- (1.) THIS appeal has been filed under sec. 39 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against the order of the Jagir Commissioner, Rajasthan, Jaipur, dated 20. 8. 56
(2.) PUT briefly the acts of the case are that Thakur Sobhag Singh, Jagirdar of Jhakora, the appellant, whose Thikana had been resumed under the Act on or about the 24th Sept. 1954, filed a statement before the Jagir Commissioner claiming compensation for the whole jagir including village Peepal-ka-Bas The respondent contested it on the ground that this village had been granted to her by her husband, the appellant, in 1930 in Khangi and a Patta to that effect was also executed by him in her favour and that ever since she had been in possession of this village in her own right and collected rents and appropriated the same for her maintenance. She prayed that the village being a sub-grant, it was not liable to resumption, and may be given back to her. After making enquiries through the Collector the learned Jagir Commissioner ordered that this being a sub-grant the village was not liable to resumption and it may be given back to the respondent as it was in her Khangi. The appellant filed a writ petition before the Hon'ble High Court of Rajasthan contesting the propriety of the order given by the learned Jagir Commissioner about the return of the village to the respondent. This Lordships of the High Court held in their judgment, dated 12. 10. 56 that the proceedings that were taken for giving back the village to the Thakurani were not taken under Chapter VII of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952. They also observed that any disputed title has to be decided whether there is a question as to who should receive the compensation under sec. 37 of the Act: and that these proceedings which were not taken under sec. 37 of the Act will have no force and effect and if and when a question arises as to who should get the compensation of the Thikana. If at that stage a dispute is raised properly under sec. 37, it will be for the authority concerned to decide that dispute on the merits without any regard for these orders. With these remarks the writ application was dismissed. In the meantime the Thakurani had already filed on 1. 11. 55 a statement claiming compensation under sec. 37 of the Act for this village, which was resumed subsequently. The matter was again enquired into by the learned Dy Collector, Jagir. After a protected enquiry, the Dy. Collector, Jagir to whom the matter was sent for enquiry under sec 42 (2) of the Act, observed that the matter whether the village was in the Khangi of the respondent had long ago been decided by the Prime Minister, Jaipur, by this order dated 6. 5. 47. It was pointed out that as this order was given by a competent authority within the meaning of sec 37 of the Act, no further enquiry was necessary and the respondent was entitled to get compensation in respect of village Peepal-ka-Bas under the provision of the Act. This report was submitted to the learned Jagir Commissioner who also agreed with the learned Dy. Collector and rejected the claim of the appellant Being aggrieved from this order the appellant has filed this appeal before us. The main contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that neither the learned Dy. Collector, Jagir nor the learned Jagir Commissioner made enquiries in the matter in the manner as contemplated under sec. 37 of the Act, and that no reasonable opportunity was given to him to meet the case which was put up by the respondent. It was also urged that the decision of the learned Prime Minister of Jaipur relied upon by the lower court was not that of a competent authority on the point that the village was in the Jagir Khangi of the respondent. It was also urged that even if it be considered for the sake of argument that the jagirdar, appellant, had granted this village for the maintenance of his wife the respondent, it was subsequently resumed by him in 1954 by a Patta, dated 16. 7. 54 and therefore, the respondent was not entitled to claim any compensation for it. As against this the learned counsel for the respondend urged that the decision of the learned Prime Minister of the former Jaipur State was conclusive on the point that the village was enjoyed by the lady in her Khangi granted by the appellant, and that ever since she had been appropriating rents and the income of the village, for this purpose. It was also urged that this order being of a competent authority it was not necessary for the learned Jagir Commissioner to make any further detailed enquiry in the matter. It was also contended that the learned counsel for the appellant had fully argued this case before the lower courts and enough opportunity was given to him to prove his case and that there was no violation of the principles of natural justice. Further, it was pointed out that even if the Jagirdar resumed this Khangi village, he could not do so in an arbitrary manner after the Constitution of India had come into force. In order to appreciate the weight of these arguments we have ourselves gone into the decision of the learned Prime Minister of Jaipur on which the lower courts have based their decision. It appears that the Govt of Jaipur issued a notification on 8. 7. 