MOHAMMAD RAFIQ,J. - (1.) This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 19.5.2007 passed by learned Addl. Distt. and Sessions Judge (FT), Chomu Distt. Jaipur whereby the accused appellant Ram Karan was convicted and sentenced as under: U/s. 302 IPC: sentenced to life imprisonment and fine of Rs. 5,000/-; in default of payment of fine to further undergo six months simple imprisonment. U/s. 201 IPC: sentenced to three years Simple Imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default to undergo imprisonment for one month; U/s. 404 IPC: Sentenced to undergo three years imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default to undergo imprisonment for a period of one month.
(2.) The facts leading to this appeal are that an information was received on 3.7.2005 at about 7.35 pm that a dead body of a child was lying in Dabar Ki Pahari. On this information, Inayat Ali, ASI along with his party reached the place of occurrence where Ram Karan son of Kalu Ram made a written report that his brother Kishan Lal had started from his house on 30.6.2005 in the morning at about 7.30 am for a haircut but he did return back and as such, a report dated 2.7.2005 was lodged about Kishan Lal being missing. When the search was going on, the dead body of Kishan Lal was found in the ravines of Dadar. As the cause of death was known, an inquest report No.16/2005 under Section 174 Cr.P.C , 1973was made on 4.7.2005. Inayat Ali in his enquiry submitted report that looking to the place of occurrence and post mortem, the dead body of Kishan Lal has been thrown away in the deep ravines in order to conceal the evidence of crime. On this report FIR No. 204/2005 under Section 302, 201 IPC was registered and on investigation, the police concluded that the appellant is responsible for the crime and a charge-sheet under Section 302, 201 and 404 IPC was filed against the appellant in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Chomu. The Court of Judicial Magistrate, Chomu committed the case to the Court of Distt. and Sessions Judge, Jaipur from where it was transferred for trial to the court of Addl. Distt. and Sessions Judge (Fast Track), Chomu. 4. The appellant was charged by the trial court for offence under Section 302, 201 and 404 IPC. As the appellant denied having committed the offences charged, the trial was commenced. The prosecution in its evidence examined P.W.-1 Ashok, P.W.-2 Raj Kumar, P.W.-3 Mahesh, P.W.-4 Bodu Ram, P.W.-5 Gopal, P.W.-6 Gautam, P.W.-7 Dinesh, P.W.-8 Babu lal, P.W.-9 Jagdish, PW-10 Lal Chand Kumawat, P.W.-11 Dr. Sumant Datta, P.W.-12 Bajran Lal, P.W.- 13 Tejpal, P.W.-14 Subhas, P.W.-15 Mahendra Singh, PW-16 Beena Bharti, P.W.-17 Gajanand, P.W.-18 Iniyat Ali, P.W.-19 Atar Singh and P.W.-20 Dr. Rajendra Kakkad. In defence evidence the appellant examined DW-1 Smt. Lali. 5. The learned trial court after hearing both the parties, passed the impugned judgment and order dated 19.5.2007. Hence this appeal has been filed. 6. Shri Anshuman Saxena, learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the entire prosecution evidence led against the appellant was sufficient even to create a genuine doubt about commission of any offence. The learned trial court on the evidence of interested witnesses of the family members of the deceased has wrongly concluded that the case against the appellant under above mentioned sections of Indian Penal Code is proved. It has been argued that the appellant infact has been falsely roped in this case on account of enmity in the circumstances that the police was able to locate as to who has committed the crime and the appellant was named by the interested witnesses on account of enmity and lurking suspicion. 7. It is argued that the case set up by the prosecution against the appellant is wholly unfounded in as much as according to the prosecution, it was the appellant who after 4 days of the elopement of Kishan Lal along with 5 others boys/children had gone to Dadar Ki Doongri where the dead body of the deceased was found. Had the appellant been the culprit, he would have never taken his associates to the place where the dead body was found. In fact, this is the circumstance which goes to prove that after 3 days when Kishan Lal did come back, the appellant and other associate went to search Kishan Lal and the dead body of Kishan Lal was first seen by Vijay Pal who called others to see the dead body and since Viajy Pal was having enmity with the appellant, the appellant was blamed as the culprit without any rhyme or reasons. 8. It is submitted that the learned trial court was wrong in concluding that the appellant was lastly seen with Kishan Lal and for this purpose, it relied on the evidence of Gautam Sen, who was the barber to whose shop Kishan Lal had gone for a Haircut. This witness has stated that Kishan lal had come alone and he also went away alone from his shop. P.W.-6 Gautam Sen was declared hostile by the prosecution and in his cross examination by the Public Prosecutor, he has stated that when Kishan Lal had come out at his shop after hair cut, then Ram Karan had come to give the grains for grinding. This statements of Gautam Sen can hardly be relied for concluding that the appellant was lastly seen together with the deceased. 