Wanchoo, C. J. - (1.) THIS is an appeal by Bansilal and twelve others under sec. 18 (1) of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance (No. XV of 1949) against the judgment of a learned Single Judge in an appeal in an election matter under sec. 19 (2) of Municipal Act.
(2.) THE appellants had brought an election petition against the election of Manohar Lal respondent to the Municipal Board of Chittorgarh from Ward No. 10. We do not think it necessary to set down in detail the case put forward in the election petition, for though the District Judge framed as many as nine issues, he decided only one issue relating to the rejection of the nomination paper of Ramchandra. We, therefore, propose to mention only those facts which are relevant so far as only the rejection of Ramchan-dra's nomination paper on the 15th of November 1955. This nomination paper was rejected on the 18th of November 1955 It appears that there was no objection by anyone under rulel7 (l) of the Rajasthan Town Municipal Election Rules, 1951 (hereinafter called the Rules ). It also appears that it was the Returning Officer himself who rejected the no mination paper under rule 17 (2) of the Rules. THE case of the appellants with respect to this was in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of their election petition. THEy said in these paragraphs that Ramchandra, who was one of the respondents in the petition, had filed a nomination paper for election from Ward No. 10 which was rejected by Returning Officer on the 18th November 1955. THEy went on to say that the Returning Officer made a mistake in rejecting the nomination paper of Ramchandra as there was no legal defect in it and that the difference in the signature of Ramchandra by the addition of the word "kabra" did not make the nomination paper invalid and liable to rejection. THE reply of Manohar Lal to these paragraphs was that he admitted that Ramchandra had filed a nomination paper for elect ion from Ward No. 10. He, however, said that this nomination paper was properly rejected on the date of scrutiny as it had not been properly filled in and also because an addition was made and no addition or alteration was allowed in the nomination paper under the Rules. THEse allegations and counter allegations would show that there was no question raised by anybody about the identity of Ramchandra Kabra who had filed the nomination paper on the 15th of November 1955 with the person entered at No. 342 of the electoral roll. Though the District Judge framed as many as nine issues in the case, no issue was framed as to whether Ramchandra Kabra, who filed the nomination paper on the 15th of November 1955,was the person entered at No. 342 of the electoral roll of Ward No. 10. This was because the point was never raised by the parties before the District Judge. The only issue, which was framed in this connection, was this - "did the Returing Officer make a mistake in rejecting the nomination paper of respondent No. 4 (i. e. Ramchandra) and did this materially affect the result of the election. " The District Judge came to the conclusion that the Returning Officer was wrong in rejecting the nomination paper of Ramchandra merely because of a difference in the signature where the word "kabra" was added, while in the entry in the electoral roll at No. 342 of Ward No. 10 the name was only Ramchandra without the word "kabra". He relied on the well settled law relating to such matters that a nomination paper should not be rejected on the ground of unsubstantial irregularity. He was also of opinion that if the Returning Officer had any doubt about the identity of the person filing the nomination he should have made an enquiry about it and then only he could reject the nomination paper, As the Returning Officer did not make any inquiry in this connection, the District Judge held that he could not reject the nomination paper. Finally he held that the rejection of the nomination paper resulting in depriving Ram Chandra Kabra of his right to stand for election materially affected the result. He, therefore, set aside the election of Manoharlal from Ward No. 10. Manoharlal came in appeal to this Court and his appeal was heard by a learned Single Judge. The learned Judge agreed with the view of the District Judge that a nomination piper should not be rejected on a mere technicality and the wrong rejection of a nomination paper amounts to a material irregularity sufficient to vitiate the election The learned Judge was, however, of opinion that it was the duty of the appellants to prove in their election petition that Ramchandra Kabra, who filed the nomination paper was the same person who was entered at No. 342 of the electoral roll in Ward No. 10 and that as Bansilal and others had failed to prove this, the District Judge could not assume that Ramchandra Kabra was the same person and therefore, could not set aside the election. Thereupon the present appeal was filed by Bansilal and others who are aggrieved by this order of the learned Single Judge. Before we deal with the merits of the case, we should like to dispose of briefly two preliminary objections that have been raised. They are: - (1) That no appeal lies against the order of the learned Single Judge. (2) That, in any case, this appeal is time-barred, even if one lies. We are of opinion that there is no force in either of these contentions and our reasons follow. Let us take the point that no appeal lies. All that learned counsel has been able to submit before us in this connection is that under sec. 19 (2) of the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act (No. XXIII of 1951) there is only one appeal from the District Judge to the High Court on a question of law and that there is no further appeal provided in that section. It is enough to say that that section has nothing to do with an appeal of this kind before us. This appeal arises out of the provisions of sec. 