- (1.) THE circumstances which have given rise to this application in revision may briefly be stated as below - Bhonralal and others the plaintiff-applicants purchased the land in dispute from the defendants, the opposite party on 22. 3. 29 and applied for mutation of the sals in their names before the Tehsildar, who dismissed the same on 30. 7. 36 on the ground that the opposite-party denied the receipt of consideration. THEy then filed a suit on 5. 12. 14 presumably under sec. 52 of the Bharatpur State Revenue Code (Act No. II of 1905) before the Collector Deeg, of the former Bharatpur State for a declaration of their title and mutation of their names in place of the opposite party who had admittedly sold the land, got the sale deed registered and delivered possession of the land to them. THE main point which arose for consideration in the case before the trial court was whether the period of limitation in the suit be computed from the date of the registration of the sale or the refusal of mutation. THE trial court after hearing the parties observed that in suits of this nature, the period of limitation was to be computed from the date of the sale and not from the date of the refusal of mutation. Accordingly the suit which was evidently instituted more than 15 years from the date of the registration of the sale-deed, was dismissed as barred by limitation. In appeal, the then Revenue Commissioner of the former Bharatpur State also held the same view and dismissed the plaintiff's suit, as being time-barred. THE plaintiffs went in second appeal to the Board of Revenue of the former United State of Matsya. THE learned member observed that the period of limitation in a case of this nature began to run from 30. 7. 36, i. e. when mutation was refused and the rights of the applicants were invaded and a cause of action accrued to them.- But for the reason that as the suit was instituted on 5. 12. 14, i. e. , more than 6 years from the date when the cause of action arose, it was barred by limitation under art. 120 of the Limitation Act which provides six years for the institution of such suits. Accordingly the appeal was rejected with costs. A review application against the said order prevailed with the same learned Member who in his changed capacity as Addl. Commissioner in the new set up after the formation of Rajasthan allowed it on the ground that the period of limitation was not to be governed by Art. 120 of the Limitation Act but should be computed as given in the Schedule to the Bharatpur Revenue Cole. Accordingly he reheard the appeal. THE learned Addl. Commissioner observed that a reference to the schedule to the Bharatpur State Revenue Code would show that at item No. 13 against secs. 52 to 54 suits of every kind as to biswedari and possession by mortgage, sale and gift, were to be instituted within a period of 15 years. It also pointed out that unfortunately the point of time from which the limitation was to run was not mentioned in the column for 'remarks' but considering the omnibus type of the description of suits and the extraordinarily long period of limitation, the learned Addl. Commissioner thought that it should commence from 22. 3. 29 i. e. the date of the registration of the sale-deed. Applying this principle he again dismissed the appeal on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation. It is against this order of the learned Addl. Commissioner that the present revision has been filed before us.
(2.) THE learned counsel for the applicants argued that as there was no period of limitation prescribed for applying for mutation of a sale of land, the vendees who are the applicants before us could apply for mutation as and when they chose. THEy were lawfully in possession of the land since the time the sale had been duly registered and, evidently, they had no apprehension to the effect that the vendor opposite party would ever contest the mutation on the ground of non-receipt of consideration. It was only when the said application for mutation was rejected that a cause of action arose and accordingly the applicants filed the present suit on 5. 12. 44 within the prescribed period of 15 years to be computed from the date of the rejection of the mutation application on 30. 7. 36. It was also urged that it was a well laid principle of law that if the point of time from which the limitation was to run was not specifically mentioned in the schedule as was the case in the present proceedings, it should be construed in favour of the suitor, so as not to deprive him from exercising his rights. THE learned counsel for the opposite party refused these contentions by arguing that in the absence of any clear provisions in the schedule to the Bharatpur Revenue Code as to the point of time from which limitation was to run in such cases it should be taken to be 15 years from the date of the registration of the sale deed when the right to sue for the declaration of their title had accrued to the applicants. We have carefully examined item 13 of the schedule to the Bharatpur Revenue Code which is reproduced as below - Name of Section. Kind of suit. Limitation. Remarks 50 to 54 Suits of every kind as to biswedari and possession by mortgage, sale and gift. 15 years. X It is significant that except under this item the time from which the period of limitation is to run has been mentioned in the column for 'remarks' against all the items given in the Schedule. It is a well laid rule of interpretation of a statute that "where the language of a statute is clear, the court is bound to give effect to its plain meaning uninfluenced by extraneous considerations but that where the language of the enactment is not itself precise or is ambiguous or of doubtful import recourse may be had to extraneous considerations. No exception can be recognised to these rules of construction in the case of the Limitation Act. There is thus no room for an equitable construction of the provisions of the Act where the language of such provision is plain and clear. But where the language is not precise or is of doubtful import, the provision should be construed equitably. In the case of the Limitation Act which takes away a right to sue, an equitable construction, where the language is not clear would be to adopt a construction in favour of the right to proceed rather than one barring such right. It is in this view that it is generally observed that the Limitation Act must be construed in favour of the right to sue. (Indian Limitation Act by Chitely page 13-14, III Edition, 1952 ). Applying this rule of construction to item 13 of the schedule to the Bharatpur Revenue Code referred to above, we find that the framers of the Code for reasons which we cannot gather from the Code itself, did not precisely state the point of time from which limitation was to run in such cases. As a rule, however, the period of limitation runs from the date when a cause of action arises and a right to sue accrues to a party unless otherwise specifically stated. In the present suit which in substance corresponds to one under sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, the cause of action accouts when the plaintiff feels aggrieved, for the simple reason that if the plaintiff is in possession or enjoyment of the property in suit he is not obliged to sue for a declaration of title on the first or on each succeeding denial of his title by the defendants. He may look upon each denial with complacency or at his option may institute a suit to falsify the assertions of the other side. But when his rights are actually jeopardised by the action or assertion of the defendants then he must take proceedings within the prescribed period of time which will run from the date of such action or assertion. An authority on this point is 1928 Lahore page 516, wherein the above view was held. In I. L. R. 15, Madras page 350, in a suit for mutation of names in register, their Lordships observed that time would begin to run from the date of the Collector's refusal to register. Thus it appears to be a well established principle that where the plaintiff is in actual possession or enjoyment of the property each fresh invasion of his rights gives him a fresh cause of action to bring suit for declaration of his title. In the case before us, it is common ground between the parties that the land in question had been sold to the plaintiff-applicants whoever since the date of the registration of the sale, i. e. 22. 3. 29 have remained in possesion thereof. They have since then been enjoying this property as full owners and could ask for a mutation of entry in the record of rights in place of the opposite-party defendant vendor as and when they chose to do so because no period of limitation, was prescribed in the Bharatpur Revenue Code for initiating mutation proceedings. It was only for the first time, i. e. , on 30. 7. 36 when the opposite-party contested the mutation proceedings, on ground of non-payment of consideration and the consequent refusal of the Tehsildar to effect mutation on that ground that the applicant's rights were jeopardised and having felt aggrieved from this invasion on their title they filed the present suit. We therefore hold that the period of limitation would run from the aforesaid date, viz. 30. 7. 36. Since the present suit was filed on 5. 12. 44, i. e. within 15 years from the date of the refusal of mutation when the cause of action arose, it is not barrel by limitation. Accordingly we allow this application, set aside the orders of the lower courts and direct that the case be sent back to the trial court for disposal according to law. .;