SHARMA, J. - (1.) MR. Shankerlal and Sadasukh, petitioners, have invoked inherent powers of this Court by way of an application under sec. 482 Cr. P. C. for quashing the orders of the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Karanpur and the Additional Sessions Judge, Shri Ganganagar dated 4-10-76 and 9-11-76 respectively. It will not be out of place to mention that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Karanpur vide its order dated 4-10-76 attached the land under controversy on the ground that there was imminent danger of breach of peace necessitating immediate action for its prevention. The petitioners felt aggrieved petition in the Court of Sessions Judge, Shri Ganganager. The revision petition was transferred to the court of Additional Sessions Judge, Shri Ganganagar for disposal according to law. The Additional Sessions Judge heard the parties and upheld the order of the attachment passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Karanpur in proceedings under section 145 Cr. P. C. As against these two orders, the petitioners have moved this Court for exercise of its inherent powers.
(2.) THE relevent facts giving rise to this application may be briefly stated as follows: - Shankerlal, petitioner, filed an application before the Superintendent of Police, Shri Ganganagar on 8-9-76. It was alleged in the application that by way of an agreement with Mukhtiar Singh, Sitasingh, Malkiat Singh and Pritam Singh herein after to be referred as party No, 2, the petitioner gave his agricultural land situated at Fatyabad Distinct Hissar in exchange for their land situated at Chak No 82 L. N. P. Tehsil Padampur. The petitioners got possession of the land from party No 2 about three years ago. Parly No. 2, however, did not execute a deed of exchange and get it registered in favour of the petitioners, so the petitioners instituted a suit against party No. 2 and obtained a temporary injunction restraining party No. 2 from interfering with their possession over the disputed land. The petitioner cultivated Gwar in the land, but party No. 2 uprooted the crops by their tractor on 25 7-76. As the members of party No. 2 were armed with guns, the petitioners could not prevent them from causing damage to his crops. He, however, lodged a report about this incident with the police at police station Ghumarwali on 26-7-76, when the petitioner was returning home after making a report to the police, the members of party No. 2 formed an unlawful assembly with a common object to kill him and having armed themselves with weapons, they give out threats to the petitioner. The police did not take any action on his report despite repeated requests made to it by the petitioner. On 22-8-76 at about 9 P. M , a shot was fired at the petitioner from the house of Gurdeep Singh, one of the members of party No. 2. Luckily the shot did not hit the petitioner. As the petitioner apprehended grave danger from the side of party No. 2, he requested the Superintendent of police take immediate action against the miscreants. It appears that the report was sent to the Police Station Ghumarwali for enquiry into the matters. The S. H. O. , Ghumarwali enquired into the matter and after recording the statement of Shankerlal and the members of party No 2 and collecting other necessary documentary evidence in the case, made a report to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Shri Karanpur that a dispute likely to cause breach of peace concerning the land under controversy exists and that necessary orders for attachment of the subject of dispute may be passed to prevent likelihood of imminent breach of peace. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate was satisfied upon the police report as to the existence of a dispute between the parties concerning the land under controversy, which was likely the cause brecah of peace, so he drew up an preliminary order under sub sec. (1) of sec. 145 Cr. P. C. , stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in the dispute to attend his court and to put in written statements of their respective claims as regards the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. After passing the preliminary order, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was of the view that the case was one of emergency, so he attached the subject of dispute under sub-section (1) of section 146 Cr. P. C. and appointed the Nayab Tehsildar as receiver to take the possession of the disputed fields and make necessary arrangements for public auction of the crops standing therein. As stated earlier, Shankerlal and his brother have challenged this order by way of an application under section 482 Cr. P. C. I have carefully perused the record and heard Mr. R. N. Bishnoi for the petitioner, Mr. S. R. Bajwa for party No. 2 and Mr. K. C. Bhandari, Public Prosecutor for the State. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioners that there was no dispute over the possession of the land under controversy and so the provisions of sec. 145 Cr. P. C. were not applicable. According to Mr. R. N. Bishnoi, learned counsel for the petitioner, the land in dispute has been in continuous possession of the petitioners for the last so many years and they have been sowing crops therein. As the members of party No. 2 themselves had handed over the possession of the disputed land to the petitioners in exchange for the later's land situated in village Fatiyabad District Hissar. In support of his above contention, Mr. Bishnoi relied upon a judgment passed by the Asstt. Collector, Shri Ganganager on 6-12-74 in a suit for possession of the land instituted by party No. 2 against the petitioners. He further placed reliance upon an injunction order issued against party No. 2 on 29 4-75 restraining them from interfering with the possession of the petitioners over the land in dispute. Mr. S. R. Bajwa, learned counsel for party No. 2, on the other hand, urged that the jurisdiction of the Sub Divsional Magistrate to proceed under sec. 145 Cr. P. C. is not taken away merely because an injunction was issued by the Civil Court restraining party No 2 from interfering with the possession of the petitioners. According to him, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate is empowered to initiate proceedings under section 145 Cr. P. C. even though a Civil Suit between the parties is pending. As regards the dismissal of the suit for possession filed by party Nc. 2 