Wanchoo, C. J. - (1.) THESE are four connected applications under Art. 226 of the Constitution and we propose to deal with them in one judgment.
(2.) THE applicants in all these cases are original residents of District Narnol in the former Pepsu State. THEy say that they came to Bharatpur District in 1947. From there they shifted to Alwar District in 1950. In Svt. 2011 (i. e. 1954 A. D.), the applicants came to know that certain evacuee land was available for cultivation in villages Khilori and Niboli of Tehsil Ramgarh in the District of Alwar. Consequently, they applied to the Naib Tehsildar for grant of Patta of these lands and certain Pattas were granted to them for a period of five years from July, 1954 to June 1959. THEy had been cultivating that land since July, 1954. But in July, 1956 the Naib Tehsildar gave notice to them that their Pattas had been cancelled and asked them to deposit the Pattas in the Tehsil and file objections, if any, to the cancellation of the Pattas. THE applicants filed objections, but they eventually received orders from the Naib Tehsildar of the 21st of February, 1957 forbidding them from cultivating the land in future as it was to be allotted to local persons. Consequently the applicants came to this Court for issue of a writ of prohibition. THEir case is that the order of the Naib Tehsildar cancelling the Pattas and forbidding them to cultivate the land is illegal and without jurisdiction. THE applicants claim that these orders are in violation of secs. 161 and 181 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and rule 14 of the Evacuee Property Rules. THEy say that they had not violated any of the conditions of the lease and cannot be ejected during the term of the lease. The applications have been opposed on behalf of the opposite parties. Their case is that the Pattas were granted to the applicants by the Naib Tehsildar in his capacity as ex-officio Assistant Custodian. It is contended that the Naib Tehsildar as ex-officio Assistant Custodian was entitled under rule 14 of the Rules framed under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act to order the ejectment of the applicant. If is further contended that the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act were not applicable to lands which are evacuee property and there was thus no violation of any of the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act as the applicants had not acquired any tenancy rights. It is also urged that the applicants had an alternative remedy and, therefore, this Court should not grant them any relief under its extraordinary jurisdiction. We shall first consider whether this Court should grant any relief to the applicants in this case and whether they had any alternative remedy open to them. There is no doubt that the land is evacuee property and rule 14 of the rules framed under the Evacuee Property Act gives certain special powers to the Custodian, Deputy Custodian and Assistant Custodian in respect of tenants of evacuee property. Our attention has also been drawn to a notification No F. 6 (2) RR/l1/52, dated January 31, published in the Rajasthan Gazette, dated 7th February, 1953 Part I at page 1008. Under this notification, all Naib Tehsildars in Alwar and Bharatpur districts have been appointed Assistant Custodians ex-officio. But it is remarkable that though the lands are said to have been dealt with by the Naib Tehsildar under his capacity and powers as Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Property, he does not seems to have signed anywhere even when Pattas were granted, as Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Property. He has all along signed as Naib Tehsildar. Further, when notice was given to the applicants on 28th of July, 1956 informing them that their Pattas had been cancelled and that they would only be given Pattas for the Kharif crop and if they had any objection, they should appear on the 12th of August, 1936, no mention was made anywhere in the notices under what provision of law these notices were being given and the Naib Tehsildar did not even sign as Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Property. Similarly, when the last order was passed on the 21st of Feb. , 1957, no provision of the law was mentioned under which it was passed and it was passed and it was shown as issued from the Tehsil and somebody signed it as Incharge of Sub Tehsil, Ramgarh. We are now told that in fact all these orders were passed under rule 14 of the Rules under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act and that the Naib Tehsildar passed them as Assistant Custodian. That may in fact be so. But there was nothing on the face of these orders to show that they had been passed by an Assistant Custodian under the Evacuee Property Rules. Even the Pattas which were granted to the applicants did not show that they were being granted by the Assistant Custodian. The only fact which the applicants knew was that this property was evacuee property. The question is whether under these circumstances, it can be said that the applicants should have known that they had an alternative remedy under sec. 27 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act (No. XXXI of 1950) by applying in revision to the Custodian General. We are of opinion that it is the duty of officers who are acting under a certain provision of law and dealing with the rights of third parties to show in their notices and orders under what provision of the law they are acting and in what capacity. If they do not do so, they cannot be heard by us to say that third parties with whose rights they have meddled had an alternative remedy, because they really acted under some undisclosed provision of law and in some undisclosed capacity, other than what appears in their orders and notices. This is not a solitary case of this kind that has come to our notice. As a matter of fact, learned counsel for the applicants went so far as to say that these officers dealing with these matters deliberately do not show under what law and in what capacity they are acting, so that the persons with whose rights they are meddling may not know what further remedies they have. Considering therefore that this sort of thing seems to be general in this part of the State, we are not prepared to reject the applications on the ground that the applicants had another remedy under some law, when the remedy under that other law cannot be apparent from the orders and notices issued by the authorities concerned. Persons in the position of the applicants, who are, after all is said and done, ordinary ignorant village cultivators cannot know in the case of orders passed in these cases by looking at the orders that they are dealing with order under the Evacuee Property law. Nor would an ordinary counsel be able to tell them on looking at the notices of the 28th of July, 1956, and the order of the 21st of February, 1957 that these are Evacuee Property proceedings and they should go to the Custodian General. Unless, therefore an order of this nature interfering with the rights of third