9. It is submitted further that the learned trial court was patently wrong in concluding that the appellant was last seen with the deceased on the basis of the statement of father of deceased P.W.-4 Bodu ram and P.W.-1 Ashok. As far as Ashok P.W.-1 is concerned he has no where stated that the appellant Kishan Lal was seen by him together on the day Kishan lal disappeared form the village. There being no such statement of Ashok, the trial court has misread the statement to the prejudice of the appellant. P.W.-4 Bodu Ram, father of the deceased also does say that he has last seen Kishan Lal with appellant. In his statement Bodu Ram has stated that Kishan Lal had taken a cycle from the house and had gone for haircut but when he did come back Bodu Ram went to shop of Gautam Sen and Gautam Sen told Bodu Ram that after the haircut Kishan Lal had gone and Ram karan had come there for giving grains for grinding and thereafter had gone with Kishan. When Bodu Ram asked Gautam Sen as to whether Kishan Lal had gone alone or both of them went together, he told that both of them went together. Bodu Ram then went to house of Banshidhar Jangid where he met Sampati wife of Banshidhar and when Bodu Ram asked her about Kishan Lal, she told that Ram Karan and Kishan Lal were standing in the village at about 8.30 AM. It is respectfully submitted that this statement can be taken as evidence of last seen together in as much as the statement of Bodu Ram is hearsay and Sampati has been produced by the prosecution. In these Circumstances, it is crystal clear that the finding of the trial court about appellant being last seen with the deceased on the day of disappearance of the deceased is without any stratum of legally admissible evidence. 10. It has also been argued that the learned trial court has appreciated statement of P.W.-4 Bodu Ram that Babu Lal Gared and Raj Kumar had told him on 30.6.2005 that at about 2.30 PM they had seen Kishan with one boy also can be regarded as evidence of last seen together, firstly because name of the other boy has been mentioned and secondly because Babu lal Gared and Raj Kumar have been examined as witnesses. It is also submitted that the learned trial court has glossed over the fact that P.W.-4 Bodu Ram loged the report of elopement/disappearance of Kishan on 27.7.2005 at Police Station but these facts which have been lateron introduced by the prosecution for proving that the appellant and the deceased were last seen together were mentioned in the report. 11. The learned trial court was wrong in acting upon the evidence of extra judicial confession since according to P.W. -4 Bodu Ram extra judicial confession is said to have been made by the appellant to the police and the statement of P.W.-9 Jagdish does prove that the appellant had confessed the guilt in as much as in the statement under section 161 Cr.P.C., 1973 Jagdish PW-9 had stated that the appellant made confession having put Kishan Lal to death by strangulation. 12. It is also argued that the learned trial court was wrong in relying the evidence of P.W.-9 Jagdish Singh and that he has deposed in the presence of police. In fact, the statement of Jagdish is regarding the appellant confessing his guilt. He has made definite improvement in the court over the police statement and as such, statement of Jagdish Singh could have been relied to prove extra judicial confession especially since the trial court itself disbelieved statement of PW-12 Bajrang Lal and PW-4 Bodu Lal as regards extra judicial confession. The conclusion of the learned trial court that the appellant made confession since he was terrified on account of the possibility of his photo might have been leaked. This reasoning and part of evidence relied on by the trial court is simply a conjecture and does be constituted legally admissible evidence. 13. It is also submitted that the learned trial court was further wrong in relying upon the evidence of recovery of cycle from Lal Chand since there were different versions of P.W.-10 Lal Chand regarding the price demanded by him and secondly because according to Jagdish P.W.-9 the recovery was made at 10 AM in the day while according to Bajrang Lal P.W.-12 another witness of recovery it was paid at 10 PM in the night. 14. The evidence of recovery of the cycle was fake and bogus since the fact of cycle being with Lal Chand was known on 3rd or 4th of July, 2005. This fact was discovered at the instance of the accused under section 27 of Indian Evidence Act. In these circumstances, prior knowledge only disprove the recovery but further go to establish that the case against the appellant is entirely concocted. 15. Further, it is submitted that the learned trial court was wrong in relying on the evidence of Bajrang Lal P.W.-12 and Jagdish Singh P.W.-9 that their evidence does establish the fact of selling of the cycle to LaL Chand which was disclosed to these witnesses as well as to the police. It is further surprising that the bill/cash memo of the purchase of the cycle exhibited as P-10 was taken from the shopkeeper at Jaipur who had sold the cycle while there is no question of the cash memo/bill remaining with the shop keeper but it should have been in possession of the purchaser of the cycle. 