against the petitioners in the Revenue Court, Mr. Bajwa submitted that an appeal has been filed against the dismissal of the suit in the Court of Revenue Appellate Authority and the appeal has not yet been decided by the Court of appeal. I have considered the rival contentions. In my opinion, if there a dispute between the parlies relating to the possession of land and such dispute is likely to cause breach of peace, the pendency of a civil litigation between the same parties with regard to the same land could not taken away the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to launch proceedings under section 145 Cr. P. C. It is no doubt true that proceedings under section 145 Cr. P. C. should be initiated with due care and caution during the pendency of a civil suit between the same parties with regard to the same land. But the scope of the proceedings u/s. 145 Cr. P. C. is quite different from that of the civil proceedings. Under section 145 Cr. P. C. it is the concern of the Magistrate to maintain law and order and to proceed in the matter where there is a real apprehension of breach of peace on account of a dispute relating to possession of land, water etc. In the instant case, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was satisfied upon the police report about the necessity to take action u/s. 145 Cr. P. C. The police enquired into the matter on the application of Shankerlal, petitioner, who clearly stated some such fact3 in his application as led to an inference that there was likelihood of breach of peace on account of a dispute between the parties concerning the possession of the land. The dispute concerning the land must, of course, be a real dispute and not a mere pretence. But it is not necessary that the dispute must necessarily be bonafide, because u/s 145 Cr. P. C. even the possession of a trespasser is declared over the land if he is found to have been in actual occupation of the land at the date of the preliminary order or within two months next before it. The word dispute used in sub sec. (l) of sec. 145 Cr. P. C. means in the ordinary sense a quarral or disagreement over the possesion of land, which renders breach of peace likely. In the present case, the members of party No. 2 are contending that terms of agreement for exchange of land between the parties were not carried into effect or acted upon by them with the result that party No. 2 continued to occupy its own lands and parlies did not get possession of each others land. In view of the above contention of party No. 2, there is a disagreement or quarrel for possession of land-dispute and if this disagreement or quarrel for possession of the disputed land was in likely to cause breach of peace, the jurisdiction of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was not ousted merely because some litigation was going on between the parties in a civil or revenue court with regard to that very land. There must be the satisfaction of the Magistrate himself as to the existence of likelihood of danger to public peace on account of a dispute relating to possession of an immovable property. If there is prima facie material on the record on the basis of which the Sub-Divistonal Magistrate could satisfy himself that a dispute likely to cause breach of peace existed concerning the land, this court will be reluctant in exercise of its inherent powers to interfere with the satisfaction of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate regarding the necessity to take action under section 145 Cr. P. C. Consequently, I do not feel inclined to subscribe to the arguments of Mr. R. N Bishnoi, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, that there was no dispute over the possession of the land between the parties and the provisions of section 145 Cr. P. C. were inapplicable. The next contention put forward by Mr. R. N. B shnoi, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that there was no eminent danger of breach of peace necessitating an order of attachment of the land in dispute. According to him, the Sub Divisional Magistrate committed an error in attaching the subject of dispute without considering that such attachment seriously affects the rights of the petitioners and also subjects them to unnecessary inconvenience and Joss of means of livelihood- The above contention has no force. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate has clearly indicated in the impugned order as to the existence of emergency justifying attachment of the disputed land. It appears from a bare perusal of his order that he has applied his mind to the materials on the record and acted with care and caution in passing the order of attachment. The Sub-Divitional Magisrate relied upon the statement of Shankerlal, Sitasingh, Gurdeepsingh and Mukhtiarsingh, recorded by the police in the course of inquiry into the application of Shankerlal, petitioner, and upon their basis came to a conclusion that there was eminent danger of breach of peace, as the parties were bent upon fighting with each other and had made attempts to assault each other in the past. Hence, it cannot be said that the Sub Divisional Magistrate had no reasons to hold that there was an emergency and that unless the property was attached there was immediate danger of breach of peace. The petitioner himself stated in his application that the members of party No. 2 had formed an unlawful assembly with a common object to kill him and in pursuance of the said object they gave grave threats to him. It is not now open for the petitioners to contend before me that there was no real emergency justifying the attachment of the subject of dispute. The result of the above discussion is that no case is made out for interference by this court with the impugned orders, passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Sri Ganganagar and the Additional Sessions Judge, Sri Canganagar in exercise of its inherent powers. The application u/s. 482 Cr. P. C. has no subs-tance and is hereby dismissed. Mr. R. N Bishnoi, learned counsel for the petitioners, orally prayed for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The revision petition has been decided on the peculiar facts of this case. No sudstantial question of law which requires authoritative to decision of the Supreme Court is involved in this revision petition Hence, oral prayer for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is rejected and leave sought is refused. . ;