Wanchoo, C.J. - (1.) THIS is an application by Bal Singh under Art. 226 of the Constitution against the order of the Special Board of Revenue in a matter relating to certain land in the former State of Alwar.
(2.) WE may briefly narrate the facts which have led to this application. The applicants were Jagirdars in village Patan-ka-Bas. Ramchandar and Rampal (now dead and represented by his sons Budha and Shukla) were the tenants of the applicants. The applicants gave notice to them under sec. 180 of the Alwar State Revenue Code for ejectment in 1943. Thereupon, Rampal and Ramchandar filed a suit under sec. 181 of the same Code to contest their liability to ejectment. Their case was that they were not liable to ejectment because they became occupancy tenants as provided under sec. 135 of the Code. The trial court held that sec. 135 did not apply and Ramchandar and Rampal were liable to ejectment. There was then an appeal by Ramchandar and Rampal which was allowed and their suit contesting their liability to ejectment was decreed. Then there was a second appeal by the present applicants to the Revenue Minister. That second appeal was allowed and the decree of the Collector was set aside and the suit was dismissed It appears that Rampal and Ramchandar were dispossessed after this decree of the Revenue Minister. Rampal and Ramchandar filed an appeal before the Executive Council of the former State of Alwar in February, 1945. That appeal was not disposed of till the former State of Alwar merged into the Matsya Union. It appears that there was no provision in the Matsya Union for the disposal of such appeals and nothing was done with respect to this appeal Then came the merger of the Matsya Union in the present State of Rajas than in 1949. Eventually, the appeal was put up for hearing before the Special Board of Revenue created under the Rajasthan Appeals and Petitions (Discontinuance) Ordinance (No. XL of 1949) (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance). The learned members of the Board were of the view that no appeal lay to the Executive Council; but as a revision lay, they treated the appeal as a revision. They came to the conclusion that the tenants had acquired occupancy rights under sec. 135 of the Alwar Revenue Code and therefore, could not be ejected. Consequently, the revision was allowed and the order of the Revenue Minister of the former State of Alwar set aside. The present application is against this order of the Special Board of Revenue. The main contentions of the applicants are twofold. In the first place it is urged that the Special Board of Revenue had no jurisdiction to hear this appeal as a revision. In the second place, their submission is that the view of the law as to the accrual of occupancy tenancy taken by the Special Board of Revenue is patently wrong and this Court should, therefore, correct it by a writ of certiorari. We have come to the conclusion that the first point namely that the Special Board of Revenue had no jurisdiction to hear this appeal even as a revision, is correct and must succeed. We, therefore, do not think it necessary to decide the second point in the present case. The Special Board of Revenue which heard this appeal as a revision, was created under Ordinance No. XL of 1949. Sec. 4 of the Ordinance provides for hearing of appeals, revisions, references or petitions of the nature described in sec. 3 by a Special Board of Revenue if they relate to judicial revenue matters. Sec. 3 provides for discontinuance of appeals etc. to the Ruler and it is only such appeals as are discontinued under sec. 3 which can be heard under sec, 4 provided they were pending on the date the Ordinance came into force. Now the relevant portion of sec. 3 is in these terms: - "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Rajasthan Administration Ordinance, 1949, or in any law for the time being in force in any covenanting State, no appeal, revision, reference or petition, which according to such law lies to the Ruler and is preferred, brought, made or presented to the Ruler or to any authority known by the designation of Ijlas-i-Khas or Judicial Committee or by any other designation shall so lie or be so preferred, brought, made or presented after the commencement of this Ordinance." Now this section provides for discontinuance of appeals etc. which lay to the Ruler and therefore only those appeals which lay to the Ruler and which were pending on the date this Ordinance came into force could be heard under sec. 4. The question, therefore, which immediately arises is, whether an appeal or a revision to the Executive Council of the former State of Alwar can be said to be an appeal or revision which lay to the Ruler. The Executive Council was created by a notification of Shri Rajendra Shasan dated the 21st of February, 1941 published in the Alwar State Gazette Extraordinary of the 27th of February, 1941, by the Ruler of the former State of Alwar. It consisted of six members, namely, a Vice President, a Senior Member and four other members. By an earlier notification of the 14th of February, 1941 published in the Alwar State Gazette Extra-ordinary of the 26th of February, 1941, the Ruler made himself the President of the Executive Council. There was also a provision in this notification for hearing of appeals etc. by the Executive Council. It is however, clear from a perusal of these two notifications that the Executive Council in the former State of Alwar was something different from the Ruler and the Ruler seems to have been designated by the name Shri Rajendra Shasan. There are other provisions in these notifications which provide for appeals from the Executive Council in certain matters to Shri Rajendra Shasan. We have, therefore, no doubt that the Executive Council of the former State of Alwar was not the same as the Ruler, though the Ruler was its President. An appeal or revision to the Ruler in the former State of Alwar was an appeal or revision which according to the notifications lay to Shri Rajendra Shasan. Therefore, under sec. 3 of the Ordinance, an appeal lying to Shri Rajendra Shasan in the former State of Alwar, would be an appeal to the Ruler and it is only these appeals which lay to Shri Rajendra Shasan in the former State of Alwar and which were pending on the date the Ordinance came into force, which could be heard under sec. 4. The present appeal assuming that it could be treated as a revision lay not to Shri Rajendra Shasan or the Ruler but to the Executive Council of the former State of Alwar. In these circumstances this appeal could not be heard by the Special Board of Revenue under Ordinance No. XL of 1949. It is enough to say that if there are many such appeals, the State Government may have to consider the passing of law for hearing of such appeals. Till such law is passed, these appeals or revisions must remain pending. We, therefore set aside the order of the Special Board of Revenue dated the 1st of October, 1956. This means that the order of the Revenue Minister will stand till such time as a law is passed; providing the forum for hearing this matter. As this particular point was not taken in the application, we pass no order as to costs of this Court.;