16. The learned trial court did properly consider the evidence of the Doctor who conducted the post mortem examination that both the chambers of the heart of the deceased were empty, this itself went to make it doubtful whether the deceased was strangulated. It is further submitted that the learned trial court was wrong in brushing aside the major contradictions in the statement of P.W.-18 Inayat Ali, the investigating agency who has stated that the belt (ligature) was having any cuts while the doctor has stated that he had handed over the belt to the police after cutting it. 17. The circumstances alleged by the prosecution were proved by legally admissible evidence and the entire judgment is based on possibilities and surmises and conjectures and further because the circumstantial evidence was wholly insufficient to prove the offences charged against the appellant. 18. This appeal was listed before the Division Bench of this court on 27.1.2016, and an attention was drawn to the document (Ex.P- 17) a certificate issued by the Government Upper Primary School, Biharipura (Amer), Distt. Jaipur. In the school certificate, date of birth of the appellant was recorded on 8.7.1987. It was contended that on the basis of school certificate (Ex.P-17) issued by the Government School first attended by the appellant, the appellant was less than 18 years of age on the date of occurrence, hence is a delinquent juvenile in conflict with law. Reliance was also placed upon the judgment of Apex Court rendered in Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan and anr. [(2009) 13 SCC 211] . It was contended that as per Sections 2(k), 2(l), 7-A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection and Children) Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to be as 'the Act of 2000') and Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to be as 'Rules of 2007') read with Section 20 of the Act of 2000 as amended in 2006, a juvenile who had completed 18 years on the date of commission of the offence is also entitled to the benefits of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, as if the provisions of Section 2(K) had always been in existence even during the operation of the 1986 Act. The said position has been re-emphasised by virtue of the amendments introduced in Section 20 of the Act of 2000 whereby the proviso and explanation were added to Section 20, which make it even more explicit that in all pending cases, including trial, revision, appeal and any other criminal proceedings in respect of a juvenile in conflict with law, the determination of juvenility of such a juvenile would be in terms of Section 2(l) of the Act of 2000, and the provisions of the Act would apply as if the said provisions had been in force when the alleged offence was committed. It was argued that Section 7-A of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 made provision for the claim of juvenility to be raised before any court at any stage, as has been done in the present case, and such claim was required to be determined in terms of the provisions contained in the Act of 2000 and the Rules framed thereunder, even if the juvenile had ceased to be so on or before the date of commencement of the Act. The law as now crystallized on a conjoint reading of Sections 2(k), 2(l), 7-A, 20 and 49 read with Rules 12 and 98, places beyond all doubt that all persons who were below the age of 18 years on the date of commission of the offence even prior to 1.4.2001, would be treated as juveniles, even if when the claim of juvenility was raised after they had attained the age of 18 years on or before the date of commencement of the Act and were undergoing sentence upon being convicted. Since the appellant was below 18 years of age at the time of commission of the offence the provisions of the said Act would apply in his case in full force and on the date of the incident it has to be held that he was a juvenile. 19. Having relied upon the observations of Supreme Court in Hari Ram's case (supra), it is contended that the trial court vide order dated 4.1.2006 committed a grave error ignoring the school certificate and rely upon the report of ossification test. It is contended that the school certificate has to get precedence over ossification test conducted by the medical board. It is further contended that the trial court could doubt the authenticity of the school certificate by relying upon the medical report. 20. The Division Bench while taking into consideration all the submissions and evidence, passed the following the order on 27.1.2016: "Hence, dehors of order dated 4.1.2006 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track), Chomu, Distt. Jaipur, we remit the matter to the concerned Juvenile Justice Board who has jurisdiction over Chomu, District Jaipur. The said Juvenile Justice Board within three months shall hold an inquiry as per Rule -12(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 and shall determine the age of the appellant on the date of occurrence. The concerned Juvenile Justice Board while holding inquiry shall associate the appellant and all concerned including the victim for determination of the age." 21. Inspite of direction by Division Bench, the Juvenile Justice Board could hold and