- (1.) THIS is a second appeal by the defendant Kalu in a suit for recovery of possession and compensation with respect to certain agricultural land.
(2.) THE suit was brought against the present appellant by Kajod and others in the court of the Munsiff Chittor on the 15th October, 1953. THE suit is admittedly based on title. It is common ground between the parties that there was a proceeding under sec. 145, Cr. P. C. , set in motion at the instance of Kalu against the plaintiffs respondents, as a result of which Kalu was put into possession of the suit land by an order of the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Begun, dated the 2nd June, 1953 Consequently, the respondents brought the present suit, their allegations being that they had acquired tenancy rights with respect to the suit land (which is situate in Moza Sudarshanpura bearing khasras Nos. 38/603 and 44 and 45) from Jadav Chand Bhuralal Kesrimal Kothari on Bhadva Sudi 12, Svt. 1994 (equal to sometime in 1937 A. D.) and that they had been in possession of the land ever since. THEir case further was that Kesrimal had thereafter colluded with the appellant and again sold his rights to him by a registered deed, dated the 1st April, 1952 and the appellant then tried to take forcible possession of the land but was not successful. THEn came the proceeding under sec 145 and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Begun attached the land on the 18th June, 1952, and finally by his order dated the 2nd June, 1958, put the appellant in possession on the finding that he had been in possession of the land in dispute within two months of the date of the preliminary order and directed that his possession shall not be interfered with until he was evicted therefrom in due course of law. Hence the suit out of which the present appeal has arisen. The defendant appellant resisted the suit on a number of grounds which it is unnecessary to mention for the purpose of the present appeal, as the trial proceeded on one objection only, namely, as to jurisdiction. The contention of the defendant appellant was that the Munsiff Chittor had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as it was exclusively triable by a revenue court. The Munsiff framed only one issue as to jurisdiction and eventually decided it in favour of the defendant appellant and returned the plaint for presentation to the proper court. The plaintiffs preferred an appeal to the District Judge, Pratapgarh, who transferred it to the Civil Judge Nimbaheda for disposal. The learned Civil Judge held that the suit was triable by a civil court and directed the Munsiff Chittor to proceed with the trial of the suit. The defendant has come up in appeal against the aforesaid order. The only question for determination in these circumstances is whether this suit is exclusively triable by a revenue court. As already stated, the suit was filed on the 15th October, 1953, when the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act (No. I) of 1951 was in force. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the suit clearly falls within the four corners of serial No. 12 of Group B of the First Schedule of that Act. This serial is in the following terms : S. No. Description of suit or application. Period of limitation Time for which period begins to run. 12. For recovery of possession by a person who has been wrongly ejected or for compensation or for both. 3 years When the wrongfull dispossession takes place. The learned Civil Judge does not appear to have considered this serial though some argument appears to have been raised before him as regards its applicability to the present suit and even though the Munsiff had clearly placed his reliance upon this serial. The judgment of the Civil Judge is rather confused, and he appears to have thought that the plaintiffs respondents were entitled to recover possession under sec. 8 of the Specific Relief Act. I do not quit follow what the learned Judge meant by this. But assuming that section has relevance, all that it says is that a person entitled to the possession of specific immovable property may recover it in the manner prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure. Now, if we turn to sec. 9 of the Code, it clearly lays down that the civil courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. In other words, if a suit is expressly barred from the jurisdiction of a civil court (and such an eventuality docs arise where it falls within sec. 7 of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act, 1951) it is obvious that a civil court will have no jurisdiction to try such a suit. I may also make it clear before proceeding further that it is not the contention of the respondents in the present case that their suit has been brought under sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act. The suit is clearly based on title on the allegations made in the plaint, and there is no getting away from that fact. It was also brought after six months of the alleged date of dispossession. In these circumstances, the question which emerges for consideration is whether the present suit is covered by serial No. 12 of Group B of the First Schedule of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act. I have no hesitation in saying that the serial in question fully applies to the present suit. The suit admittedly relates to agricultural land. The relief claimed in the suit is for recovery of possession, and it has been brought by a person whose case is that he has been wrongly ejected. He has also claimed compensation. In these circumstances, I do not see how the application of serial No. 12 could be resisted. Learned counsel for the respondents drew my attention in this connection to Nawalji vs. Jagji (l ). I have perused that case and do not see how it helps the respondents. I may also add here that the last mentioned case came up for consideration in a Bench case in Bhuralal vs. Thikana Badi Sadri (2) to which I was a party. It was pointed out in the latter case that the ruling in Nawalji vs. Jagji (l) should be confined to the facts and circumstances of that particular case, and that it was never intended to lay down that a suit under serial No. 12 should be by a tenant