- (1.) THIS revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, filed by the applicant Dashrath Chand is directed against an order of the Additional District Judge No. 2, Jodhpur dated 24th September, 1974, dismissing his appeal under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, as barred by limitation.
(2.) THE revision must be allowed on the short ground that the learned additional District Judge has acted illegally and with material irregularity in passing the order that he did. The order of the Payment of Wages authority was made on 30th December, 1972. The applicant applied for the grant of a certified copy on 4th January, 1973. The certified copy was granted to him on 21st February, 1973. The appeal was presented by him on 21st March, 1973, i. e. on the 33rd day. The learned Additional district Judge after excluding 48 days being the time requisite for obtaining a certified copy, held that the appeal was barred by 3 days. The learned Additional District Judge has, however, wrongly dismissed the appeal holding that the period of 30 days for an appeal under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 has to be reckoned from the date of order. That was a literal construction of the words 'date of order'. The section no doubt provides that the appeal may be filed. 'within 30 days from the date of order when made. ' The words 'date of order' must be construed liberally to mean the date of communication or knowledge of the order. The words 'from the date of order' occurring in section 17 of the Act have been so construed in Arumughan v. Jawahar Mills (AIR 1956 Madras 79), and M/s. Sita Ram Mulchand Transport Co. v. Bashir Ahmed (1962 12 Bom. LR 930) That view is in accord with the decisions of the supreme Court in Raja Harishchandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and another (AIR 1961 SC 1500), and Madan Lal v. State of U. P. (AIR 1975 SC 2085 ). Interpreting expression 'date of award' used in proviso (b) to section 18 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1976, their Lordships in Raja Harishchandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and another (supra) held that it must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known to him either actually or constructively. In Madan Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra) their Lordships have placed similar construction on the words 'date of order' in section 17 of the Indian Forests Act, 1927, as meaning the date of knowledge. The decisions of this Court in Bajrang Singh v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1965 Rajasthan 82), and Tej Ram v. State (AIR 1969 Rajasthan 233), on which reliance is placed clearly are distinguishable. In Bajrang Singh v. State of Rajasthan (supra) the decision turned on the provision of S. 33 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952, which cast a duty on the Jagir commissioner to communicate his orders. In Tej Ram v. State (supra)the question was whether the such circumstances a party can complain of the breach of the rules of natural justice.
(3.) IN the present case, the applicant filed an application for condonation dated 24th March, 1973 before the learned Additional District judge, stating that despite his registered letter dated 16th November, 1972 addressed to the Payment of Wages Authority, the authority did not communicate its order. It was mentioned that an intimation was received by him on 4th January, 1973 vide letter No. 36, dated 1st january, 1973 disclosing that the authority had delivered the order on 30th December, 1972, but that he had no notice of the date. Merely because the applicant had at an earlier stage appeared before the Payment of Wages Authority, that did not absolve it of the duty of communicating its order, particularly when the applicant had addressed a registered letter making the request.;