conclude the inquiry as per Rule 12(3) of the Rules of 2007 for determining the age of the appellant on the date of occurrence within the stipulated period, and even sent a request letter dated 19.7.2016 praying for extension of time on various grounds. Thereafter this court vide order dated 27.7.2016 issued direction to the Juvenile Justice Board, Jaipur to conclude the inquiry within a period of two months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. In the meantime, case was adjourned awaiting record of the case. On 4.4.2017, again matter was adjourned for 10.4.2017 awaiting record of the case as also status of the matter pending before the Juvenile Justice Board. The Board again sent a letter dated 6.4.2017 requesting that since matter is under active process, therefore, sometime may be extended for recording evidence of the witnesses. Hence, matter was posted for 10.5.2017 directing the Board to expedite the matter and send its report to this court at the earliest. On 10.5.2017, the Dy.Registrar (Judl.) was directed to seek report from the concerned Board and place the same before this court on the next date i.e. 17.5.2017. In compliance thereof, the Member of the Board again sent a request letter dated 12.5.2017 stating the reasons for which the delay occurred and requested that if two months further time is granted, the Board may complete the enquiry and would be in a position to submit the report, as directed. Thus, trusting upon the request for extension of time made by the Board, matter was adjourned for 8.8.2017 with the hope that Board shall send the report positively to this court by next date. It was thereafter the Juvenile Justice Board passed the order dated 25.5.2017 holding that the age of appellant on the date of incident i.e. on 30.6.2005 was 17 years 11 months and 24 days and this was less than 18 years. 22. It was in this context that this appeal has come up before this court. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Hari Ram (supra) and argued that once the findings have been concluded by the Juvenile Justice Board that the appellant was minor on the date of incident, the logical conclusion should be that Addl. Sessions Judge who conducted the trial of the appellant, was competent to do so, the appellant could have been tried in the criminal proceedings pending before the Juvenile Justice Board. It was also argued that in the case of Hari Ram (Supra), dispute is related to the matter of Juvenile Justice Board while setting aside the order of the High Court and remitting the matter to the Juvenile Justice Board for disposal to this court. Having regard to the fact that the offence was committed, if the appellant was found in custody for more than the maximum period for which the juvenile is confined in the special form, the court shall release the person. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the present appellant is in jail since 11 years, no useful purpose would be served by keeping him behind the bars or remitting the case to the Juvenile Justice Board because as per Section 18-G of the Act of 2000, the maximum period of confinement of juvenile is three years which the appellant has completed long back. 23. Learned Public Prosecutor appearing for State as also learned counsel for the complainant have argued that once the trial court after inquiry vide order dated 4.1.2006 held the appellant to be juvenile on the date of incident, there was no justification for this court to take a difference view as taken by trial court. In any case, the offence which the appellant has committed, falls within the purview of heinous offence as defined in Section 2 Sub-Section 33 of the Act of 2015. As per Section 15 of the Act of 2015, in case of a heinous offence alleged to have been committed by a child, who has completed or is above the age of sixteen years, the Board shall conduct a preliminary assessment with regard to his mental and physical capacity to commit such offence, ability to understand the consequences of the offence and the circumstances in which he allegedly committed the offence, and may pass an order in accordance with the provisions of subsection (3) of Section 18; provided that for such an assessment, the Board may take the assistance of experienced psychologists or psycho-social workers or other experts. In the present case, even though the Juvenile Justice Board has made inquiry as to the claim of juvenility of the appellant and precisely as to his date of birth but has made any criminal assessment with regard to his mental and physical capacity to commit such heinous offence. Under the belief, the claim of juvenility could be made by any person at any stage, but in the present case, as per Rule 12 of the Rules of 2007, the Court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee referred to in Rule 19 of these rules shall determine the age of such juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with law within a period of thirty days from the date of making of the application for that purpose. We are, therefore, inclined to continue with the consensus that the trial court was competent to determine that question but when the matter was referred to this court in appeal, this court was fully justified in