exclusively and not by a person claiming any other title, so far as the Act of 1951 is concerned. It was further held that a suit even if the plaintiff was not a tenant but claimed some other kind of title as that of an under-pro-prietor, would nevertheless fall under that serial provided his case was that he had been wrongfully ejected from his agricultural land. It is not seriously disputed, however, that the status of the appellant as well as of the respondents in the present case is anything but that of a tenant so far as the suit land is concerned though each of them seeks to claim the tenancy to the exclusion of the other. Once I arrive at the conclusion that the respondents* suit falls within the four walls of serial No. 12 of the Act of 1951, it must follow by-virtue of sec. 7 of the Act that the suit was exclusively triable by a revenue court, and that a civil court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of it. Learned counsel for the respondents then contended that the Act of 1951 stands repealed at this date and has been replaced by the Rajasthan Tenancy Act (No. III) of 1955. This Act came into force on the 15th October, 1955. The argument is that the present suit is not exclusively triable by a revenue court in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and, therefore, there will be no use holding that the suit was cognizable by a revenue court under the Act of 1951 and, therefore, the civil court should be allowed to proceed with the trial of the suit. I have carefully examined this argument and aim of opinion there is no force in it. Now, it is well-established that in order to determine whether a suit is exclusively triable by a revenue court or not, the court must look at the plaint in its substance and not merely to its outward form. The reason is obvious because if this is not done, it may be open to a party to evade the law as to exclusiveness of jurisdiction. See Chandanmal vs. Dawar (3) in this connection. I have already given the broad gist of the plaint above. The main allegation of the plaintiffs is that the fathers of plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 respectively, and plaintiffs Nos. 3 and 4 had purchased the tenancy rights with respect to the suit land from Jadavchand Bhuralal Kesrimal Kothari on Bhadva Vadi 12 Svt. 1994, and that they had got into possession of it. It is further alleged that Kesrimal thereafter executed a sale-deed on the 1st April, 1. 952, in favour of the appellant by a registered sale-deed, and the latter obviously got into possession. It is further alleged that this gave rise to a proceeding under sec. 145, Cr. P. C. and the land was attached by a criminal court on the 18th June, 1952, and that court eventually ordered that the appellant be put into possession, and, consequently, it became necessary for the plaintiffs respondents to bring the' present suit. The plaintiffs respondents have prayed for restoration of possession, and also for compensation and mesne profits, and have not prayed for any declaration as to their right of tenancy with respect to the suit land, though such declaration, to my mind, is really the foundation of the suit and is implicit by the very nature of it. As I understand the whole plaint, this is virtually a suit for declaration and possession inasmuch as the plaintiffs respondents will have to prove their title before they can recover possession back from the defendant appellant. This is, therefore, not a case where the right of the respondents as to tenancy is not in dispute but that right is a matter for determination, and it is on the establishment of that right more than anything else that the respondents would be entitled to recover possession back of the suit land from the defendant appellant. In other words, this is a case in which the plaintiffs respondents contend that the defendant is not the tenant but the former are. On this view of the case, 1 have definitely arrived at the conclusion that this case clearly falls within the four walls of sec. 88 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act of 1955. That section clearly lays down that any person claiming to be a tenant or a co-tenant may sue for a declaration that he is a tenant or for a declaration of his share in such joint tenancy. Such a suit falls within serial No. 5 of the Third Schedule of the said Act. It follows from what 1 have stated above that this suit must be held to be exclusively triable by a revenue court by virtue of sec. 207 of this Act which provides that all suit-and applications of the nature specified in the Third Schedule shall be heard and determined by a revenue court. The section also provides that no court other than a revenue court shall take cognizance of such a suit or application The explanation to this section then provides that if the cause of action is on" in respect of which relief might be granted by the revenue court, it is immate-rial that the relief asked for from the civil court is greater than, or additional to, or is not identical with, that which the revenue court could have granted The circumstance, therefore, that the plaintiffs in this case did not ask for any declaration as such as to their right to the tenancy or that they have asked for possession cannot change the real nature of the suit, and it is the revenue court only which can properly take cognizance of such a suit and not a civil court My conclusion, therefore, is that this suit was exclusively triable by a revenue court under the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act of 1951, which was in force at the time the suit was brought, and further that the sent continues to be exclusively triable by a revenue court even under the pre-sent Act which is now in force, namely, the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. I therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the order of the Civil Judge and send the case back to the Munsiff Chittor with a direction that he shall transfer it to the Assistant Collector concerned for disposal in accordance with law. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, I would leave both the parties to bear their own costs in this court. Leave for Special appeal is asked for and is refused. .;