parties shows under what law it was passed and by what officer, so that the persons affected may know what alternative remedy they have, we would not be prepared to deny justice to persons who come to this Court against such orders. Our attention in this connection was drawn to Jaimal vs. Collector, Alwar (1 ). That was also our decision. In that case we were dealing with an order of the Tehsildar who was ex-officio Assistant Custodian. We then said that if the applicants were aggrieved by the orders of the Assistant Custodian, they could seek relief by going to the Custodian or Custodian General In the alternative we said that if the orders were not of the Assistant Custodian, the applicants in that case had remedy by a suit as they claimed to be owners of the property by some kind of auction. We have looked into the original record of that case and we find that in that case the order of the ex-officio Assistant Custodian was not produced. We, therefore, did not know what was the form of the order and whether it had been signed as an Assistant Custodian or something else. It was in those circumstances that we said in the alternative that If the order was of the Assistant Custodian, the remedy lay by appeal or revision to the Custodian or Custodian General and it the order was not of the Assistant Custodian, the remedy lay by way of a suit. That case should therefore, be confined to cases where the copy of the order against which relief is sought is not available to the Court. The position in our opinion is different where the order in question is produced as in these cases. Here we find that the order and the notices do not show that they had anything to do with evacuee property law or rules. The Naib Tehsildar also signed not as Assistant Custodian but as Naib Tehsildar. In these circumstances, if the applicants did not know that they had to go to the Custodian General under sec. 27 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, we cannot blame them. Further, in such cases we would not be prepared to hear the officer who has been guilty of all these laches to say that though he never mentioned the law under which he was acting or the capacity in which he was acting, we should debar the third persons with whose rights he has meddled, now that he is telling this Court the law under which he acted and the capacity in which he acted. It is in our opinion the duty of officers meddled with the interests of third parties to state in their notices and orders the capacity in which they are acting and the law under which they are acting and if they fail to do so, we may not deny justice to those affected by their orders on the ground that there was alternative remedy available. It was next urged that even if we do not reject the petitions on the ground that the applicants should have gone to the Custodian General, we should reject them on the ground that they had an alternative remedy against the order of the Naib Tehsildar on the revenue side. Here again, what we have said above applies to a large extent, though not fully. All that we need say is that this order has been passed by the Naib Tehsildar under the orders of the Collector. The order does not show under what provision of the law it has been passed. Therefore the applicants will have to find out where they should go in appeal. For example, if this is an order in some judicial proceeding, the applicants will have to go in appeal or revision to one set of authorities. If on the other hand, it is an executive order, the applicants cannot have legal redress against it except perhaps by approaching the Board of Revenue which has general power of superintendence. We are therefore of opinion that where such orders are passed dealing with the rights of third parties and it is not clear under what provision of the law they have been passed, or whether they are judicial or executive, we should not deny justice to the applicants if they come to us on the off chance that there may be some authority somewhere on the revenue side which might be able to interfere with such an order of the Naib Tehsildar. We are therefore not prepared to deny justice to the applicants on the basis of the preliminary objection raised in these cases. The main point urged on behalf of the applicants is that they have been given Pattas for five years and even if the Naib Tehsildar had powers under rule 14 of the Rules under the Evacuee Property law, he could not cancel them in the present case. It is enough for this purpose to refer to rule 14 of the Rules framed under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. Sub-rules (2) and (5: of the Rule 14 are the only rules that are relevant. Sub-rule (2) obviously does not apply. The justification that has been sought by the opposite parties is based on sub-rule (5) which is as follows: - "nothing in this rule shall be deemed to abridge or limit the power of the Custodian to cancel or vary the terms of a lease relating to evacuee property, or to evict a lessee of such property, where he is of the opinion that, for reasons to be recorded in writing, it is necessary or expedient to do so for the preservation or the proper administration or management of such property or for carrying out any other object of the Act. " The submission on behalf of the opposite parties in this connection is in this way. The Collector, who is ex-officio Deputy Custodian in order to carry out the objects of the Act to settle local landless tenants (Meos etc.) decided to cancel the leases of the petitioners who were not local tenants and to allow the lands to landless tenants. The petitioners are not local landless tenants, but they belong to the State of Pepsu which is now Punjab. Thus the opposite parties took their stand on that part of sub-rule (5) which gives power to the Custodian, (which word includes Deputy Custodian as well as Assistant Custodian) to cancel a lease for carrying out any other object of the Act. Now, whatever may be the objects of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, it is to our mind clear beyond all doubt that the object of that Act is not to provide for local landless tenants in preference to others to whom evacuee property might have been allotted for a term of years. We need not refer to the provision of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act to justify this view. There is nothing in that Act which lays down anywhere in any section or rule that one of the objects of the Act is that local landless tenants should be given preference and outside tenants who hold evacuee property for a fixed term should be evicted before their term is over. The only justification therefore put forward by the opposite parties for cancellation of the lease fails. The error is on our opinion an error of law apparent on the face of the record. We therefore allow the applications with costs to the opposite parties and set aside the notices, dated the 28th of July, 1956 and the orders dated the 1st of February, 1957 and prohibit the opposite parties from ejecting the applicants under those notices and orders. .;