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance (No. XV of 1949) and is similar to a Letters Patent appeal in High Courts of former British India. Sec. 19 (2) of the Municipalities Act (No. XXIII of 1951) provides for an appeal to the High Court. That appeal under the Rules of this Court is heard by a Single Judge Sec. 18 (1) of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance is a special provision which allows an appeal from the decision of a Single Judge of this Court to the High Court. There is nothing in sec. 19 of the Municipalities Act (No. XXIII of 1951) which can control that provision. We are, therefore, of opinion that where an election appeal under sec. 19 (2) of the Municipal Act is heard by a Single Judge of this Court, an appeal will lie to the High Court sec. 18 (1) of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance (No. XV of 1949 ). The matter would be different if the appeal were heard by a Division Bench, for in that case sec. 18 (1) of the High Court Ordinance will not apply. As to limitation, learned counsel for Manoharlal again refers to sec. 19 (2) of the Municipalities Act. That provides 30 days limitation for an appeal from the District Judge to the High Court. That has again nothing to do with the limitation for an appeal of this kind. The law as to limitation for an appeal of this kind is contained in Rule 134 of the High Court Rules. These appeals are called special appeals in the rule and the period of limitation provided is 60 day. Sec. 18 of the High Court Ordinance has two sub-sections; under both of them appeals from the judgment of a learned Single Judge lie to the High Court. Rule 134 of the Rules of this Court applies to appeals under both sub-sections and the limitation provided is 60 days. It is not disputed that if the limitation is 60 days, this is within limitation. Rule 134, in our opinion, clearly applies to an appeal whether it be under sec. 13 (1) or 18 (2) of the High Court Ordinance and the period of limitation in either case is 60 days. We, therefore, overrule both the preliminary points. There is one more matter which we may also decide before we come to the merits of the case. That matter was raised before the learned Single Judge by learned counsel for Manoharlal and was turned down by him. Learned counsel for Manoharlal has again raised the same point before us. His contention is that the election petition was not properly presented inasmuch as it was presented to the Munsarim of the District Judge and not personally to the District Judge himself. Reliance in this connection was placed on Brijmohan Dixit vs. Gobardhan (1 ). It is enough to say that we agree with the learned Single Judge that Brijmohan's case was decided on its peculiar facts because of the language of Order 47 Rules 1 and 2 C. P. C. Let us look at what sec. 19 (1) provides in this matter. That lays down that any ten voters or any candidate who stood for election may apply to the Judge having jurisdiction over the district within which the election has been held for the determination of the validity of the election. The election petition has to be made therefore to the Judge having jurisdiction over the district. This, in our opinion, is nothing more than laying down that the election petition shall be filed in the court of the District Judge having jurisdiction in the area in which the election is held. We are not prepared to hold that these words in sec. 19 (1) of the Municipalities Act mean that the election petition must be Presented to the Judge himself. It is enough in our opinion if it is presented to the officer who normally accepts petitions relating to his court. We are, therefore, of opinion that there was no irregularity whatsoever in the presentation of the petition in this case to the Munsarim of the Judge having jurisdiction over the district within which the election was held. Lastly we come to the merits of the case. We have already pointed out that no dispute as to the identity of Ramchandra Kabra with the person entered at No. 342 of the Electoral roll of Ward No. 10 was ever raised either before the Returning Officer or before the District Judge We have also pointed out that no objection under R. 17 (1) of the Rules was ever made by anyone before the Returning Officer. The Returning Officer therefore, when he rejected the nomination paper of Ramchandra Kabra was acting under Rule 17 (2) which is as follows: - "the Returning Officer may on his own motion reject an application if such application is: - (i) not in the prescribed form, or (ii) does not contain all the information required to be furnished by the form prescribed in Schedule I, or (iii) if the information so furnished is found incorrect". Now it is nobody's case that the nomination paper in this case was not in the prescribed form or did not contain all the information required to be furnished by the form prescribed in Schedule I. Therefore the Returning Officer could not reject this nomination paper on the first two grounds mentioned in Rule 17 (2 ). Learned counsel for Manoharlal has argued that in fact the Returning Officer rejected the nomination paper on the third ground, namely that the information so furnished was found incorrect.
