Banpa, J. - (1.) THIS is a revision by the defendants in a Small Cause Suit.
(2.) THIS facts of the case are that a registered agreement took place between the plaintiff Abdullah Mian and the defendants Nasiruddin and Haji Gaind Mohammed on 26. 7. 48, by which it was agreed that a particular house of the defendants be leased to Abdullah Mian for a period of five years for the purpose of a factory. It was agreed that after the expiry of the said period, the tenant would hand over the house in as good a condition as it was taken. On the next day, that is 27th July 1948, the tenant deposited Rs. 420/- with the landlord as a security for the due fulfilment of the stipulation to do all repairs which may be necessary at the termination of the lease, and that if the tenant did not do so, the landlords would be entitled to do it and deduct the cost out of the said deposit, and hand over the balance to the tenant. Some time after this the landlords instituted a suit on 24th August, 1949, for recovery of rent from Abdullah Mian for a period of one year on the allegation that the tenant had failed to pay the rent from the date of his occupation ion 26th July, 1948. They gave a credit for Rs. 420/- and sued for the balance of the amount. The tenant took a plea that although the rent-note was executed and registered, the landlord did not hand over possession of the house, and therefore, no rent was due. The trial court decreed the suit, but on appeal the learned, District Judge by judgment dated 6th November, 1951, upheld the defence and dismissed the suit. The same judgment was upheld on second appeal to this Court by decision in Civil Second Appeal No. 41 of 1951 dated 4th October, 1954. The tenant, through his lawyer, gave notice to the landlord on 16th November, 1951, calling upon the landlords:, to pay damages for non-delivery of possession to the tune of Rs. 18,000/- and also to return Rs. 420/-given on deposit as a security for fulfilment of one of the terms of the lease. The same notice called upon the landlords to even then hand over possession of the leased premises within 48 hours, in default whereof further damages would be claimed at the rate of Rs. 700/-p. m. The landlords gave a reply to the lawyer on 4th December, 1951, that no reply Was necessary as the notice purported to be on behalf of Abdullah Mian son of Rahim Baksh, while the contract of lease was made with Abdullah Mian son of Khuda Baksh. It appears that in mentioning the name of the client, the learned lawyer had made a mistake. The tenant was Abdullah Mian son of Khuda Baksh, and it was on his behalf that notice was intended to be served on the landlords. A second notice was served by the lawyer for the tenant, in which the latter was correctly described as Abdullah Mian son of Haji Khuda Baksh, calling upon the landlords to pay damages to the tune of Rs. 30,000/ -. THIS notice was dated 22nd November, 1954. A reply was given by the landlords that the tenant had got into possession, and was liable to pay rent upto 26th December, 1954, to the tune of Rs. 4,970/-, and it was also intimated that the amount of Rs. 420/- was paid towards rent, and had been so adjusted. The tenant filed the present suit on 22nd March, 1955, for recovery of Rs. 420/- on the ground that the landlords had never handed over possession of the leased premises to the tenant, and the amount was refundable to the tenant. The landlords reiterated their previous pleas that possession had been handed over to the tenant, and he had failed to pay the rent, and that the amount was not refundable. A plea of limitation was also raised. The learned Judge, Small Cause Court, held that the plea of the defendants about the possession being handed over to the tenant had been decided against him in the former suit, and was barred on the principle of res-judicata. He accordingly framed an issue of limitation, and appeal Art, 145 of the Limitation Act, and held the suit within limitation. The suit was accordingly decreed. The defendants have filed this revision, and it is urged on their behalf that Art. 145 of the Limitation Act was not applicable to a suit of this nature. Various Articles of the Limitation Act, viz. 49, 97, 120 and 145, were canvassed during the course of arguments, and various decisions were cited in support of the one or the other view. In my opinion, the correct Article applicable to a suit in the circumstances of this case would be Art. 120. The lower court has applied Art. 145 relying on a decision of the Madras High Court, in Ahilyamba and Chetram Devasthanam vs. R. Subramania Ayyar (1 ). While I agree that the words "movable property" in Art. 145 may include money also, the point for distinction is that under Art. 145 the period starts from the date of deposit or pawn. The money, which was handed over, was a security for the due fulfilment of certain stipulations in the agreement of lease. The cause of action for return of the money would only arise if at the end of the lease the undertaking made by the lessee was fulfilled. It would be a curious state of affairs, if limitation would start without the accrual of the cause of action. To make the position clear, suppose that the lease was for 35 years. If Article 145 would be applicable the claim would become barred even before the expiry of the lease. The view taken by me finds support in Ram Ranbijay Prasad Singh vs. Mt. Bachia Kuari (2 ). Art. 49 was Canvassed on behalf of the defendants, and it was urged that the wrongful, detention began when the demand was made on 16th November, 1951, for repayment of the amount, and the landlords did not comply. It was urged that if this Article was applicable, the suit was barred by time. Art. 49 refers to a claim for other specific movable property. Specific coins or specific currency notes were not required to be returned. Art. 49 is not applicable. It may be mentioned in passing that if money be taken to be included within the meaning of specific movable property, the wrongful detention could only be said to have started at the expiry of the period of the lease. None of the parties* had ever tried to repudiate the contract. As appears from the previous judgment of the High Court, the lessee was offered, possession of the whole house minus a small portion thereof occupied-by somebody else. The tenant insisted on having the whole house, and so the possession was not delivered. The landlords, however, considered that the possession had been sufficiently offered to the tenant, and he had become responsible for the rent. Again, while the tenant maintained that the possession had not been delivered to him, he was willing to get into possession as mentioned in his notice of 16th Nov. 1951, if the landlords could give, possession. The damages claimed in the notice of 16th November, 1951, were for a prior period and not for future also. The sum of Rs. 420/-was deposited with the landlords as a security for undertaking repairs at the close of the period of lease. The unlawful detention, if any, only arose on 26th July, 1953, on which date the period of the lease expired, because if the tenant was put in possession at any period, he had to fulfil the undertaking to leave it at end of the period of five years in as good a condition as the house was given to him. However, as discussed above, Art. 49, in my opinion was not applicable to a case of this nature. The other Article canvassed was 97. This 'article also, in my opinion, is not applicable, for, the money was not paid for any existing consideration, but for fulfilment of a promises in future. In any other view of the case, the consideration only failed when the tenant was not handed over possession till the last date of the expiry of the lease. It may be mentioned that at no time the tenant said that he had put an end to the contract, because the landlords had failed to give possession, nor did the landlords say that they had put an end to. the contract, because the tenant had not occupied the premises or had not paid the rent. The landlords had, on the other hand, sued for the recovery of rent, and had been insisting that the relationship of landlord and tenant continued to exist between the parties. There is no other specific Article which is applicable to a case of this nature. I am, therefore, of opinion that the correct Article applicable to the present case was 120. I am supported in this opinion by a few decisions of the Indian High Courts, namely, Upendralal Mukhopadhya vs. The Collector of Rajshahye (3) & Sakhawat All vs. Thakur Baldeo Sahai (4 ). Applying Art. 120, the suit is within limitation, whether the cause of action may be said to arise on 16th November 1951, or 26th July, 1953. There is no force in this revision. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. . ;