SHARMA, J. - (1.) APPELLANT was served with the charge sheet in the month of January,1993 on the ground that he remained willfully absent from duty since October 6, 1992 till March 24, 1993 and flouted the provisions of Section 11 (1) of Central Reserve Police Force Act,1949 (for short `crpf Act' ). Enquiry Officer found the charges proved and the Disciplinary Authority passed the order dated October 3, 1993 dismissing the appellant from service. The appellant against the order of dismissal preferred departmental appeal before DIG, which was dismissed on March 21, 1994. Further appeal was preferred before IG, but it was also dismissed on March 10, 1995. Assailing the said orders the appellant preferred writ petition before learned Single Judge, but the learned Single Judge also dismissed the writ petition. Against these orders that the instant action of filing instant intra Court appeal has been resorted to by the appellant.
(2.) LEARNED counsel for the appellant assailed the impugned finding from various angles and in the alternate canvassed that the punishment imposed on the appellant is disproportionate to the charges levelled against the appellant. Reliance is placed on Vijay Laxmi vs. Indian Red Cross Society [2008 (2) WLC (Raj.) 21], Ramautar Singh vs. State (1998) 9 SCC 666, Sayed Zaheer Hussain vs. Union of India (1999) 9 SCC 86, Bhagat Ram vs. State of HP (1983) 2 SCC 442 and Malkiat Singh vs. State of Punjab (1996) 7 SCC 634. We have heard rival submissions and weighed the material on record. A look at the impugned order of learned Single Judge demonstrates that the writ petition of appellant was dismissed on the ground that the medical certificate produced by him in support of his illness was found false. The question springing for our consideration in the instant appeal is as to whether the High Court while exercising the power of judicial review can interfere with the order of punishment and alter the penalty imposed by Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities? The question relating to scope of judicial review in the matter of punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority has been dealt with by the Apex Court in B. C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 749 thus:-      " 17. The next question is whether the Tribunal was justified in interfering with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Orissa vs. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra (AIR 1963 SC 779) held that having regard to the gravity of the established misconduct, the punishing authority had the power and jurisdiction to impose punishment. The penalty was not open to review by the High Court under Article 226. If the High Court reached a finding that there was some evidence to reach the conclusion, it became unassailable. The order of the Governor who had jurisdiction and unrestricted power to determine the appropriate punishment was final. The High Court had no jurisdiction to direct the Governor to review the penalty. It was further held that if the order was supported on any finding as to substantial misconduct for which punishment `can lawfully be imposed', it was not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant. The Court had no jurisdiction, if the findings prima facie make out a case of misconduct, to direct the Governor to reconsider the order of penalty. This view was reiterated in Union of India vs. Sardar Bahadur (1972) 4 SCC 618. It is true that in Bhagat Ram vs. State of H. P. (1983) 2 SCC 442, a Bench of two Judges of this Court, while holding that the High Court did not function as a Court of appeal, concluded that when the finding was utterly perverse, the High Court would always interfere with the same. In that case, the finding was that the appellant was to supervise felling of the trees which were not hammer-marked. The Government had recovered from the contractor the loss caused to it by illicit felling of trees. Under those circumstances, this Court held that the finding of guilt was perverse and unsupported by evidence. The ratio, therefore, is not an authority to conclude that in every case the Court/ Tribunal is empowered to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. In Rangaswami vs. State of T. N. [1989 Supp. (1) SCC 686] a Bench of three Judges of this Court, while considering the power to interfere with the order of punishment, held that this Court, while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, is empowered to alter or interfere with the penalty; and the Tribunal had no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority. It would be seen that this Court did not appear to have intended to lay down that in no case, the High Court/ Tribunal has the power to alter the penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the appellate authority. The controversy was again canvassed in State Bank of India case (1994) 2 SCC 537, where the Court elaborately reviewed the case-law on the scope of judicial review and powers of the Tribunal in disciplinary matters and nature of punishment. On the facts in that case, since the Appellate Authority had not adverted to the relevant facts, it was remitted to the Appellate Authority to impose appropriate punishment. 18. a review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the Appellate Authority, being fact finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/ Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/ Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/ appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. "
