- (1.) RAJASTHAN Road Transport Corporation (for short the Corporation) is a statutory body incorporated under the Road Transport Act. 1950. It is engaged in plying buses in the State of Rajasthan and other States to provide means of transporation to the public. By this petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the Corporation is challenging the order dated, July II. 1994 ot the Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur whereby approval of dismissal of the respondent-Conductor Shri Girdhar Singh under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) has been declined.
(2.) NECESSARY facts of the case are extensively set out in the impugned order of the Labour Court. Put shortly on, April 30, 1989, the respondent-workman was Conductor in Bus No. 7060 of the Corporation which was plying from Bhilwara to Amjer. It was checked at Village Nang-Ji-Ka-Kheda by the Checking party and 22 passengers, out of 23 total passengers travelling in the Bus, wer found without tickets and 60 Kg. of luggage was being transported without paying fare, though the conductor had charged fare from them. A domestic enquiry was initiated fro the above misconduct. The Conductor was suspended and a regular charge-sheet was served upon him. After Completing regular enquiry, the Enquiry Officer found his guilt established. Competent Authority, after service of the show cause notice, imposed penalty of dimissal agreeing with the findings of the enquiry officer. Since a general demand charter was pending before the Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur an application under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act was moved by the Corproation before the Tribunal to accord approval of dimissal of the workman. The learned Judge of the Tribunal, though held that the workman was paid wages of one month as required by the proviso to Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act, declined to accord approval holding domestic equiry proceeding to be vitiated for violation of the principles of natural justice on the ground that the enquiry officer himself put question and cross-examined defence witness Nainu Ram and the workman was not allowed to cross-examine the witness thereafter and opportunity was also not afforded to him to explain the facts. The learned Judge placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Hukam Chand v. Union of India and Ors. 1990 (1) RLR 647.
(3.) SHRI Kewal Ram, learned counsel appearing for the Corporation while assailing the order of the Tribunal streneously contended that the scope and power of the Tribunal under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act is limited to the extent as to whether a prima facie case has been made out by the employer against the employer or not. That the Tribunal is not required to consider merits of the case as trying the case itself or as an appellate authority. Criticising the impugned order of the Tribunal, learned counsel urged the the principles of natural justice can neither be reduced to any hard and fast formula nor it can be put in a straightjacket. Their applicability depends in the context and facts and circumstance of each case. The objective is to provide a fair and impartial hearing and a fair deal to those whose rights are going to be affected. Learned Counsel contended that by mere putting certain questions to a defence witness and eliciting answers from him, in absence of anything more, does not warrant the criticism that the enquiry officer acted both as a prosecutor and Judge when he recorded evidence in the case. It was further submitted that there is nothing on record to show tha the workman was not allowed to re-exmaine or cross examine his own witness. Nainu Ram or that he was denied the opportunity to explain the facts narrated by the witness in his cross-examination. In absence of any material on record, learned counsel contended, the Tribunal committed serious error on the face of the record by assuming those facts and therefore, in holding the proceeding of the domestic enquiry to be vitiated. On the other hand, learned counsel, appearing for the workman conductor, supported the order of the Tribunal relying on the decision of Hukam Chand's case (supra ).;