examining the claim of juvenility of the appellant again to determine whether that question was correctly decided by the trial court. It is, therefore, that this court held that the trial court committed grave error to ignore the school certificate and relied upon the report of ossification test approach of which was contrary to Rule 12 of the Rules of 2007. It was, therefore, the matter was remitted to the concerned Board who conducted the inquiry. When the Juvenile Justice Board has recorded the finding that the age of the appellant on the date of incident was 17 years 11 months and 24 days, therefore, conclusion would be that the appellant was minor, and thus, a child or juvenile within the meaning of Section 2-A of the Act of 2000 on the date of incident i.e. 30.6.2005 and by that reason, would also be a juvenile as required in Section 2(l) of the Act of 2000 as he has completed 18 years of age on the date of commission of offence. 24. Having held so, now we are faced with the question as to what should be adopted in this case keeping in view this fact that appellant has already served out sentence of 11 years, and was on bail pending trial . 25. In the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court relied by the learned counsel for the appellant in the case of Hari Ram (Supra), the court observed that appellant attained the age of 16 years and 13 days on the date of commission of offence but was given benefit of the Act of 2000. When the matter was taken to Supreme Court, the appellant claimed benefit of Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 and argued that appellant is liable to be treated as juvenile. The Supreme Court relying on the decision of a Constitution Bench rendered in Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand (2005) SCC (Cr.) 742 , which led to the substitution of Section 2(l) and the introduction of Section 7-A of the Act and the subsequent introduction of Rule 12 in the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007, and the amendment of Section 20 of the Act, held that the appellant was liable to be treated as juvenile because as per Section 2(k), 2(l) of the 2000 Act and Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules read with Section 20 of the Act of 2000 as amended in 2006, a juvenile who had completed eighteen years on the date of commission of the offence is entitled to the benefits of the Act of 2000, as if the provisions of Section 2(k) had always been in existence even during the operation of the 1986 Act. In Pratap Singh (supra) case, the Constitution Bench taking into consideration the provisions of Section 3 and 20 and the relevant definitions of "Juvenile" in Section 2(k) of the 2000 Act, held that the 2000 Act would be applicable in a pending proceeding in any court/authority initiated under the 1986 Act and is pending when the 2000 Act came into force and the person concerned has completed 18 years of age as on 1.4.2001. The law as now crystallized on a conjoint reading of Sections 2(k), 2(l), 7-A, 20 and 49 read with Rules 12 and 98, places beyond all doubt that all persons who were below the age of 18 years on the date of commission of the offence even prior to 1.4.2001, would be treated as juvenile even if the claim of juvenility was raised after they had attained the age of 18 years on or before the date of commencement of the Act and was undergoing sentence upon being convicted. Since the appellant was below 18 years of age at the time of commission of the offence, the provisions of the said Act would apply in his case in full force and on the date of the incident it has to be held that he was a juvenile. The appeal was, therefore, allowed and the judgment of the High Court was set aside holding that since the appellant was below 18 years of age at the time of commission of the offence, the provisions of the said Act would apply in his case in full force. The matter was accordingly remitted to the Juvenile Justice Board for disposal in accordance with law, within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, having regard to the fact that the offence is alleged to have been committed more than ten years ago. If, however, the appellant has been in detention for a period which is more than the maximum period for which a juvenile may be confined to a special home, the Board shall release the appellant from custody forthwith. 26. The Hon'ble Supreme court recently in the case of Abdul Razzaq v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2015) 15 SCC 637 while allowing the application extended the benefit of juvenility since SLP and review petition have been dismissed but as the court was inclined to allow application, leaving conviction undisturbed, setting aside the sentence, directed the appellant to be released from custody forthwith. 