(3.) IN Union of INdia V. G. Ganayutham (1997) 7 SCC 463, again the Supreme Court considered the aspect of proportionality in administrative law in England and INdia and indicated as under:- (para 31) "31. The current position of proportionality in administrative law in England and INdia can be summarised as follows: (1) To Judge the validity of any administrative order or statutory discretion, normally the Wednesbury (1948)1 KB 223 test is to be applied to find out if the decision was illegal or suffered from procedural improprieties or was one which no sensible decision-maker could, on the material before him and within the framework of the law, have arrived at. The Court would consider whether relevant matters had not been taken into account or whether irrelevant matters had been taken into account or whether the action was not bona fide. The Court would also consider whether the decision was absurd or perverse. The Court would not however go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator amongst the various alternatives open to him. Nor could the Court substitute its decision to that of the administrator. This is the Wednesbury test. (2) The Court would not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illegal or suffered from procedural impropriety or was irrational - in the sense that it as in outrageous defiance of logic or moral standards. The possibility of other tests, including proportionality being brought into English administrative law in future is not ruled out. These are CCSU [1985 AC 374] principles. (3) (a) As per Bugdaycay [1987 AC 514], Brind [ (1991)1 AC 696] and Smith [ (1996)1 All ER 257] as long as the convention is not incorporated into English law, the English Courts merely exercise a secondary judgment to find out if the decision-maker could have, on the material before him, arrived at the primary judgment in the manner he has done. (3) (b) If the Convention is incorporated in England making available the principle of proportionality, then the English Courts will render primary judgment on the validity of the administrative action and find out of the restriction is disproportionate or excessive or is not based upon a fair balancing of the fundamental freedom and the need for the restriction thereupon. 4 (a) The position in our country, in administrative law, where no fundamental freedoms as aforesaid are involved, is that the Courts/ tribunals will only play a secondary role while the primary judgment as to reasonableness will remain with the executive or administrative authority. The secondary judgment of the Court is to be based on Wednesbury and CCSU principles as stated by Lord Greene and Lord Diplock respectively to find if the executive or administrative authority has reasonably arrived at his decision as the primary authority. (4) (b) Whether in the case of administrative or executive action affecting fundamental freedoms, the Courts in our country will apply the principle of `proportionality' and assume a primary role, is left open, to be decided in an appropriate case where such action is alleged to offend fundamental freedoms. It will be then necessary to decide whether the Courts will have a primary role only if the freedoms under Articles 19, 21 etc. are involved and not for Article 14. " Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Regional Manager UP SRTC vs. Hoti Lal (2003)3 SCC 605 indicated that while dealing with the quantum of punishment, reasons are required to be assigned. It was observed as under:- (Para 10) "it needs to be emphasized that the Court or tribunal while dealing with the quantum of punishment has to record reasons as to why it is felt that the punishment does not commensurate with the proved charges. As has been highlighted in several cases to which reference has been made above, the scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases in the indicated circumstances. Unfortunately, in the present case as the quoted extracts of the High Court's order would go to show, no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. (See Alexander Machinery Dudley Ltd. vs. Crabtree (1974 LCR 120) A mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice. A party appearing before a Court, as to what it is that the Court is addressing its mind. It is not only the amount involved but the mental set up, the type of duty performed and similar relevant circumstances which go into the decision making process while considering whether the punishment is proportionate or disproportionate. If the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, highest degree of integrity and trust-worthiness is must and unexceptionable. " Judged in this background, conclusions arrived at in the instant matter by the Disciplinary Authority, Appellate Authority, learned Single Judge do appear to us as proper. The appellant was serving as Constable in Central Reserve Police Force. He was granted sixty days leave and had to appear in the department on October 6, 1992, but he did not appear and committed illegality under section 11 (1) of CRPF Act. A recommendation was made by superiors to declare him Bhagora (absconder ). His warrants of arrest were issued. He submitted medical certificate to show that he was suffering from Typhoid, but the alleged certificates were found false. In these circumstances the penalty of dismissal imposed on the appellant does not shock our judicial conscious and in our considered opinion it is not a fit case to grant the relief as sought by the appellant. ;