JUDGEMENT
PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI,J. -
(1.) The petitioner has preferred this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in sum and substance, for the following reliefs:- (prayer clause of SBCWP No.6933/2016)
"a) allow the above writ petition of the petitioner.
b) Quash and set aside the impugned termination order dated 17.12.2014 (Annex.2) and impugned order dated 17.12.2015 (Annex.5);
c) Quash and set aside the impugned order no.592 dated 8.10.2014 (Annex.3);
d) Direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service and grant all consequential benefits as if he was never ordered to be terminated from his service;
e) Any other appropriate writ, order or direction which this Hon'ble Court may deem just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may kindly be passed in favour of the petitioner.
f) Writ petition filed by the petitioner may kindly be allowed with costs."
(2.) The petitioners were appointed as Conductor and while they were continuing their services with Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (RSRTC) on probation, their services were terminated by stigmatic order on the allegation that they did collect fare lawfully from the passengers. It was argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that the respondents without conducting proper enquiry under the Rules penalized them and terminated services of the petitioners, which is arbitrary, illegal and colourable exercise of power.
(3.) Since the matters involve common questions of facts and law and thus, all the writ petitions are being decided together by this single order. For the sake of brevity, the dates of the respective orders terminating the petitioners' probationary services is mentioned below:-
1. SBCWP No.6933/2016
Shrawan Kumar
- termination order dated 17.12.2014 (Annex.2)
2. SBCWP No.7189/2017
Abid Mohammad
- termination order dated 5.11.2014 (Annex.3)
3. SBCWP No.14010/2016
Ramesh Kumar Choudhary
- Termination order order dated 20.1.2015 (Annex.4)
S4. SBCWP No.14011/2016
Hari Ram
- Termination order order dated 27.1.2015 (Annex.2)
5. SBCWP No.5485/2017
Tarachand
- Termination order order dated 01.12.2014 (Annex.3)
6. SBCWP No.3223/2017
Dinesh Rajpurohit
- Termination order order dated 25.11.2014 (Annex.4) To substantiate his arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the precedent law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State Bank of India & Ors. v. Palak Modi & Anr., reported in (2013) 3 SCC 607; the relevant portion whereof reads as under :
"44. The proposition laid down in none of the five judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Appellants is of any assistance to their cause, which were decided on their own facts. We may also add that the abstract proposition laid down in paragraph 29 of the judgment in Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences (supra) is only contrary to the Constitution Bench judgment in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab (supra), but large number of other judgments -
State of Bihar v. Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra (supra), Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha (supra) and Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India (supra) to which reference has been made by us and to which attention of the two-Judge Bench does appear to have been drawn. Therefore, the said proposition must be read as confined to the facts of that case and cannot be relied upon for taking the view that a simple order of termination of service can never be declared as punitive even though it may be founded on serious allegation of misconduct or misdemeanor on the part of the employee.
46. In the result, the appeals are dismissed. The Appellants shall reinstate the private Respondents within 15 days of the production of copy of this judgment before Respondent No. 3 and give them all consequential benefits like pay, allowances, etc. within next one month. However, it is made clear that this judgment shall preclude the competent authority from taking fresh decision in the matter of confirmation of the private Respondents after giving them effective opportunity of hearing against the allegation of use of unfair means in the test held on 27.2.2011." Counsel for the petitioners also relied upon judgment of this Court in Rajendra Kumar v. The Chairman, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Ors., reported in 2008(4) WLC page 359; relevant portion whereof reads as follows:-
"12. Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in V.P. Ahunja's case (supra) that a probationer like a temporary servant is also entitled to certain protection and his services cannot be terminated arbitrarily or punitively without complying with the principles of natural justice. In this case also, admittedly no enquiry whatsoever has been conducted in respect of the alleged charges which are mentioned in the impugned orders, therefore, the order passed by the Chief Manager, Hanumangarh is totally illegal, unconstitutional and against the principles of law.
13. In the case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra), Hon'ble the Apex Court has held that if order is punitive in nature and cast stigma, then enquiry is necessary before terminating the services of an employee. The relevant portions of the said judgment in paras 21, 26 and 31 are as follows:
21. If findings were arrived at in an enquiry as to misconduct, behind the back of the officer or without a regular departmental enquiry, the simple order of termination is to be treated as "founded" on the allegations and will be bad. But if the enquiry was held, no findings were arrived at and the employer was inclined to conduct an enquiry but, at the same time, he did want to continue the employee against whom there were complaints, it would only be a case of motive and the order would be bad. Similar is the position if the employer did want to enquire into the truth of the allegations because of delay in regular departmental proceedings or he was doubtful about securing adequate evidence. In such a circumstances, the allegations would be a motive and the foundation and the simple order of termination would be valid.
... ... ...
26 . There is, however, considerable difficulty in finding out whether in a given case where the order of termination is a simple order of termination, the words used in the order can be said to contain a "stigma". The other issue in the case before us is whether even if the words used in the order of termination are innocuous, the court can go into the words used or language employed in other orders or proceedings referred to by the employer in the order of termination.
... ... ...
Thus, it depends on the fact and circumstances of each case and the language or words employed in the order of termination of the probationer to judge whether the words employed amount to a stigma or not." Counsel for the petitioners further relied upon judgment of this Court in Hanuwant Singh v. RSRTC & Ors., (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.9242/2014, decided on 13.8.2015), relevant portion of the judgment aforesaid reads as follows :
"Heard and considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. The proposition of law as expounded in the catena of judgments cited at the bar clearly postulates that if the order of a probationary employee's termination is punitive and stigmatic and where the allegation of misconduct constitutes the foundation of the action taken, then the ultimate decision taken by the competent authority can be nullified on the ground of violation of the rules of natural justice. It was further held that in such cases, the Court can lift the veil for examining whether, in the garb of termination simplisitor, the employer had in fact punished the employee for misconduct. Considering the material available on record in its entirety and upon examining the impugned orders on the touchstone of the principles enunciated in the above judgments, this Court is in total agreement with the arguments advanced by the petitioners' counsel that the impugned orders were founded on allegations of misconduct and cannot be termed as orders of termination simplisitor.
In the background of the above discussion, the orders under challenge cannot be sustained and are liable to be quashed.
Consequently, the writ petitions deserve acceptance and are hereby allowed. The impugned orders dated 27.11.2014, 28.11.2014 and 2.12.2014, whereby the respective petitioners' probationary services were terminated, are hereby quashed and set aside. However, the respondents are given liberty to pass a fresh order in the matter if so warranted, after following the principles of natural justice and the procedure established by law.
Stay petitions are disposed of.
No order as to costs.
A copy of this order be placed in each file." The purport of the judgment so rendered as per learned counsel for the petitioners is that the decision taken by the competent court can be nullified on the ground of violation of principles of natural justices. Learned counsel for the petitioners also stated that the court can lift the veil for examining whether in the garb of termination simplicitor, the employer had in fact punished the employee for misconduct.
"Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the following judgments in support of the contention that termination of the services of a probationary employee for punitive reasons cannot be ordered without holding a mandatory inquiry as per the service Rules and Regulations and is a mandatory pre-requisite as per Article 311 of the Constitution of India:-
1. Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U.P. and Ors. AIR 2000 SC 1706
2. Ramraj Gurjar v. RSRTC and Ors. 2008 WLC (Raj.) UC 485
3. Rajendra Kumar v. The Chairman, RSRTC and Ors. 2008(4) WLC 359
4. Ashique Ali v. RSRTC Jaipur and Anr. 2009(2) RLW (Raj.) 1162
5. State Bank of India and Ors. v. Palak Modi and Anr. (2013)3 SCC 607 ;