1945 that bona fide Hawalas which existed at the time of settlement will for the present be excluded from the settlement. In pursuance of this the Kamdar of Thikana, Jhakora (the appellant) made an application to the Settlement Department requesting that as Peepal-ka-Bas was held in Khangi by the Thakurani, namely, the respondent under a Patta executed in February, 1930, the settlement introduced in that village may be cancelled. The cultivators of the village objected to the cancellation of the settlement. The settlement department made necessary enquiries in the matter and the Assistant Settlement Officer recommended that the village having been granted in khangi, the parchas issued to the cultivators be cancelled The Settlement Officer however, disagreed with the A. S. O. on the ground that the Khangi assignment appears to be excessive and the village be recorded as Khangi in the name of the lady, but the settlement assessment should stand. Against this the Thikana filed objections before the Special Board appointed by the Government of the former Jaipur State to go into such matters. The Special Board, after ex mining the facts of the case, recommended to the Govt. that village Peepal-ka-Bas be recorded in the Hawala of the respondent, Thakurani Bikanwatji of Thakur Sobhag Singh of Jhakora and the settlement parchas distributed to the tenants of the village be treated as cancelled. This recommendation was approved by the learned Prime Minister. Accordingly, entries in the record-of-rights were made showing the respondent as a sub-grantee of village Peeal-ka-Bas. It is clear that the order given by the learned Prime Minister of Jaipur was made in a proceeding in which the Thakur, the appellant as well as the respondent were the parties in common against the tenants in which the Thakur himself had in so many words clearly stated that the village was in the Khangi of his wife, the respondent. He cannot now be allowed to blow hot and cold by resiling from the position which he had taken in a regular proceeding before an authority competent to decide the dispute. It is a well-settled principle that a litigant party cannot be permitted to assume inconsistent positions in court, to play fast and loose, to approbate and reprobate to the detriment of his opponent and this wholesome doctrine applies not only to the succession stages of the same suit but also to a suit other than the one in which the position was taken up provided the second suit grows out of the judgment in the first suit (Page 958, Munir's Law of Evidence, Edition III ). The settlement department or the Special Board or even for the matter of that the learned Prime Minister of Jaipur who was also admittedly in charge of the revenue portfolio were competent to decide as to whether or not the village was in the Khangi of the respondent. The entries in the record-of-rights which followed this decision also confirm the fact that the village was in the Khangi of the respondent. There is a statutory presumption of correctness attached to these entries and nothing has been shown to us as to why these entries be disregarded. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the Patta was subsequently cancelled by him in 1954 is without any substance because having once granted the village the profits of which were admittedly appropriated by the respondent since 1930, the appellant had hardly any power to withdraw the grant in an arbitrary manner. Such an unilateral transaction divesting a person from his property is hit by Art. 31 of the Indian Constitution. Further it has not been proved at all by the appellant that prior to the resumption of the Jagir this village had ceased to remain the Khangi of the lady or that it remained in possession of the appellant as a Jagirdar of the village. As regards the contention of the appellant that he was not given a reasonable opportunity to argue his case, it is clear that after several adjournments, the case was heard by the learned Dy. Collector, Jagir. The learned Dy. Collector, Jagir went through the documents which were relied upon by both the parties in the earlier proceedings including the one produced by the appellant before him. He also heard the arguments and then decided that the order of the learned Prime Minister of Jaipur regarding the title of the respondent on this village being that of a competent authority precluded the necessity of any further enquiry under sec. 37 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952. The appellant filed objection against this proposal before the learned Jagir Commissioner who, after giving a hearing to the learned counsel for the parties, agreed with the proposal of the learned Dy Collector, Jagir. Having examined all these proceedings and taking into consideration the circumstances under which the Thakur wanted to deprive the lady of her rightful claim for compensation, we are clear in our minds that there had been no violation of the principles of natural justice The learned Government advocate to whom we had also given a notice also supports the order given by the learned Jagir Commissioner on the ground that on or prior to the date of resumption, it has been established beyond doubt that the respondent had been enjoying this village in her Khangi. The learned Govt. advocate also agrees that it was not necessary for the learned Jagir Commissioner to hold any further enquiry in the matter under sec. 37 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, as the matter had already been decided in the past by a competent authority, viz. the Prime Minister of Jaipur, by his order dated 6. 5. 47, within the meaning of sec. 37 of the Act. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the order given by the learned Jagir Commissioner is correct and calls for no interference. In the result, the appeal is dismissed and the order given by the learned Jagir Commissioner is upheld. . ;