur invited applications for filling up one vacancy on the Gangapur-Karauli route. After the applications had been received, they were published in the Gazette dated the 17th of March 1956 and objections under sec. 57 (3) were invited within thirty days. THE Regional Transport Authority eventually decided to grant the permit to the present applicant. On this there were four appeals before the Appellate Tribunal. Two of these appeals were by the existing operators. It may be mentioned that these existing operators had opposed the grant of permit to all the applicants who had applied in response to the notice issued by the Regional Transport Authority. When the matter came to be considered by the Appellate Tribunal, it decided to cancel the permit granted to the applicant and further decided to grant a permit to Jagannath who was one of the four appellants before it. THE present application is directed against this order of the Appellate Tribunal cancelling the permit granted to the applicant and granting it to Jagannath instead. The main contention of the applicant is that no foundation had been laid by proper objections under sec. 57 (4) of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter called the Act which would enable the Appellate Tribunal to cancel a permit on an appeal under sec. 64 (f) of the Act. It is also urged that even if there was jurisdiction in the Appellate Tribunal to cancel the permit, it has done so for reasons which are foreign to S. 47 of the Act and, therefore, it acted in excess of jurisdiction. The application has been opposed on behalf of Jagannath and also by the Appellate Tribunal. Their case is that necessary representations were made under S. 57 (4) of the Act and, therefore, the Appellate Tribunal had jurisdiction to cancel the permit. They also contend that the Appellate Tribunal did not act in excess of its jurisdiction inasmuch as it took into account matters provided in sec. 47 when it cancelled the permit of the applicant. Turning to the first point raised on behalf of the applicant, the argument is that sec. 57 (4) requires that a copy of the representation should be furnished simultaneously to the person applying for a permit and as this was not done, it was not open to the Regional Transport Authority or to the Appellate Tribunal to consider the representation at all. Sec. 57 (4) with which we are concerned here reads as follows: - "no representation in connection with an application referred to in sub-sec. (3) shall be considered by the Regional Transport Authority unless it is made in writing before the appointed date and unless a copy thereof is furnished simultaneously to the applicant by the person making such representation. " It is submitted on behalf of the applicant that under this provision it is the duty of the person making the representation to make that representation within the time allowed before the Regional. Transport Authority and also see that a copy of the representation is received by the person applying for permit again within the time prescribed. We have considered the language of sec. 57 (4) and are of opinion that this meaning cannot and should not be given to it. There is no doubt that sec. 57 (4) provides a period of limitation within which representation has to be made to the Regional Transport Authority. It also provides for furnishing of a copy simultaneously to the person making the representation. Now simultaneously means at the same time. It is obvious that it will be impossible for any person who wants to make a representation to the Regional Transport Authority to supply a copy at the same time to the person applying for permit. The reason is that the person applying for permit is not expected to remain in attendance at the Regional Transport Authority's office for all the period which is allowed for making of representation in order that he may at the same time receive a copy of the representation to the Regional Transport Authority. If, therefore, the words "furnish simultaneously" are to be interpreted strictly, it will be impossible to comply with that condition. We are, therefore, of opinion that these words should be read liberally and so long as the person making the representation has taken steps to see that a copy of the representation reaches the person applying for permit reasonably soonafter the representation is delivered to the Regional Transport Authority, he has substantially complied with the last part of sec. 57 (4 ). Two ways appear to us to be very obvious in which a person making the representation can furnish a copy simultaneously to the person applying for permit. He may, for example, alongwith his representation file before the Regional Transport Authority as many copies as are necessary to be delivered to those against whom he is making the representation and ask the Regional Transport Authority to make arrangements for delivery or he may about the same time as he makes the representation to the Regional Transport Authority send a copy to the person applying by post. So long as he has done either of these things, or utilises any other method which would result in the person applying the copy soonafter the representation is delivered to the Regional Transport Authority, he has complied with the substance of the last part of sec. 57 (4 ). We do not see why it should be insisted upon that the party should also actually receive the copy of the representation before the period of limitation has expired. We are, therefore, of opinion that sec. 57 (4) should be liberally interpreted and if so interpreted, all that it provides is that the Regional Transport Authority should receive the representation within the time allowed and at the same time, the person making the representation should take steps to see that a copy thereof reaches the person applying for permit. If he has done that, he has, in our opinion, complied with sec. 57 (4 ). Turning to the facts of this case, we are satisfied that one of the appellants before the Appellate Tribunal,namely Varma Motors, Karauli, had complied with sec. 57 (4) and, therefore, it was open to the Appellate Tribunal to cancel the permit granted to the applicant on an appeal before it of Shri Varma Motors. So far as the second point is concerned, it is enough to say that sec. 47 empowers the Regional Transport Authority and, therefore, also the Appellate Tribunal to take into account the interests of the public generally when considering the grant of a permit. Now the words "the interests of the public generally" are of very wide import and any thing which can reasonably be considered to be the interests of the public can be taken into account by the Regional Transport Authority or the Appellate Tribunal when it considers the grant of a permit. In this case, the Appellate Tribunal had considered that applicant lives much too far away from the place where the service has to be run. This is a matter which can, in our opinion, be reasonably taken into account in the interests of the public generally in deciding whether permit should be granted to a particular person or not. There is, therefore, no force in this application and it is hereby dismissed with costs to the Appellate Tribunal. The other parties will bear their own costs. . ;