- (1.) THIS appeal, which is brought from an order of the learned jagir Commissioner, dated 22. 8. 1956 under sec. 39 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952, raises two main questions for consideration which may be shortly stated as follows : -
(2.) WHETHER document Exhibit D. I. which was admittedly written by the appellant can be construed in favour of the respondent as containing an unequivocal admission on the part of the former that the Bahndari sub-grant which was created by the Thikana in favour of his ancestors and had devolved on him had been resumed by the Thikana on the ground that the appellant had stopped rendering service to the Thikana which he was bound to do under the sub grant. Whether the learned Jagir Commissioner in arriving at a decision in the matter which was unfavourable to the appellant had adopted a procedure which was not in consonance with the mandatory provisions of Rule 20 (2) of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption Jagirs Rules, and whether he was justified in the absence of adequate material in reaching a conclusion that the sub-grant had been admittedly resumed by the Thikana as alleged by the respondent. Before we proceed to consider these questions upon which the decision of this appeal would ultimately hinge, we think it necessary to give a brief summary of the salient features of the case which constitute its back-ground and against which the crucial questions involved in the matter, arc set. The circumstances of the dispute leading to this litigation between the parties have been fully stated in the report of the Deputy Collector Jagir dated 12. 1. 1956 and for present purposes the narrative may be limited to a few important particulars of the case. It is difficult to make out from the material before us what conditions were attached to the creation of the sub-grant in favour of the ancestors of the appellant. The original Patta which would have thrown sufficient light on the terms of sub-grant was not produced by either of the parties. It has been conceded at the bar that prior to 1950 the appellant had been recognised as a Badhdae by the Thikana. It was alleged that as he had taken up service in Jaipur the sub-grant was resumed by the Thikana between 1950 and 1954. The exact date of its resumption has not been specified by the respondent. The Thikana, however, omitted to make a mention of this sub-grant in the compensation from which was submitted to the learned Jagir Commissioner and which contained a detail of all the sub-grants which had not been resumed. The appellant submitted an application to the learned Jagir Commissioner on 23. 12. 54 raising a claim for compensation under sec. 31 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 which for convenience will hereafter be referred to as the said Act. As the appellant raised a question relating to title in the Mandara Jagir Land the learned Jagir Commissioner instead of making an enquiry into the merits of the question himself sent it to the Deputy Collector Jagir Jhunjhunu under rule 20 for enquiry and report. The respondent appeared through his Mukhtiar before he Deputy Collector Jagir Jhunjhunu and filed a written statement in which he contended that the sub-grant bad been resumed and, therefore, the appellant was not entitled to claim any compensation for it. When the enquiry was adjourned to a subsequent date in order to enable the parties to adduce evidence in support of their respective versions of the matter the respondent did not appear nor did he lead any evidence on the point that the sub-grant had been resumed. The learned Deputy Collector Jagir ordered that proceedings be taken exparte against him. After recording the evidence of three witnesses who were examined by the appellant he submitted a report to the learned Jagir Commissioner emphasising that there was sufficient evidence on the file which pointed to the conclusion that the sub-grant had not been resumed and that the appellant continued to be a Badhdar and should be declared as such. When the matter came up before the learned Jagir Commissioner he allowed an opportunity to the parties to adduce further documentary evidence. The respondent put in a couple of documents in addition to those which he had filed along with bis written statement before the learned Deputy Collector, Jagir Jhunjhunu. After wading through documentary evidence the learned Jagir Commissioner held that the oral evidence adduced by the appellant was not entitled to any credence, in the face documentary evidence adduced by the respondent which established beyond a shadow of doubt that the sub-grant bad been resumed. The findings of the learned Jagir Commissioner were mainly based on document Exhibit D. I. which according to him pointed to the conclusion that the sub-grant had been resumed and the status of the appellant had changed from that of a Badhdar to that of a tenant on a concessional rate of rent, which position was accepted by him. His acceptance of the khatauni also knocked the bottom out of his claim that he was a Badhdar. The learned Jagir Commissioner did not express any opinion whether the appellant should be allowed to enjoy the concessional rate of rent at which the land, which was formerly in his Badhdari, was given to him as a tenant. Against the order of the learned Jagir Commissioner the appellant has filed the present appeal. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and have also examined the record. As the Government was vitally interested in the decision of this appeal a notice was issued to the Govt. Advocate to appear and participate in the proceedings. We have also heard him at some length. At the outset we think it proper to point out that we have proceeded on the assumption that the Thikana was adequately represented before the learned Deputy Collector Jagir by the Mukhtiar, whose claim to represent the Thikana was contested by the appellant. Before we set out to consider the crucial questions involved in the matter we think it necessary to make a few preliminary observations which would help to clear the ground. An 'admission' has been defined in Sec. 17 of the Indian Evidence Act as a statement, oral or documentary, which suggest an inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact. The most generally accepted ground of reception of such statements appears to be that a parties declarations whether for or against his interest when made, may always be taken to be true as against himself. Admissions are however, not conclusive proof of the matters admitted but they may operate as estoppels. The first important rule with regard to admissions is that the whole statement containing the admission must be taken together, for though some part of it may be favourable to the party and the object is only to ascertain what he has conceded against himself and what may, therefore, be presumed to be true, yet unless the whole is received the true meaning of the part which is evidenced against him cannot be ascertained. It is not open to a party to split up the statement and pick out a portion which may be "favourable to him and ignore the rest. 'conclusive proof is defined in sec. 4 of the" Indian Evidence Act as 'when one fact is declared to be conclusive proof on another, the court shall not allow evidence to be given for the purpose of disproving that fact". An admission does not operate as an estoppel is not conclusive. The person against whom it is proved is at liberty to show that it was mistaken or untrue It is also well-established principle of law that when a question is entirely one of construction of a document it can only be properly answered after a consideration of all the surrounding circumstances, the position of the parties to the agreement, its subject-matter and the apparent purpose and object thereof and in particular of the provisions to be construed. For the purpose of gathering the intention the language of the entire deed should be taken into consideration and interpretation to be adopted should be one which gives effect, if possible, to all the parts and does not reject any of them. Too much stress should not be laid on isolated passages but the intention is to be gathered from the document as a whole. With these preliminary observations we turn to the questions which have been posted in this appeal and proceed to answer them. The first question turns largely upon document, Exhibit D. I. As this document figures prominently in the controversy between the parties it is necessary to give a rendering of its relevant portions in English instead of quoting it textually - "i have been considerably pained to learn that the Thikana is realising rent from the sub-tenants directly when I continue to be a Badhdar. In pursuance of the parchas which have been distributed by the Thikana, I am prepared to deposit rent. As the rent of the remaining Badhdars is not being realised directly by the Thikana I am at a loss to make out why my rights as a Badhdar are being extinguished. I am prepared to appear personally and settle the matter relating to payment of rent. " Through the remaining parts runs a note of protest against the invidious treatment meted out to the appellant who has repeatedly laid stress on the circumstances that he is considerably embarrased by financial difficulties. The circumstances in which document Exhibit D. I. was written are described in great detail in the evidence of Jassu Singh which establishes beyond any manner of doubt that document Exibit D. I. was obtained from the appellant under pressure when he was in a week state of health. Document Exhibit D. I. is apparently based on the assumption that the Thikana had resumed the sub-grant and had started collecting rent directly from the sub-tenants. The appellant was certainly justified in proving facts from which it could be inferred that document Exhibit D. T. was based upon a mis-conception of the true position. The circumstances which tell against the contention of the Thikana that the sub-grant had been resumed may be briefly enumerated as follows - (1) There was no apparent reason why the Thikana should have collected rent only from a few sub-tenants and not from others, if the sub-grants had been resumed. (2) Instead of crediting this amount directly to the revenues of the Thikana it was kept in suspense account, which clearly indicates that the Thikana was not quite sure whether the sub-grant had been resumed. The Explanation furnished on behalf of the Thikana that as the total amount of rent had not been collected from all the subtenants, it could not be credited to the account of the Thikana, is on the face of it of a halting and suspicious nature. (3) There is documentary evidence which indicates that the Thikanadar had been enquiring from other Thikanas whether such grants could be resumed or not as late as the year 1954. If the sub-grant had been resumed, as is made out on behalf of the Thikana between the years 1950 and 1954, there was hardly any justification for pursuing such enquiries. (4) It has not been possible for the Thikana to specify the exact date or the year in which the sub-grant was resumed. (5) Even after the so called resumption of the sub-grant in respect of a village situated in another Tehsil the amount was erroneously collected by the Tehsildar and was subsequently refunded to the appellant without any objection from the Thikana. The Tehsildar had probably proceeded on the assumption that the sub-grant had been resumed by the State. (6) The notification No. 4 (388) Rev. 1/53, dated 18. 11. 