JAIN, J. - (1.) THIS is an appeal against the order of the learned Motor Acci-dents Claims Tribunal, Udaipur dated 21st day of September, 1972.
(2.) A claim for compensations for damage to the truck of the appellant and for injuries to its driver involved in an accident which took place on 16th March, 1970, was filed before the said Tribunal. It was alleged that the Bus No. RJS. 1736 collided with the truck. The non-petitioners raised an objection that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim for compensation for damage to the truck. The learned Tribunal held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim and it directed that the claim petition shall be returned to the petitioner for presentation before a proper Court or Tribunal. The reasoning of the learned Tribunal was that before its amendment in 1969, sec. 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, only provided for constitution of a Tribunal for adjudication of claims for compensation for death or bodily injury. Therefore, the Tribunal as it was originally constituted before the amendment had no jurisdiction to abjudicate upon claims relating to property. By a mere amendment of section 110, the jurisdiction cannot be extended without re constitution of the Tribunal. I have heard arguments. The learned counsel for the appellant Mr. B. P. Dave maintained that in the original notification dated Oct. 7, 1966 constituting the Tribunal, it was not mentioned that it was constituted only for adjudicating upon the claims regarding death or bodily injury. The Tribunal was constituted for a particular area and when by an amendment of sec. 110a, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was extended to cover the damages in respect of property as well it automatically acquired the extended jurisdiction. He relies upon Banwarilal vs. Vishnunarayan (1) which is on all fours with the case in hand. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh in a similar situation had held that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain such a claim Another argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that in Dr. Achalmal Singhvi vs. M/s Chand Khan & Sons (2), it was held that even before the amendment, the Tribunal had powers to deal with composite claims and it could adjudicate upon the claim for loss of and damage to property. In that view of the matter, the amendment is merely declaratory and no further reconstitution of the Tribunal was called for. As against this Mr. Ranendra Mehta, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, referred to Wing Commander J. S. Sodhi vs. Lt. Col. I S Deol (3 ). In that case, after the amendment of 1963 came into force, a fresh notification was issued investing the Tribunal with the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon claims for compensation in respect of damage to any property of the third party. Similarly, in Delhi Transport Corporation vs. Shri P. S. Shukla, M. A. G. F. , Delhi (4), in the pre-existing notification an amendment was made in order to give the Tribunal an extended jurisdiction. He urged that similar action should have been taken by the State Government to share too, if it was desired to extend the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. An extreme view is however, taken in B S. Nat vs. Bachan Singh (5) that though the provisions of sec. 110 (1) of the said Act have been amended by Act No. 56 of 1969, so as to enable the States to empower the claims Tribunal to adjudicate the claims in respect of damage to property also, yet since no corresponding consequential amendments have been made in section 110a (1) so as to give right to a third party to file a claim for damages in respect of property, the Tribunals were precuded from adjudicating upon such claims. I have considered over the matter and with due respect, I regret I am in disagreement with the view taken by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in B. S. Nat vs. Bachan Singh (5 ). I am inclined to fall in line with the view taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Banwarilal's case (l) and since the notification of the State Government simply provided for constitution of Tribunals without specifying their jurisdictions, whatever jurisdictions the law allowed at the relevant time, can be exercised by such Tribunals. In that view of the matter, the judgment of the learned Tribunal appears to be erronous. Consequently, I accept this appeal, set aside the order of the learned Tribunal under appeal and direct it to adjudicate upon the claim for compensation with respect to any damage to the property as well. In the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. . ;