(3.) NOW let us look at the nomination paper and the reasons for its rejection. The nomination paper is this: - FORM OF APPLICATION FOR CANDIDATE Name of ward from which the candidate intends to stand for election; Ward No. Ten (10 ). Name of candidate Ramchandra Father's name Prithviraj Age 50 Address C/o Dalichand Parthivraj Chhittorgarh. Number of the candidate in the electoral roll: 342 in ward No. Ten (10 ). Date 15th November, 1955, Sd/- RAMCHANDRA KABRA, Signature of candidate. DECLARATION BY THE CANDIDATE I hereby declare that the information furnished above is true and that I possess all the qualifications necessary for election to the Municipal Board and that I am not subject to any disquali-fications specified in the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act, 1951 or the rule framed thereunder to be a candidate. Date 15th November, 1955. Sd/- RAMCHANDRA KABRA, Signature of candidate. The declaration made by Ramchandra Kabra was to the effect that information furnished by him was true. Part of the information was that his number in the election roll was 342 in Ward No. 10. Now the Returning Officer could only reject this nomination paper on the third ground contained in rule 17 (2) if the information so furnished was found by him to be incorrect. The order of the Returning Officer is, however this: "ramchandra has written as Ramchandra Kabra, whereas with this insertion (?) name does not appear in the roll. Hence the application is rejected. " Now reading this order as it stands, there is nothing in it to show that the Returning Officer was of opinion that any part of the information furnished in the nomination paper was incorrect. All that he says in this order is that Ramchandra has signed (we presume that was what he meant when he used the word "written") as Ramchandra Kabra, while the name entered in the roll was Ramchandra. Merely because of this difference between the signature and the name in the roll, the Returning Officer said that he was rejecting the nomination paper. He does not say anywhere that he found the information incorrect, namely that Ram Chandra Kabra who filed the nomination paper and who declared that he was the person entered at No. 342 in Ward No. 10 was not that person. We have already said that at no stage either before the Returning Officer or before the District Judge was the identity ever questioned. We would have agreed with the learned Single Judge that it was the duty of the appellants to prove the identity of Ramchandra Kabra with the person entered at No. 342 of Ward No. 10 if there was the slightest indication in the order of the Returning Officer that the identity was doubted, or if anybody had made any objection under rule 17 (1) about the identity of Ramchandra Kabra. The conclusion, therefore, which we arrive at, is that the Returning Officer could not on his own motion reject this nomination paper under Rule 17 (2) because none of the three conditions mentioned therein were satisfied. This nomination paper was on the prescribed form. It contained all the information required to be furnished by the form prescribed in Schedule I and the Returning Officer did not find that any part of the information was incorrect. His only reason for rejecting the nomination paper was that slight difference in the signature. That is why in the election petition the appellants came forward with the allegation that that slight difference in the signature was unsubstantial irregularity which should have made no difference. Manoharlal, on the other hand, contended that that difference was substantial and the Returning Officer rightly rejected the nomination paper. But nobody ever challenged the identity of Ramchandra Kabra who filed the nomination piper and declared that he was entered at No. 342 of the electoral roll of Ward No. 10. If the Returning Officer had said in his order that this part of the information was incorrect, namely that Ramchandra Kabra was not the person entered at No. 342 of Ward No. 10, it would have become the duty of the appellants to prove it. But the Returning Officer never said so. On the face of this nomination paper he could hardly say so. We are not unmindful of the fact that there may be cases where a Returning Officer can say on the face of the nomination paper. For example if the name entered in the electoral roll is say Ramchandra Kalla and the person who signs the nomination paper signs as Ram Chandra Kabra, any person who is familiar with things as they are in this part of Rajas-than would immediately know that Ramchandra Kalla and Ramchandra Kabra cannot be the same person. But where the name entered in the roll is merely Ramchandra without the caste appellation and a person signs himself as Ramchandra Kabra, merely because he adds his caste, that does not mean that he is not the person entered in the electoral roll when he solemnly declares as required in the declaration that he is the person. In any case, even if the Returning Officer is so perverse as to hold that he is not the person without any objection by anybody, the Returning Officer should say so specifically. Where, as in this case, the Returning Officer does not even say so and all that the order of rejection shows is that he is rejecting the nomination paper because of the slight difference in the signature, without any doubt being cast on the identity, it was not, in our opinion, necessary for the appellants to prove the identity of Ramchandra before the District Judge. The identity, in our opinion, stood proved by the declaration made in the nomination paper which came to be considered by the District Judge, unless either the order of the Returning Officer showed that that information was incorrect or Manohar Lal showed in evidence before the District Judge that that declaration was incorrect. So long as that has not been done, the declaration must hold field and it was not necessary for the appellants to prove the identity of Ramchandra. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and hold that the nomination paper of Ramchandra Kabra was wrongly rejected. This materially affected the result of the election. We therefore set aside the election of Manoharlal and order that a bye-election should take place as soon as possible. In view of the fact that this point on the basis of which the appellants have succeeded in this case was not specifically put either before the District Judge or before the learned Single Judge, we order parties to bear own costs throughout. ;