- (1.) THIS is an application in revision by the defendants against a decree of the Civil Judge, Ganganagar acting as a Tribunal under the Displaced Persons (Debt Adjustment) Act 1951 (hereinafter called the Act) passed on the application of Girdharilal plaintiff.
(2.) THE facts which have been proved from the evidence on record are these. Girdharilal plaintiff used to carry on business before partition in Mandi Chistion in the Bahawalpur State,which is now in Pakistan under the name and style,tarasingh Girdharilal, THE defendants Heerasingh and his three sons Jagguram,munsiram and Bhagwandas constituted a joint Hindu family firm which carried on business in Mandi Chistion under the name Heerasingh Jagguram. THE plaintiff and the defendants migrated to India after partition and settled in Ganganagar. THE parties had money dealings since Asoj badi 8 Svt. 2000. Girdharilal used to advance money to the defendants from time to time and the latter made payments from time to time. Accounting took place between the parties on Magh badi 6 Svt. 2002 corresponding to 18. 1. 46 and a sum of Rs. 979/-/3 was found due against the defendants. An entry was made about this balance in the Khata of the defendants by Munsiram which was signed by Heerasingh defendant. A fresh Khata for Rs 979/-/3 was opened on the same day and various writings were made about it both by Munsiram and by Heerasingh in which it was mentioned that they had understood the accounts and found this sum to be due against them. THE application under sec. 10 of the Act was made on 17. 12. 52. It was not mentioned in the application as required under Order 7 Rule 6 C. P. C. as to how the claim was within time. THE defendants resisted the claim interalia on the ground that it was barred by limitation. THE Tribunal passed a decree against them but it was not mentioned in the judgment as to how the claim was within limitation. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties I am satisfied that it is barred by limitation. Accounting took place on 18. 1. 46. The claim became time barred on 19. 1. 49 in the ordinary course. But before it became time barred the Displaced Persons (Institution of Suits) Act, 1948 came into force on 4. 9. 48. Sec. 2 of the Act provided that it would remain in force for a period of three years. Sec. 3 ran as follows: - "notwithstanding anything contained in sec. 3 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908), or any special or local law, any suit instituted in pursuance of sec. 4 of this Act may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor when the plaintiff satisfies the Court that he was unable to institute the suit within such period owing to causes connected with his being a displaced person. " It was neither alleged in the application under sec. 10 by the plaintiff nor did he produce any evidence at the trial to show that he was unable to file the application within the ordinary period of limitation that is by 18. 1. 49 owing to causes connected with his being a displaced person, The mere fact that the plaintiff was a displaced person was not sufficient under sec. 8 of the Act of 1948 to extend limitation upto 4. 9. 51. The claim of the plaintiff therefore became time barred on 19. 1. 49 inspite of the coming into force of the Displaced Persons (Institution of Suits) Act, 1948 on 4. 9. 48. The Displaced Persons (Institution of Suits and Legal Proceedings) Amendment Act,1950 came into force on 8. 12. 50. Under sec. 3 of the Act the duration of the Act of 1948 was extended upto 31st March 1958. Sec. 8 of this Act relating to the extension of period of limitation ran as follows:- - "extension of period of limitation. Notwithstanding anything contained in sec. 3 of the Indian Limitation Act. 1908 (IX of 1908), or in any special or local law, any suit or other legal proceeding by a displaced person - (a) where such suit or other legal proceedding instituted in pursuance of sec. 4 and the period of limitation expires or has expired on or after the 14th day of August 1947, or (b) where such suit or other legal proceeding is instituted otherwise than in pursuance of Sec. 4 in respect of cause of action which arises or has arisen in a place now situate within the territories of Pakistan and the period of limitation expires after the commencement of Displaced Persons (Institution of Suits & Legal Proceedings) Amnd. Act, 1950, may be instituted at any time before the date of expiry of this Act. " It will be seen that under the provisions of the Act of 1950 a suit could be instituted by the plaintiff upto 31. 3. 52 even without showing that he had sufficient causes for not bringing it within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act. But there is nothing in this Act to show that causes of action which had become time barred could be revived under it. This Act was therefore unable to revive the claim of the plaintiff which had become time barred on 19. 1. 49. Only such suits as had not already become time barred on the date on which this Act of 1950 came into force could be instituted upto 31. 3. 52 under its provisions Then came the Act of 1951, which came into force in the State of Rajasthan on 20. 12. 1951. The provision relating to extension of period of limitation is contained in sec. 36 (a) which runs as follows: - "extension of period of limitation. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908) or in any special of local law or any agreement - any suit or other legal proceeding in respect whereof the period of limitation was extended by sec. 8 of the Displaced Persons (Institution of Suits) Act, 1948 (XLVII of 1948) may be instituted at any time within one year from the commencement of this Act. " It will be seen that the above provision is only applicable to such legal proceedings in respect whereof the period of limitation was extended by sec. 8 of the Displaced Persons (Institution of Suits) Act, 1948, namely to such cases in which the plaintiff is able to show that he had sufficient reason for not being able to bring the suit within the ordinary period of limitation. As in the present case the plaintiff has everly shown that he was unable to institute the suit within the ordinary period of limitation owing to causes connected with his being a displaced person he is unable to get the advantage of the extended period of limitation provided under sec. 36. I therefore find that the claim of the plaintiff is time barred. I accordingly allow the application and set aside the decree passed under sec. 10 of the Act of 1950. In the circumstances of the case I direct that parties shall bear their own costs. . ;