M.A.A. Khan, J. - (1.) On January 28, 1977 PW-1 Sri Hari Dutta Sharma, Food Inspector, Bharatpur, purchased the sample 'pedas' prepared with Mawa, from the petitioner at his shop, M/S Radha Bhallabh Gopal Dass, Chobarja Bazar, Bharatpur. On analysis of the sample 'Pedas', the Public Analyst reported them adulterated for their containing non-permitted metanil yellow and basic dye(yellow shade,) food colour. On the complaint of the Food Inspector, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bharatpur (CJM) tried the petitioner for an offence punishable Under section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954(the Act) and found him guilty thereof. He, therefore, convicted the petitioner of the same and sentenced him to one year RI and fine of Rs. 2,000/-. In appeal, the learned special Judge, Bharatpur confirmed the order of the conviction and sentence of the petitioner. Hence this revision application under Section 397 Criminal Procedure Code before this court.
(2.) Mr. R. N. Khandelwal, the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the specified authority granted the sanction in this case without aoplying his mind to the facts of the case, hence the very foundation of the prosecution of the petitioner was infirm. Mr. Khandelwal supported his argument on the point with a good number of case law from this court as well as other courts but in view of the authoritative pronouncement by the Apex Court in the case of Dhian Singh v. Municipal Board Saharanpur, 1973 F.A.C. 404 , I do not think that the cases taking a contrary view should be discussed.
(3.) In the case of Dhian Singh (Supra) a Food Inspector, with written consent of the Municipal Board, Saharanpur, had filed a complaint Under section 7/16 of the Act against the accused. The order of acquittal of the accused by the trial court was reversed by the High Court. In appeal to the Supreme Court by the accused the maintainability of the very complaint filed by the Food Inspector was challenged on the grounds, interalia, that the authority authorising the prosecution did not apply its mind to the facts of the case before granting its written consent Under section 20 of the Act. Their lordships settled down the controversy on this and other allied issues in para 5 of the report in the following manner: 5. It is true that the complaint was signed by the Food Inspector. As seen earlier it competent (sic) for the Municipal Board to authorised by the Municipal Board to the filed (sic) the complaint was never put into issue. Both the parties to the complaint proceeded on the bass that it was a validly instituted complaint. If the Municipal Board had not authorised him to file the complaint then the complaint itself was not maintainable. If that is so, no question of the invalidity of the appear (sic) arises for consideration. It was never the case of the accused that the complaint was invalid. In K.C. Agarwal v. Delhi Administration, Criminal Appeal No. 100 of 1996, D/d. 27-3-1969 this Court has held that a complaint filed by one of the officers of a local authority at the instance of that authority is in law a complaint instituted by that local authority. Therefore if the complaint with which we are concerned in this case had been filed by the Food Inspector on the authority of local board, the complaint must be held to have been instituted by the local board itself. The question whether the Food Inspector had authority to file the complaint on behalf of the local board is a question of fact. Official acts must be deemed to have been done according to law. It the accused had challenged the authority of the Food Inspector to file the complaint the trial court would have gone into that question. The accused cannot be permitted to take up that contention for the first time after the disposal of the appeal. This court refused to entertain for the first time an objection as regards the validity of his sanction granted in Mangal Das Regi aij v. State of Maharashtra . Mr. Garg, learned counsel for the accused urged that a permission under Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 to file a complaint is a condition precedent for validly instituting a complaint under the provisions, of that Act. The fulfillment of that condition must be satisfactorily proved by the complainant before a court can entertain the complaint. Without such a proof, the court will have no jurisdiction to try the case, In support of that contention of his he sought to take assistance from the decision of the Judicial Committee in Gokul Chand Dwaraka Das v. The King and Madan Mohan Singh v. The State of U.P. Both those decisions deal with the question of the validity of sanctions given for the institution of certain criminal proceedings. The provisions under which sanction was sought in those cases required the sanctioning authority to apply its mind and find out whether there was any justification for instituting the prosecutions. The Jurisdiction Committee as well as this Court has laid down in such cases, the Court must be satisfied either from the order of sanction or from the other evidence that all the relevant facts had been placed before the sanctioning authority and that authority had granted the sanction after applying its mind to those facts. The ratio of those decisions has no bearing on the facts of this case. Under Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. no question of applying one's mind to the facts of the case before the institution of the complaint arises as the authority has to be conferred long before a particular offence has taken place. It is a conferment of an authority to institute a particular case or even a class of cases. That Section merely prescribes that persons or authorities designated in that Section are alone competent to file complaints under the statute in question.";