S. K. SHARMA, J. - (1.) THE appellant is a limited Company having its Officer in Vishwakarma Industrial Area, Jaipur. THE State of Rajasthan acting as appropriate Government within the meaning of Section 2 (a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ``the Act'') referred the following dispute under Section 10 (1) (c) of the Act for adjudiction before the Labour Court, Jaipur:- *** A list of 67 workmen, was appended with the reference.
(2.) THE workmen through General Secretary, Small Scale Karkhana Labour Union (for short Union) filed their statement of claim, alleging that there were 135 permanent workmen, employed in the impugned industry and apart from the permanent workmen, there were certain workmen employed through the Contractor. A demand of bonus for the year 1986-87 was raised on September 25, 1987 by the Union before the employer. During the conciliation proceedings, the management suspended five active Union leaders and terminated the services of casual employees and in place of the casual employees, the work was taken from the permanent employees. The protest was raised by Union and in consequence of this protest the management terminated the services of 7 workmen without enquiry and chargesheeted 11 workmen. As per the statement of claim, the management on February 13, 1988 declared a lockout in the premises of establishment and, therefore, the Union raised a dispute in respect of unjustified and illegal lock-out before the Conciliation Officer. The Conciliation proceedings failed and consequently a failure report was sent to the State Government on March 02, 1988. After considering the said failure report the State Government while exercising the powers under Section 10-K of the Rajasthan Act. No. 14 of 1970, by a special order prohibited the strike and lock-out for one year and directed the workmen to report on duty within one week of the order. The Union was not satisfied with the Special order because their demand regarding wages for the lock-out period, bonus and termination of their workers were not referred for adjudiction and they raised protest against this. When the protest was going on, demanding the amendment in the special order, the management, without conducting an enquiry terminated the services of 135 workers and published the fact of dismissal w. e. f. May 16, 1988 in a local newspaper. That is how the matter was referred to learned labour Court under Section 10 (1) (c) of the Act. The management submitted reply to the statement of claim. The parties produced oral and documentary evidence and the learned Labour Court by its award dated November 15, 1997 held as under:- (i) Termination of 48 workers was illegal; (ii) From the date of termination till the closure of establishment, they be paid 50% of back wages. (iii) Since 9 workers had been taken back on duty, no order was passed in regard to them and as regards 13 workmen who did not appear before the Court no relief was granted.
(3.) ASSAILING the award of the learned labour Court the management filed writ petition before the learned Single Judge seeking quashing of award dated November, 15, 1997. The learned Single Judge vide order dated May 7, 1998 dismissed the writ petition thus-      " Having perused the impugned award of the labour Court, which is under challenge in this writ petition, I find no reason to interfere with it. Hence, this writ petition is dismissed. " We have heard Mr. Vinendra Agarwal learned counsel appearing for the appellant. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M. P. Mittal vs. State of Haryana (AIR 1984 SC 1888) issued direction which are beneficial to the general administration of justice, thus- (Para 6) "before parting with this case, we think it appropriate to point out that it would be beneficial to the general administration of justice if in certain cases where the High Court disposes of a writ petition in limine it does so by an order incorporating the reasons for such order. Where a case is admitted to final hearing, the judgment of the High Court disposting of the appeal almost invariably sets forth the reasons for its decision. We think it desirable that even when a writ petition is dismissed in limine the High Court should set out its reasons, however briefly, for doing so, especially in those cases where the matter in controversy is the subject of judicial examination for the first time and has not been processed earlier by an infeior judicial or quasi-judicial authority. It is of some importance that a party should know from the Court of first instance the reasons for an adverse decision received by it, for that promotes acceptance of the judgment and thereby ensures credibility and public confidence in the judicial institution. It must be remembered that the High Court exercises original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, and it is only appropriate that a petitioner whose writ petition is dismissed in limine should know what are the precise reasons for the adverse order, whether the writ petition has been rejected on the ground of laches or other preliminary ground or on the merits of the controversy, and what are the reasons of the High Court thereof. We may add that a brief statement of reasons rendered by the High Court when dismissing the writ petition in limine, is of great assistance also this Court when the judgment and order of the High Court are sought to be brought here by a petition for special leave to appeal. To sum up, we think it desirable that the High Court, when dismissing a writ petition in limine, should set forth a brief statement of the reasons for its order instead of disposing of the proceeding by the single word "dismissed. " ;