PRASAD, J. - (1.) THE petitioner was elected as the Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, 2-BBA tehsil Padampur district Sri Ganganagar and a Notification to this effect was issued in the Official Gazette. A few Members of the Panchayat gave a notice to the Authorities that they want to bring `no confidence motion' and in this regard a notice was issued by the Chief Executive Officer cum Secretary, Zila Parisad, Sri Ganganagar, which has been produced alongwith the writ petition as Annexure 3. THE meeting was scheduled to be held on 22. 4. 97 and the notice was issued on 4. 4. 97.
(2.) THE case of the petitioner is that on 4. 4. 97, when the notice was issued, it was not served on him but it was purportedly served on the minor son of the petitioner on 7. 4. 97 and since the notice was served on his minor son, it was not a proper service. However, that is a question of fact and not much emphasis has been given to it by the petitioner and he has urged that a notice under Sec. 37 of the Raj. Panchayat Act has not has been issued. Sec. 37 of the Act, 1994 reads as under : ``37. Motion of No-confidence in Chairpersons and Deputy Chairpersons. (1) A motion expressing want of confidence in the Chairpersons or Deputy Chairperson of a Panchayati Raj Institution may be made in accordance with the procedure laid down in the following sub-sections. (2) A written notice of intention to make the motion in such form as may be prescribed, signed by not less than one-third of the directly elected members of the Panchayati Raj Institution concerned together with a copy of the proposed motion, shall be delivered in person by any one of the members signing the notice to the competent authority. (3) THE competent authority shall thereupon- (i) forward a copy of the notice, together with a copy of the proposed motion to the Panchayat in the case of a Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch, to the Panchayat Samiti in the case of a Pradhan or Up-Pradhan and to the Zila Parishad in the case of a Pramukh or Up-Pramukh. (ii) convene a meeting for the consideration of the motion at the office of the concerned Panchayati Raj Institution on a date appointed by him which shall not be later than thirty days from the date on which the notice under Sub-section (1) was delivered to him; and (iii) give to the members a notice of not less than fifteen clear days of such meeting in such manner as may be prescribed. '' THE emphasis of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the notice was required to be for fifteen days and if the reckoning is done from 7. 4. 97 to 22. 4. 97 by excluding the dates 7. 4. 97 and 22. 4. 97, the period fell short of fifteen days stipulated period. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the explanation of the expression `clear days' as contained in Black's Law Dictionary (Fifth Edition) which says that ``if a certain number of clear days be given for the doing of any act, the time is to be reckoned exclusively, as well as of the first and as the last'' and on this, his contention is that the first day and the last day have to be excluded. He has further placed reliance on a decision of this Court in : Anokhmal Bhurelal vs. Chief Panchayat Officer, Rajasthan, Jaipur & Ors. (1) wherein it has been held that ``the use of the words `at least seven days before the date of election' clearly indicates that the law contemplates exclusion of the date of election in the computation of the interval of seven days for the purpose of that rule. '' THE Court held that seven clear days' interval is required between the date of announcement of the notice and the date of election. Thus, learned counsel for the petitioner urges that in the present case the notice was not for a clear fifteen days and since the notice falls short of the required time, it was not a valid notice and the notice could not have been for a period less than fifteen days and, thus, the proceedings of the meeting are vitiated. He has further placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in : Pioneer Motors (Private) Ltd. etc. vs. Municipal Council, Nagercoil (2) wherein the Apex Court has interpreted the words ``not being less than one month'' and held that these words implied that clear one month's notice was necessary to be given, that is, both the first day and the last day of the month had to be excluded. '' Thus, the basic argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that if 7. 4. 97 and 22. 4. 97 are excluded out of the reckoning then the intervening period being not fifteen days, the provisions of law will make the notice for a period less than fifteen days and, therefore, the notice is bad. Learned counsel for the respondents has put-in appearance and has stated that Section 37 of the Act, as stated in Sub-section (3) (i) provides that the competent authority shall thereupon give to the members a notice of not less than fifteen clear days of such meeting in such a manner as may be prescribed. Thus, this provision is not independent and prescription of the mode of notice has been given in Rule 21 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj. Rules, 1996 which reads as under:- Vfo'okl dk uksfvl & 1 /kkjk 37 ds v/khu fdlh iapk;rh jkt lalfkk ds v/;{k ;k mik/;{k esa fo'okl dk vhkko vfhko;dr djus okyk izlrko djus ds vk'k; dk fyf[kr uksfvl izk:i 1 esa gksxk vksj ljiap@34&ljiap] iz/kku@34&iz/kku ds ekeys esa eq[; dk;zikyd vf/kdkjh ftyk ifj"kn dks vksj izeq[k@34& izeq[k ds fo:) izlrko gksus ds ekeys esa fodkl vk;qdr dks ifjnrr fd;k tk;sxka 2 csbd vksj mlds fy, fnu rkjh[k vksj le; dk uksfvl eq[; dk;zikyd vf/kdkjh@fodkl vk;qdr }kjk csbd dh rkjh[k ls de ls de 15 iwoz fnu iwoz Mkd Mkys tkus ds izek. k&i= ds v/khu Mkd ls izr;{kr% fuokzfpo izr;sd iap@lnl; dks mlds lkeku; fuokl LFkku ij izk:i&2 esa Hkstk tk;sxka ,sls uksfvl dh izfr ,slh iapk;rh jkt la[;k ds lwpuk&iv~v ij Hkh yxk;h tk;sxh % ijurq ,sls fdlh LFkku dh n'kk esa tgkwa tgkwa dksbz Mkd?kj ugha gks ;k uksfvl dh rkehy 'kh?kzrk ls ugha dh tk ldrh gks] ,slk uksfvl lacaf/kr rglhynkj ds ek/;e ls rkehy fd;k tk;sxka** According to the learned counsel for the respondents, the notice should have been posted before fifteen days and be sent to the members or the Panch concerned and a copy of the same has to be