SHARMA, J. - (1.) PRAFOOL Chand, Kaushalya Devi and Rakesh, the appellants herein, were put to trial before learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No. 1, Kota, who vide judgment dated January 30, 2002 convicted and sentenced them as under:- U/s. 304b IPC: Each to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years. U/s. 498a IPC: Each to undergo two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 500/- in default fifteen days simple imprisonment. U/s. 4 Dowry Prohibition Act: Each to undergo six months rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 300/- in default seven days simple imprisonment. The substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently.
(2.) THE informant Purshottam Khandelwal (Pw. 8) submitted a written report at Police Station Vigyan Nagar Kota on January 21, 1992 with the averments that his daughter Sangeeta (since deceased) was married to appellant Rakesh on November 27, 1991. He alleged that his daughter was harassed for insufficient dowry. One of his relative informed him on January 20, 1992 about death of his daughter, he reached Kota and came to know that on January 19, 1992 his daughter and her husband went to market where they purchased a betel-leave (Pan), through which poison had been administered to his daughter. On that report case was registered and investigation commenced. Dead body was subjected to autopsy. Statements of witnesses were recorded. After usual investigation charge sheet was filed. In due course the case came up for trial before the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No. 1 Kota. Charges under sections 498a, 304b and 120b IPC were framed against the appellants, who denied the charges and claimed trial. THE prosecution in support of its case examined as many as 13 witnesses. In the explanation under Sec. 313 Crpc, the appellants claimed innocence. Nine witnesses in defence were examined. Learned trial Judge on hearing final submissions convicted and sentenced the appellants as indicated herein above. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance weighed the material on record. Learned counsel for the appellants made following submissions:- (i) The letter (Ex. P-7) could not have been relied on without obtaining the opinion of the Hand-writing Expert. (ii) Further the letter Ex. P-7 differed from letters Ex. D-5 and Ex. D-6. (iii) The letter Ex. P-7 does not find mention in the FIR or the statements of witnesses recorded under section 161 Crpc. (iv) The letter Ex. P-7 was presented by one Pushpendra Kumar but he was not examined by the prosecution. (v) Chemical Analysis Report (Ex. P-14) was inadmissible evidence. (vi) Dr. Y. K. Sharma (Pw. 13) clearly opined that because of Aluminium Phosphate there could be very bad smell, but on opening the body no bad smell was found therefore no definite opinion about cause of death could be given. (vii) The trial court held that prosecution failed to establish the demand of dowry, therefore harassment of deceased for dowry could not have been inferred. (viii) Informant Purshottam Khandelwal lodged the report on the basis of information supplied by a neighbour of the deceased but that person has not been examined by the prosecution. (ix) The story of the informant chewing of betel-leave was not believed by the trial court still the appellants have been convicted. Coming to the evidence adduced at the trial I notice that Sangeeta died just within two months of her marriage under abnormal circumstances. A look at the Post mortem report (Ex. P- 12) shows that no opinion of cause of death was given. Viscera was sent for chemical examination. Vide Chemical Examination Report (Ex. P-14) it was opined that packet A1 gave positive tests for the presence of Aluminium Phosphate. The first version stated in the report was based on the information supplied by a relative of informant. Conjoint reading of statements of prosecution witnesses however shows that possibly Sangeeta was dragged to such a situation by her husband that she opted to commit suicide. The expression `dowry' is defined by Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,1961 (for short `the Act'), as meaning anything which is given either directly or indirectly, by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage or by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person to either party to the marriage or to any other person" at or before or after the marriage as consideration for the marriage of the said parties. The act has been amended by Act 63 of 1984 and Act 43 of 1986. Formerly dowry was defined as property given as consideration for the marriage but the words "as consideration for the marriage" have been omitted and substituted by the words "in connection with the marriage". Now dowry means any property given or agreed to be given by the parents of a party to the marriage at marriage or before marriage or at any time after marriage in connection with the marriage.
(3.) CONSIDERING the definition of dowry their Lordships of Supreme Court in Reema Aggarwal Vs. Anupam (2004)3 SCC 199, indicated thus:- " The definition of the term "dowry" under Section 2 of the Dowry Act shows that any property or valuable security given or "agreed to be given" either directly or indirectly by one party to the marriage to the other party to the marriage "at or before or after the marriage" as a "consideration for the marriage of the said parties" would become "dowry" punishable under the Dowry Act. Property or valuable security so as to constitute "dowry" within the meaning of the Dowry Act must, therefore, be given or demanded "as consideration for the marriage". Interpreting the words "in connection with the marriage of the said parties", the Apex court in Satvir Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2001)8 SCC 633, propounded as under:- " The word "dowry" in Section 304-B has to be understood as it is defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,1961. Thus, there are three occasions related to dowry. One is before the marriage, second is at the time of marriage and the third is "at any time" after the marriage. The third occasion may appear to be an unending period. But the crucial words are "in connection with the marriage of the said parties". This means that giving or agreeing to give any property or valuable security on any of the above three stages should have been in connection with the marriage of the parties. There can be many other instances for payment of money or giving property as between the spouses. For example, some customary payments in connection with birth of a child or other ceremonies prevalent in different societies. Such payments are not enveloped within the ambit of "dowry". The word "agreement" referred in Section 2 has also been considered in Pawan Kumar Vs. State of Haryana (1998)3 SCC 309, by their Lordships of Supreme Court and it was observed as under:- " Demand for dowry neither conceives nor would conceive of any agreement. The word "agreement" referred to in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,1961 has to be inferred on the facts and circumstances of each case. The interpretation that conviction can only be if there is agreement for dowry, is misconceived. This would be contrary to the mandate and object of the Act. "dowry" definition is to be interpreted with the other provisions of the Act including Section 3, which refers to giving or talking dowry and Section 4 which deals with penalty for demanding dowry, under the 1961 Act and the Indian Penal Code. This makes it clear that even demand of dowry on other ingredients being satisfied is punishable. This leads to the inference, when persistent demands for TV and scooter are made from the bride after marriage or from her parents, it would constitute to be in connection with the marriage and it would be a case of demand of dowry within the meaning of Section 304-B IPC. It is not always necessary that there be any agreement for dowry. " ;