SOBHAGMAL JAIN, J. - (1.) THIS is a tenant's special appeal against the judgment and decree dated September 22, 1983 of a learned Single judge of this Court dismissing the appeal directed against the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge No. 2, Jodhpur, dated May 29, 1982 decreeing the suit for eviction. The suit for eviction was filed by Shri Hukam Chand Jain, respondent herein, in the court of District Judge, Jodhpur on May 15, 1980 for eviction of the appellant the Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company Ltd. Jodhpur from the suit premises, namely, the first floor of the building known as Shrichand Hukam Chand Jain Niwas situated on the Mahatma Gandhi Hospital Road Jodhpur. The eviction was sought on the ground that the suit premises were required by the plaintiffy reasonably and bona fide for his personal use. It was alleged that the plaintiff was the Karta of the Hindu Joint Family consisting of himself and his four sons who are all married. The plaintiff had four daughters who too are married and has 18 grand children. Three of his sons are residing at Delhi, but they with their families of and on come to Jodhpur and stay with the plaintiff. The wife of the plaintiff has expired and, therefore, he requires the attendance of the children. His daughters and their husbands and children also frequently visit him. He requires accommodation for their stay when they come to visit him. The plaintiff's case further was that his son Hans-raj wanted to establish his own business in the part of the premises. The plaintiff himself was an Advocate of long standing and was 7o years of age. His present residence and office, which was in the second floor was inconvenient for him and for these reasons he requires the suit premises.
(2.) THE suit was contested by the tenant, who is appellant herein. THE fact that the plaintiff has a large family was not contested. It was denied that the plaintiff requires the suit premises for his personal use reasonably and bonafide. It was pleaded that three sons and the daughters of the plaintiff did not reside with him and only casually visit him. THE requirement of Hansraj for establishing his business in the suit premises was also denied. It was pleaded that the premises already in possession of the plaintiff was sufficient to meet his requirements. After trial, the Additional District Judge No. 2 Jodhpur by his judgment dated May 29, 1982 decreed the plaintiffs suit and granted six months' time to the defendant to hand over vacant possession of the premises. Learned Additional District Judge held that the plaintiff bonafide and reasonably requires the suit premises for the occupation of himself and his family. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, the defendant filed an appeal in the High Court which was heard by a learned Single Judge. During the pendency of the appeal applications were filed by the appellant in the High Court- (l) applications under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC bringing on record the documents evidencing the fact that a decree for eviction was passed in favour of the plaintiff against the Punjab National Bank in respect of the ground floor and some compromise were entered into between the parties in respect of the same; (2) Application by the appellant under Order 6 Rule 17 C. P. C. to amend the written statement to plead oblique motive of the plaintiff, inasmuch as, he had got a decree for ejectment against the Punjab National Bank even prior to the letting out of the present premises to the appellant but did not get them vacated in pursuance of that decree and had made compromise with the Bank. The additional documents sought to be produced were taken on record by agreement of the counsel for the parties. It was agreed by the counsel for the parties that they do not want to file any documentary evidence in rebuttal of the documents of the parties taken on record. The learned Single Judge by his judgment dated the 22nd September, 1983, affirmed the finding of the learned Additional District Judge that the plaintiff established his reasonable and bonafide necessity for the premises in dispute. He also held that the defendant would not suffer any hardship if a decree of eviction is passed, whereas the plaintiff would certainly suffer greater hardship, if he does not have the suit premises. On these findings the learned Single judge dismissed the defendant's appeal with costs. The appellant was however granted six months' to hand over vacant possession. Dissatisfied with the judgment of the learned single judge the appellant has preferred the present Special Appeal. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Shri P. K. Bhansali counsel for the appellant has urged that the plaintiff did not require the suit premises bonafide and reasonably. The plaintiff had a subsisting decree for eviction in his favour against another tenant, namely, the Punjab National Bank, in respect of the ground floor in the same building and if he really wanted* additional accommodation for himself and his family, he could have obtained possession from the Punjab National Bank and occupied the ground floor but instead, the plaintiff entered into agreement with the said bank and got the rent increased to Rs. 9, 000/- p. m. Thus, argues learned counsel for the appellant, the need of the plaintiff was not genuine and he was not entitled to a decree for eviction. We have considered the above arguments and we do not find substance in the same. True, the decree against the Punjab National Bank in respect of the ground floor was passed as back as August 26, 1969 and the same was maintained with modification by the High Court on November 27, 1970. It is also an admitted fact that despite the decree the Punjab National Bank was allowed to continue in possession on the rent being enhanced. As per compromise entered into between the parties on August 2, 1977, the bank was given time to vacate the premises by December 31, 1981 and the mesne profits were increased as Rs. 2503/- per month. The present suit was filed on May 15, 1980. On January 4, 1982 and April 2, 1983 further compromises were made with the Bank, whereby the time to vacate the premises was extended and the rent was raised from Rs. 2500/- to Rs. 4500/- on January 4, 1982 and from Rs. 4500/-per month to Rs. 9000/- per month on April 2, 1983/ -. The question for consideration, therefore, is whether the above circumstances dispel the fact that the plaintiff required the suit premises reasonably and bonafide. Both the learned courts, namely, the District Judge and the learned Single Judge of this Court have concurrently held