SANDEEP MEHTA,J. - (1.) Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Public Prosecutor. Perused the material available on record.
(2.) By way of these two misc. petitions filed under Sections 482 Cr.P.C. the accused petitioner Radha Kishan seeking to challenge the order dated 14.2.2012 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No.2, Bikaner in separate revisions whereby, the revisioal court rejected the petitioner's revisions filed against the order dated 20.9.2011 passed by learned ACJM No.4, Bikaner rejecting the application of the petitioner to consolidate the trials of Complaint Cases No.388/2010 (Mohd.Rafiq Vs. Radha Kishan) and 387/2010 (Mohd.Ayub Vs. Radha Kishan).
(3.) Ex-facie, after having appreciated the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the impugned orders, it is evident that questioned complaints consolidation whereof was sought, were filed by different complainants and as such, there arises no question of consolidating the trial of the two cases with each other. The prayer made by the petitioner in his application was totally alien to the letter and spirit of Section 218 Cr.P.C. Hon'ble the Kerala High Court considered an identical controversy in the case of Sidhardhan Vs. Prasannan & Ors. reported in 2006 Cr.L.J. 2568 and held as below: "3. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner does not have a case that the two cheques in question were issued in connection with the same transaction or there was anything common between the two cases. Of course, it is true that the petitioner has alleged that respondent No. 1 is the brother-in-law of respondent No. 2. Nothing more, nothing less. The petitioner has not produced copy of the complaints in the two cases. However a perusal of the averments made in the petition before this Court will clearly show that there is nothing in common between the two cases other than that the offence alleged in the two cases happens to be one and the same and the petitioner is the accused in both cases. 4. Section 219 of the Code only postulates that when a person is accused of more offences than one of the same kind committed within the space of twelve months from the first to the last of such, offences, whether in respect of the same person or not, he may be charged with and tried at one trial for any number of them not exceeding three. The contention raised by the petitioner on the basis of the above provision, particularly in the factual matrix of this case, is wholly misconceived and untenable. The rule is that for every distinct offence there should be a separate charge, and every such charge should be tried separately (S. 218 of the Code ). It is of course true that the Magistrate may try together all or any number of charges framed against the accused, if he so desires, and also if the Magistrate is of opinion that the accused is not likely to be prejudiced by such a course of action. But that does not mean that two cases involving an offence under Section 138 of the Act which are being prosecuted by two different complainants arising from separate causes of action can be tried together, only for the reason that the accused person is the same. A complainant is the master of his prosecution. His interests and rights also have to be protected. 5. Equally untenable is the contention that the provisions contained in Section 220 of the Code are applicable in the case. What is contemplated in the above provision is a joint charge and one trial for more than one offence, if they are committed in one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction. It is inconceivable as to how the common accused in two complaints filed by two different complainants albeit alleging commission of the same offence (S. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act ), under different circumstances, can seek the benefit of Section 219 or 220 of the Code . As rightly noticed by the learned Magistrate, the complaints and their witnesses have to be examined in both the cases. The documents in the two cases have to be marked separately and for all practical purposes the merit of the two cases has to be evaluated separately. It may be true that the offence in the two cases is of the same kind. The common factor is only that the petitioner is the accused in the two cases. For that reason alone, it cannot be contended that the two complaints filed by two different complainants under different set of circumstances have to be tried at one trial..." ;