affixed on the Notice Board. Since the pre- scription of the notice under Section 37 of the Act has been made under rule 21 of the Rules, wherein it has been provided that the notice, if despatched fifteen clear days before, then there is a complete compliance of the provisions of Section 37. To support his argument, learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance over : Jai Charan Lal Anal vs. The State of U. P. & Ors. (3) wherein the Apex Court has held that when the notice was despatched seven clear days before then the intervening period, being the provided period and being the period prescribed, there would be no illegality. According to this Supreme Court judgment, the critical date is the date of despatch of the notice and not the date of its receipt. On the strength of this Supreme Court judgment, learned counsel for the respondents wants to assert that the language is ``given notice to the member not less than fifteen clear days'' and though this has been further prescribed in Rule 21 that the notice should be despatched. Thus, what has been prescribed in Rule 21 is that the notice shall be despatched fifteen clear days before the meeting. It cannot be held to mean that the notice should be served on the member fifteen days prior to the date of meeting to be held. Yet another case relied-upon by the learned counsel for the respondents is : Ram Charan Das vs. Girja Nandini Devi & Ors. (4), wherein it was held that even if there was a short-fall in the time of notice, it would not by itself make the proceedings of the meeting invalid. The meeting will be invalid only if the proceed- ings are effected by such irregularity. In that meeting, 19 out of 20 councillors attended the meeting and, therefore, the irregularity in the service was taken as `not to have prejudicially affected the meeting. Learned counsel for the respondents asserts that in the present case, in the meeting, out of total eleven members, ten members were present; eight members voted in favour of the `no confidence motion' and two members, viz. , Shri Ganpat Ram and the present petitioner, left the meeting-room without casting any vote. Therefore, out of eleven members, ten members having participated in the meeting, the alleged irregularity in the service cannot be deemed to have affected the result of `no confidence motion'. He has further relied-upon the case decided by this Court and reported in Radhey Shyam vs. Vijay Singh, District Magistrate, Ganganagar & Ors. (5) wherein though the expression ``seven clear days'' has been interpreted in the same fashion in which the learned counsel for the petitioner urges, still this Court declined to interfere in favour of the petitioner because this Court felt that if the petitioner has lost the confidence of the majority then he should not try to sit in the Office even for a mom- ent and should not come forward to seek the protection of this Court under its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The jurisdiction is of equitable nature and if the petitioner does not come with clean hand then he is not entitled to seek any relief from this Court. This Court has interpreted the expression ``clear seven days'' and declined to interfere in the order. In the same fashion, a judgment has been delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in : Bhurekhan vs. State of Rajasthan & 14 Ors. (6) wherein the technicalities have been refused to be invoked to generate sympathy in favour of the petitioner when he has lost the faith of members. On the basis of the aforesaid arguments, learned counsel for the respondents urges that no relief should be granted in favour of the petitioner. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the cases cited by them. There can be no denial that the expression ``fifteen clear days'' can only be reckoned by excluding the first and the last days. In the instant case, if the recko- ning is made from the date of service of the notice to the date of the meeting, the notice falls short by one day. But then there is a rider in rule 21 which is the extension of Section 37 of the Act which fixes the period and in that prescription made under the rule, which is as provided by the Section itself, the notice has to be despatched fifteen clear days prior to the meeting. As contended by the learned counsel for the respondents and as stated in para 8 of the reply, the notice of the meeting was sent to the Sarpanch and the Up-Sarpanch through the Tehsildar (Revenue) concerned on 4. 4. 97 and that notice was despatched on 4. 4. 97. This being the date of despatch, is the sufficient compliance of the provisions of rule 21 of the Rules, 1996. If there is a sufficient compliance of Rule 21 then the rigor of Section 37 is diluted in terms of this rule then it cannot be said that the notice was not despatched as provided by law. In any case, the Division Bench of this Court and the learned Single Bench, in the judgments quoted supra have already held that such petitioner who faced the electorate and when lost the confidence, is not entitled for granting indulgence by this Court under its extraordinary jurisdiction contained under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That being the position, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief.
(3.) YET the other facet of the case is that the petitioner has received the notice and had attended the meeting: though he refused to cast any vote. Once the petitioner had attended the meeting, the purpose of notice was served. The require- ment of the notice is for the purpose of expressing his opinion and try to spread his influence. There is no pleading in the writ petition that any prejudice was caused to the petitioner. In the absence of any such pleading, the petitioner cannot legimately urge the grounds of prejudice and in such a case, in terms of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in : K. Narasimhaih vs. H. G. Singri Gowda & Ors. it cannot be held that any prejudice was caused to the petitioner and, therefore, on this count also, the petitioner is not entitled for any relief and the writ petition is not liable to succeed. In this view of the matter, I do not find any merit in this writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed. .;