that the accommodation at present in the possession of the plaintiff was wholly insufficient and he needed additional accommodation and that his requirement for the suit premises could not be said to be unreasonable. We have examined the reasons given by the learned courts below in coming to the above findings and we do not find any error to justify our interference in special appeal. We affirm the finding of the learned courts below that the premises at present in occupation of the plaintiff are inadequate and he needs additional accommodation to meet his requirements. The further question for consideration however, is whether a landlord, whose felt need is genuine, can make a choice when two alternative accommodations are available to him? Our answer to this would be in the affirmative. Although a decree for eviction in respect of the ground floor was available to the plaintiff, he preferred to have the first floor now in possession with the appellant. Can this be said to be reasonable? The learned Single Judge has held that the ground floor in respect of which the decree for eviction was passed against the Punjab National Bank was not suitable for the needs of the plaintiff and could not conveniently and properly be used for residential purpose and also for the office of the plaintiff. The learned Single Judge has come to this conclusion for the following reasons:- (1) The suit against the Bank was based on the necessity apart from other necessities, of the wife of the plaintiff, who died in 1971 and therefore, that necessity had come to an end; (2) Just near the plaintiffs building, there is a lot of noise on account of taxis and tongas as the premises are on the road, and as such the ground floor could not conveniently and properly be used for residential purpose and also for the office of the plaintiff; (3) In these circumstances if the plaintiff changed his view in respect of having a residence on the ground floor, he could not be imparted any oblique motive; and (4) The compromise terms with the Punjab National Bank were so attractive that any reasonable and prudent man would have entered into the same. For the reasons mentioned above the learned Single Judge held that the plaintiff had been able to establish his reasonable and bonafide necessity for the suit premises. We agree with the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge, we have been taken through the site plan Ex. 1 which contains the particulars of the accommodation on the ground floor, first floor and the second floor. From a bare look at the constructions available on the ground floor it transpires that the ground floor is suited for a Bank. It has a basement measuring 18' x 12' with a store 9' x 8'. The ground floor itself consists of a Banking hall 42' x 26' with a bight of 15'. Adjacent to the hall are the Store, a record room, the loan department and the Manager's room. The constructions available on the ground floor is thus more suited for use by a Bank. The premises on the ground floor cannot, therefore, be utilised for residence and office of the plaintiff in the present shape and to convert it to be suitable and useful for the residence and office of the plaintiff, he would be required to alter the constructions and incur consider-able expenses. Now that the wife of the plaintiff has passed away, it may not be prudent for him to go for this expenditure, The premises which are the sub-ject matter of the decree against the Punjab National Bank cannot, therefore, be said to be suitable accommodation to meet the additional requirement of the plaintiff. It has come in evidence that the execution of the decree against the Punjab National Bank was being resisted by the Bank on various grounds is it was a compromise decree. The accommodation on the first floor which consists of a hall, a bed room, an office room, a kitchen and a store is more suited to need the additional requirements of the plaintiff. On account of the rush and noise, it would not be convenient to shift the family and the office to the ground door. The plaintiff is an Advocate by professions. He is now more than 80 years' of age. When his felt need is held to be genuine his choice for the first floor which is more suited for his residence and office cannot be said to be unreasonable. We, therefore, uphold the finding of the learned courts below that the plaintiff requires the suit premises reasonable and bonafide for his own use.
(3.) LEARNED counsel for the appellant has further contended that the learned Single Judge having allowed the appellant to being on record subsequent events ought to have remanded the case to the trial court for redeciding the question of bonafide necessity. We do not find any substance in this contention. The documents under Order 41 Rule 27 C. P. C. produced by the appellant were admitted in evidence with the agreement of the parties. LEARNED counsel for both the sides stated before the learned Single Judge that they do not propose to produce any documentary evidence in rebuttal. Further, the facts emerging from the documents were not disputed or denied by either of the parties. The learned Single Judge under the circumstances allowed the amendment sought to be made by the appellant under Order 6 Rule 17 C. P. C. and held that in view of the admitted facts no further evidence was necessary. We have given our thought to the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. When the documents were taken on record with the consent of the parties and the learned counsel for both the sides did not wish to produce any additional document, it was not necessary to remand the case to the trial court for re-deciding the question of bonafide necessity. Learned counsel for the appellant has then contended that the finding of bonafide requirement was vitiated because the learned courts below took into account the needs of the other sons who were not residing with the plaintiff. True, three out of the four sons were residing at Delhi and it was Hansraj only who was residing with the plaintiff at Jodhpur, but what the learned Single Judge took into consideration was the temporary visit and stay of the plaintiff's sons and not their need as such. Even if we exclude from consideration the need of other sons the requirement of the plaintiff" himself and his ore son. Hansraj for the additional accommodation is fully made out, inasmuch as, the accommodation available at present to the plaintiff is hardly adequate to meet his needs. He does require additional accommodation. The result is that there is no merit in the Special Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge and the same is dismissed with costs. . ;