M.L.JAIN, J. - (1.) THIS is a petition for grant of a writ of certiorari directed against the order of the Rajasthan State Go -operative Tribunal, Jaipur, dated June 29, 1971. The petitioner the Central Cooperative Bank Ltd., Bikaner, a cooperative society vas formed on 19 -5 -1951 with Bikaner and Churu districts within us area of operation On 27 -3 -1361, Churu Central Cooperative Bank Ltd., a cooperative society was formed for the district of Chura and the area of the Cooperative Bank. Bikaner was reduced to the district of Bikaner. The assests and liabilities of the district of Churu were transferred to the Churu Bank by a deed of transfer executed on 15 -7 -1961, whereby an amount of Rs. 7,71,577.10 paise were to be paid by the Churu Bank to the Bikaner Bank. In pursuance of this settlement, the Churu Bank made payment upto 30 -5 -64 bit thereafter refused to pay the balance of Rs. 42,736.48 paise on 23 -4 -1966. The Manager of Churu Bank addressed a letter to the Manager, Central Cooperative Bank, Bikaner, that there was some difficulty regarding reconciliation of the accounts of both the banks However, the Churu Bank will make the payment after recoveries from the various societies are made after the coming crop. The whole matter will be settled after personal discussion and payment of principal and interest will be made accordingly. On 16 -3 -1967, the Committee (appointed on 21 -6 -61 for division of assets and liabilities) was called by its convener, namely; the Deputy Registrar, Co -operative Societies, Bikaner. The proceedings were drawn by the said Deputy Registrar in which it is recorded that it was unanimously decided that Chum Bank shall soon make payment of the remaining amount of debt and its Chairman assured that the amount shall be paid after Kharif crop. These proceedings are not signed by any of the members of the Committee. The Committee was again summoned on 9th January, 1968. The proceedings were reduced to writing by the Deputy Registrar, Co -operative Societies, Bikaner. These proceedings contain a reference that a sum of Rs. 27,331.48 paise were payable by the Churu Bank besides interest. The Chairman of the Churu Bank b said to have stated that the payment shall be made after recoveries were made But the Churu Bank failed to abide by these decisions and the Bikaner Bank raised a dispute on 5 -7 -69 before the Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Bikaner, under Section 76 of the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act, 1965, (or recovery of Rs. 42,736 48 paise with interest. The Deputy Registrar gave a decision on 318 -1970, granting a decree of Rs. 58,240.81 paise in favour of the petitioner Bikaner Bank against the respondent Churu Bank. An appeal was filed against this decision in the Rajasthan State Cooperative Tribunal, Jaipur It was urged before the said Tribunal that the claim of the petitioner Bikaner Bank was time barred under Article 26 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The learned Tribunal upheld the contention, accepted the appeal and set aside the decision of the Deputy Registrar. Aggrieved of the judgment of the learned Tribunal, the present writ petition has been filed.
(2.) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the learned Tribunal committed an apparent, error of law by overlooking the provisions of Section 76 of the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act, 1965, hereinafter called the 'Act'. It was pointed out that according to Clause (b) of Sub -section (1) Section 76 of the Act, the Limitation Act, 1963, has been excluded and a separate period of limitation of six years has been provided in respect of such a dispute. It was further contended that the Churu Bank did not raise the question of limitation in its written statement before the Deputy Registrar. It was raised for the first time before the Tribunal and therefore, the petitioner, had no opportunity to meet this challenge by leading evidence to show that there were acknowledgements made on behalf of the respondent so as to bring the claim within limitation. The learned Counsel for the petitioner next contended that according to the explanation to Section 123 of the Act, the Tribunal hearing an appeal under the Act, shall exercise all the powers conferred upon an appellate court by Section 97 of, and Order 41 of the first schedule to, the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The learned Counsel urged that Section 97 is a misprint and as a matter of fact it refers to Section 96 CPC under which section there is no appeal against the consent decree. The order of the learned Tribunal was without jurisdiction as it heard an appeal against the judgment which was passed upon admission of the defendant Chum Bank. I have considered over the matter. As regards the contention that the objection regarding limitation was not raised before the Deputy Registrar, it will be sufficient to observe that according to Section 3 of the Limitation Act, it was the duty of the Deputy Registrar to take rote of the law of the limitation, all by himself, if it can be decided without making any investigation into the question of facts, and even if the opposite party did not claim limitation. According to Order 7, Rule 6 CPC it is the duty of the plaintiff or the claimant to show how his claim was within the period of limitation The petitioner did not even care to file an application under Sub -section (3) of Section 76 which empowers the Registrar to condone for sufficient reason any delay in referring the dispute to him The contention that the respondents had made acknowledgements which extended the period of limitation Under Section 18 of the Limitation Act is also not correct These acknowledgements comprise the letter of the Manager of the Churu Bank dated 28 -4 -1966 and the records of the proceedings Gated 16 -8 - 1967 and 9 -1 -68. If the period of limitation is 3 years, then, the letter of the Manager of the respondent dated 28 -4 -1966 was by itself of no help to the petitioner, having been written more than three years before the application for reference. The records of proceedings dated 16 -8 -67 and 9 -1 -1968 are not signed by any person on behalf of the respondent. According to Section 18 of the Limitation Act, an acknowledgment in order to extend the period of limitation must be in writing signed by the parties personally or by an agent duly authorised in this behalf. As I have already stated, the proceedings dated 16 -8 -1967 and 9 -1 -1968 have not been signed by the Chairman of the Churu Bank. Therefore, these proceedings cannot be availed of by the petitioner for extension of tie period of limitation. As regards the submission that the period of limitation is not 3 years but 6 years, Section 76(1)(b) may be quoted; 76 Limitation - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Limitation Act 1963, (Central Act 36 of 1963), but subject to the specific provisions made in this Act, the period of limitation in the case of a dispute referred to the Registrar under Section 75, shall - (a) xxxxxxx (b) When the dispute is between a society or its committee any past committee, any past or present officer, or past or present agent, or past or present servant or the nominee, heir or legal representative of a deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased servant of the society, or a member, or past member or the nominee, heir or legal representative of a deceased member, and when the dispute relates to any act or omission on the part of either party to the dispute be six years from the date or which the act or omission with reference to which the dispute arose took place;
(3.) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner says that the case of the petitioner is covered by the last portion of the aforesaid provision as the dispute relates to any act or omission on the part of either party to the dispute. But this argument is misconceived. This dispute refers to a dispute between a society, its committee, officers, agent or member, while the present dispute is between two cooperative societies within the meaning of Clause (d) of Sub -section (1) of Section 75. To such a dispute, Limitation Act, 1963, has been made specifically applicable by Sub -section (2) of Section 76. Therefore, a period of six years was not available to the petitioners.;