1955 issued by the Govt. of Rajasthan leave hardly any room for doubt in one's mind that the sub-grant was still in existence. If it had been resumed by the Thikana this notification would not have been issued. Under sec. 114 illustration E of the Indian Evidence Act. there is a presumption about the correctness of the official acts. This presumption has not been rebutted nor has i it been shown that the notification which was subsequently issued by the Govt. was based on an error. (7) Even if it be assumed that the Thikanadar had taken a decision to resume the sub-grant though there is no material on the file to warrant such an assumption, it stands to reason that he would have taken steps to inform the person who was adversely affected by it that his rights as Badhdar had been extinguished. Failure on the part of the Thikana to do so leads to the inference that the sub-grant had not been resumed. These circumstances taken singly or collectively would militate against the contention of the Thikana that the sub-grant had been resumed. It was frankly admitted on behalf of the Thikana that the only documentary evidence on which reliance could be placed in support of its contention that the sub-grant had been resumed was document Exhibit D. I. It was rightly conceded that the acceptance of the Khatauni by the appellant would not change bis status from that ofa Badhdar to that of a tenant. Document Exhibit D. I. as we have shown above, is not entitled to much weight, when we consider the circumstances under which it was written. It was apparently based on a mis-conception of the real facts. The answer to the first question would, therefore, be that document Exhibit D I. cannot be construed in favour of the respondent as it turns upon a mis-conception of the real position and is not conclusive of the facts set out in it. It could not therefore, be considered sufficiently itself for proving that the Badhdari sub-grant had been resumed by the Thikana. Not an iota of evidence was adduced on behalf of the Thikana in order to indicate that as the appellant had violated one of the conditions which was attached to the sub-grant he had exposed himself to the risk of his sub-grant being resumed. Dealing with the second question we may point out that rule 20 (2) lays down a procedure which is to be observed by the jagir Commissioner upon receipt of the report made under sub-rule (1 ). It was incumbent on him to afford all persons including the Government, affected thereby, opportunity to lodge objections against the same and after hearing them, if they appear, with respect thereto and with respect to the objections, if any, lodged by them, to pass such orders as he deemed reasonable and proper. The procedure adopted by the learned Jagir Commissioner was not in consonance with the provisions of this sub-rule. It was suggested by the learned Government Advocate that the learned Jagir Commissioner, as was provided in sec. 37 of the said Act, could pass such orders in the matter as he deemed fit. It was contended on the provisions of this section that he has ample discretion in the matter which he could exercise in any manner which he thought proper. These words, which are similar to the words used in sec. 115, C. P. C. , have been judicially construed in a large number of rulings. It has been held that these words would not justify interference on the part of the High Court in a case where such interference is likely to work not in the interest of justice, but against it (See 20 A I. R. 1930 Allahabad 144, 18 A. I. R. 1931 Calcutta 425 ). The learned Jagir Commissioner could not exercise his discretion in the matter in an arbitrary manner, but in accordance with the principles of justice and fair play. He could not disregard the circumstances which taken individually or collectively would lead to an irresistible conclusion that the sub-grant had not been resumed. From the facts set out above it would appear that in dealing with the matter the Jagir Commissioner disregarded the mandatory provisions of law contained in rule 20 sub-rule (2 ). He was not justified in evolving a procedure which was different from that laid down in the sub-rule. The answer to the second question would, therefore, be that the order of the learned Jagir Commissioner which is based upon scanty material and which has been arrived at after disregarding the procedure laid down in law, can not be sustained. Two other points which were raised in the course of arguments before us by the learned Govt. Advocate may be mentioned here ; one was that once a Jagir had been resumed by the Govt. certain consequences, which were dealt with in Sec. 22 of the said Act, would flow from it. Taking into consideration the consequences it was incumbent on the appellant to establish that his sub-grant continued to exist. This point loses sight of the fact that it was admitted on behalf of the Thikana that the sub-grant was in existence prior to the year 1950. This fact coupled with the notification which was subsequently issued by the Govt. and which has been referred to above would indicate beyond any manner of doubt that the sub-grant had not been resumed by the Thikana. The onus which lay upon the appellant had, therefore, been adequately discharged by him. The second point was that some of the documents on which reliance was placed by the appellant had not been proved in accordance with law and had been erroneously admitted by the learned Deputy Collector, Jagir, Jhunjhunu. Attention was drawn to the entry in the Misal Haquyat relating to the existence of the sub-grant. Unfortunately for the appellant the learned Deputy Collector, Jagir, instead of placing a certified copy of the entry on the record admitted another copy, which did not bear any certificate. The certified copy which was produced before us by the appellant indicated clearly that the entry about the existence of the sub-grant ran in his favour. This technical defect has, therefore, been sufficiently cured. For the reasons which have been given in great detail in the body of the judgment, we are clearly of opinion that the learned Jagir Commissioner reached a conclusion in the matter which was neither warranted by the facts nor by law. We are doubtful whether the sub-grant could be resumed by the Thikana, in view of the provisions of Art. 31 of the Constitution of India, which provide that a person shall not be deprived of his property save by the authority of law. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the order of the learned Jagir Commissioner, and hold that the Badhdari sub-grant which stood in the name of the appellant had not been resumed by the Thikana, and that he is entitled to all the benefits which would accrue to a sub-grantee under the said Act. . ;