27. In Lakhan Lal v. State of Bihar (2011) 2 SCC 251 , the accused was treated as juvenile and entitled to benefit of 2000 Act even when claim of juvenility was raised after they had attained 18 years of age. Hence, fact that accused had attained 18 years of age at the time of hearing of appeal irrelevant and they continued to be "juveniles" in instant proceedings. Thus sentence of life imprisonment imposed on them under Section 302 r/w Section 34 IPC was set aside. They having already undergone more than 03 years imprisonment, the maximum under 2000 Act, appellants be set free. While sustaining the conviction of the appellant under all the charges, the Supreme Court held that the sentences awarded to the accused need to be set aside. Hence accused were directed to be set free. 28. In Ashwani Kumar Saxena v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2012) 9 SCC 750 , the Hon'ble Apex Court was of the view that admission register in the school in which the candidate first attended is a relevant piece of evidence of the date of birth. The reasoning that the parents could have entered a wrong date of birth in the admission register hence a correct date of birth is equal to thinking that parents would do so in anticipation that child would commit a crime in future and, in that situation, they could successfully raise a claim of juvenility. The sentence awarded by the Sessions Court was set aside and High Court was directed to place the record before the Juvenile Justice Board for awarding appropriate sentence in accordance with provisions of 2000 Act, and if the appellant has already undergone the maximum sentence of three years as prescribed in the Act, needless to say, he has to be let free. The Supreme Court further held that the appellant has successfully established his juvenility on the date of occurrence of the crime i.e. 19.10.2008 on which date he was aged only 17 years 11 months 25 days. The appellant has faced the trial and court found him guilty along with other under Section 302 IPC and has been awarded Life Imprisonment which was pending in appeal before High Court. 29. In Mohd. Feroz Khan @ Feroz v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2015) 16 SCC 186 , the petitioner preferred a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India alleging inter-alia that he was a juvenile on the date of the commission of offence and hence entitled to seek issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari and mandamus for setting aside the order of sentence passed by Addl. Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad as confirmed by the High Court. The Supreme Court allowed the petition and remitted the matter to the Juvenile Justice Board concerned exercising jurisdiction for disposal of the petitioner's case in accordance with law within three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. However, if the petitioner has been in detention for a period, which is more than the maximum period for which a juvenile may be confined to a special home, the Board shall release the petitioner from custody forthwith. 30. In the present case, as per the enquiry report submitted by the Juvenile Justice Board, the age of the appellant was less than 18 years on the date of occurrence. The age of the appellant on the date of occurrence i.e. 30.6.2005 was 17 years 11 months and 24 days and hence keeping in mind the juvenility of the appellant at the time of commission of the crime as also the fact that the appellant has undergone about 11 years in jail and has already undergone more than the maximum period of detention as provided under Section 15 of the Act, he deserves to be released forthwith as three years being the maximum period for which juvenile would be confined. However, the appellant is held to be juvenile and at the appellate stage, matter has been remitted to the Board for inquiry, but in the present case when we find that appellant has served the sentence of more than 11 years, in our view, no useful purpose would be served by keeping him behind the bars. The argument that the trial court was not competent to hold the inquiry, is not tenable in the eyes of law as at this belated stage since the date of incident, inquiry was transferred to the Juvenile Justice Board and while exercising the power, the Board has conducted the inquiry and submitted the report, therefore, at the same time, no order could be passed in appeal by virtue of Section 24 of the Act of 2015 which inter-alia provides that a child who has committed an offence and has been dealt with under the provisions of this Act shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attached to a conviction of an offence under such law. 31. Therefore, in view of above discussion, the appeal deserves to succeed and is accordingly allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence of accused appellant dated 19.5.2007 is set aside. The accused-appellant Ram Karan S/o Kalu Ram is acquitted of the charge for offence under Section 302, 201 and 404 IPC. Accordingly, we direct that the appellant Ram Karan S/o Kalu Ram shall be set at liberty forthwith, if not required to be detained in connection with any other case. Keeping, however, in view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, appellant Ram Karan S/o Kalu Ram is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 20,000/- and a surety bond in the like amount, before the Deputy Registrar (Judl.) of this court, which shall be effective for a period of six months, undertaking that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of leave, the appellant aforesaid, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Supreme Court. Appeal allowed.;