NAVIN CHANDRA SHARMA,J. - (1.) HIRA Lal and Jawahar Lal son of Manak Chand (respondent Nos. 1 and 2) filed civil suit No. 60 of 1977 against the appellant Shyamlal and respondent Nos. 3 to 5 and Smt. Khusibai widow of Khodumal Sindhi for ejectment from a shop which had been taken on rent by the deceased Khodumal from respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on January 10, 1951 on a monthly rental of Rs. 8/-. Rent was raised to Rs. 12/- per month before the suit was filed. Ejectment was claimed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on the ground that Anil Kumar son of Hiralal respondent No. 1 had attained majority and Hiralal wanted him to carry on cloth business in the suit shop. It may be mentioned that the suit was originally filed against Khodumal Sindhi original tenant who died pending the suit and his legal representatives that is sons, widow and daughters were substituted on record. The suit was contested only by Shyamlal appellant. Rest of the legal representatives of the deceased remained ex parte.
(2.) MUNSIF , Udaipur City (South) by his judgment and decree dated July 25, 1980 decreed the suit of the plaintiffs for ejectment. A decree for Rs. 24/- on account of arrears of rent with future rent was also passed. The Munsif decreed the suit of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on two grounds. Firstly, that the original tenant Khodumal Sindhi had expired and Omparkash, who was ordinarily carrying on business with Khodumal Sindhi, was not surviving son of the deceased tenant. On the other hand, he was son of a living son Shyamlal of deceased Khodumal Sindhi. Consequently on the death of Khodumal Sindhi, Omprakash did not become a statutory tenant within the definition of that expression in Section 3(vii)(b) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act'). Secondly, the Munsif held that the suit shop was reasonably and bonafide required by Hiralal respondent No. 1 for the use and occupation of his son Anil Kumar who wanted to start cloth business in the shop. Aggrieved by this decree, Shyamlal filed Civil First Appeal No. 92 of 1980 which was decided by the Additional Civil Judge, Udaipur on June 3, 1983. The Additional Civil Judge, Udaipur agreed with the findings of the Munsif, Udaipur City (South) on both these points. Shyamlal has come in second appeal before this Court. It was contended by Mr. Kewal Chand appearing for Shyamlal defendant-appellant that Omparkash became a statutory tenant of the suit shop on the death of Khodumal Sindhi and, therefore, he was entitled to protection against eviction under Section 13 of the Act unless the grounds specified in that section were satisfied. The learned counsel referred before me and relied upon the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Gordhanlal v. Pannalal reported in 1985 R.L.W. Facts in Gordhanlal's case were that Gordhanlal was the sole tenant of Pannalal, in respect of commercial premises. Gordhanlal died during the pendency of the suit for ejectment against him. Three applications were made for substitution in place of Gordhanlal. One of the applicants was Shankarlal who was nephew of the deceased tenant Gordhanlal. Other two persons were Rajendra Kumar and Ambalal. Shankar Lal stated that being real nephew of the deceased he was his heir. Rajendra Kumar, on the other hand stated that he was working with deceased Gordhanlal in the suit premises which was a shop. Ambalal stated that he was also working with Gordhanlal as his surety in the disputed shop and they were entitled to continue the appeal as the right to sue survived to them. His Lordship K.S. Lodha, J. stated that on the death of Gordhanlal, the right to continue the appeal would survive only in favour of the person who can be deemed to be tenant after the death of Gordhanlal under Section 3(vii) of the Act. So far Shankarlal was concerned, it was stated that being nephew of the deceased, he was certainly a heir of Gordhanlal, but it was not alleged that he had ordinarily been carrying business with the deceased in the suit premises as a member of his family upto his death. Suffice it to state that in Gordhanlal's case there was nothing to show that Gordhanlal had left a surviving spouse, son or daughter behind him and, therefore, a nephew was obviously a heir in accordance with personal law applicable to the deceased. In the instant case, it is an admitted position that the original tenant Khodumal Sindhi deceased had left behind him surviving not only spouse but two sons named Shyamlal and Rajmaldas and two daughters. In the life time of Shyamlal, his son Omprakash cannot be regarded as a heir of Khodumal deceased in accordance with the personal law applicable to him. The Courts below, therefore, rightly held that on the death of Khodumal Sindhi, Omprakash son of Shyamlal appellant was a heir of the deceased tenant even though he may be carrying on business with Khodumal deceased.
(3.) I may also refer to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Smt. Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar reported in A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 796. It was rightly pointed out in Gordhanlal's case (supra) that the decision in Gian Devi Anand's case, even with respect to commercial premises cannot be an authority for interpreting Section 3(vii)(b) of the Rajasthan Act because in the Delhi Rent Control Act, the heirship had not been restricted in respect of commercial premises as has been done under Section 3(vii)(b) of the Rajasthan Act. It is also important to note that if according to Shyamlal, his son Omparkash had become statutory tenant after the death of Khodumal Sindhi, it was Omparkash alone who was an aggrieved person, and in that event Shyamlal has even no locus standi to file the present appeal. On the second point, there is concurrent finding of fact that the suit shop is required by Hiralal respondent No. 1 for the use and occupation of his major son Anil Kumar PW-1 who wants to start cloth business in the suit shop. Anil Kumar had experience in textile as he had served for some time in that line in Ahmedabad Cotton Mill and that service had been left by him. The concurrent findings given by the Courts below on this point cannot be interfered in second appeal.;