Ranawat, J. - (1.) THIS is defendant's appeal from the judgment and decree of the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Sirohi dated the 13th of July, 1954, confirming the judgment and decree of the Munsif, Bali dated the 24th of November, 1953, by which the suit of the plaintiff was decreed for an amount of Rs. 2000/- with costs. The only point that is now canvassed in this appeal is that the firm of the plaintiffs not having been registered as required by the provisions of the Indian Partnership Act, the suit is not maintainable and is barred by the provision of sec. 69 of the partnership Act. It is conceded on either side that the plaintiffs' firm is a partnership firm. The case of the plaintiffs is that the cause of action in this case arose before the extension of the India partnership Act to Rajasthan and his remedy is therefore, not barred by sec. 69 of the Act.
(2.) THERE is some difference of opinion among the various High courts in India. The Calcutta, patna and, Lahore High Courts are of the view that provision of sec. 69 is procedural and is therefore retrospective in its operation and sec. 74 applies to pending proceeding only and does not apply to causes of action which accrued before the coming into force of the Act and for which suits are instituted afterwards. Vide Surendra Nath De vs. Manohar De (1), Shazad Khan vs. Darbar Babu Kuchhi (2) Firm Krishen Lal Ramlal vs. Abdula Ghafur Khan (3 ). At one time the Allahabad High Court concurred with the view of the Calcutta High Court in Surendra Nath De's case. That decision is in the case of Firm, Danmal Purshotam Dass vs. Firm, Babu Ram Chhote Lal (4 ). Later on the Allahabad High Court has disapproved its earlier view and in the case of Ram-gopal Sriniwas vs. Netram (5) followed the view expressed by the Bombay and Madras High Courts. The Bombay High Court in Revappa Nandappa Hattarki vs. Babu Sidappa Erandole (6) and the Madras High Court in S. Girdharilal Son and Co. vs. B. Kappini Gowder (7) have held firstly, that the provision of sec. 69 cannot considered to be one of mere procedure and that the provision of sec. 74 could save causes of action which accrued before the coming into force of the Act and its scope was not limited to pending proceedings only. The same view has been accepted in Firm, Narmada Ginning and press Factory Co. vs. Kastoormal Deokaran (8), Syed Faqir Hussain vs. Chandra Bai (g), Hiralal Gulabchand Shop; Bhusawal vs. Amarchand Kisanlal Shop (10) and Soonoiram Ramniranjandas vs. Junjila (11 ). No decision of the Court has been cited at the Bar on this point. Sec. 69 (2) cannot be considered to be a provision merely of procedure as discussed by Varadachariar J. in S. Girdharilal Son and Co's case. The reason for the said provision was to put a pressure on the partnership firms to get them registered and placing of such pressure can by no stretch of imagination be registered as a matter of procedure only. In case the provision of sec. 69 (2) is applied retrospectively on the ground that it is merely a procedural provision, it would lead to a great anomaly. Under sec. 58 and 59 of the Act, only firms that are carrying on partnership business can be registered. No firms that have closed their business can be registered under those sections. There may be cases of firms that may have been dissolved just before the commencement of the Act or during one year's period thereafter and there may be outstandings of such firms against third persons. In such cases the remedy of bringing suits for the outstandings would be barred if sec. 69 (2) is held to be retrospective in its operation. It cannot be conceived that the legislature may have intended to take away the rights of such firms to institute legal proceedings. I am, therefore, inclined to hold that the provision of sec. 69 (2) is not retrospective in operation. The relevant provision of sec. 74 is, as follows: - 's. 74': - "nothing in this Act or any repeal effected thereby shall affect or be deemed to affect: - (a) any right title, interest, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred before the commencement of this Act, or (b) any legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right,title, interest obligation or liability, or anything done or suffered before the commencement of this, or (c) anything done or suffered before the commencement of this Act, or Bennet, J. in Firm Danmal Parshotam Dass' case (4) took the view that the provision of Sec. 74 (b) was confined to the Pending proceedings only and did not extend to cases instituted after the commencement of the Act. Sulaiman C. J. however, doubted the correctness of this view. There being no limiting words in the language of sec. 74 to restrict the scope of Sec. 74 (b), it does not seem fair to, give it a restricted meaning. The language as used is wide enough to save pending proceedings and also proceedings instituted after the commencement of the Act provided right to sue had accrued before the Act came into force. There is much force in the arguments contained in the judgment of Varadachariar J. that the word "remedy" appearing in sec. 74 (b) cannot be interpreted as if it were qualified by the adjective 'pending' and the intention of the legislature must have been to save the causes of action that had accrued before the commencement of the Act even though suits in such cases may have been filed afterwards. The conclusion, therefore, that the cause of action in the present case having arisen before the Indian Partnership Act was extended to Rajasthan, the suit of the plaintiff cannot be considered to be barred by the provision of Sec. 69 (2 ). The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The learned counsel for the appellant prays for leave to appeal under Sec. 18 (2) of the High Court Ordinance. As an important point of law is involved in it, the case is declared fit one for appeal, and leave to appeal is, therefore, granted. .;