JAIN, J. - (1.) HEARD learned counsel for the appellants.
(2.) THIS appeal, on behalf of the plaintiffs, under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is directed against the judgment and order dated 16. 11. 2006 passed by the Additional District Judge (Fast Track) No. 2, Ajmer, Camp at Beawar, in Civil Suit No. 112/2005 (219/2004), whereby the learned trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs for compensation under the provisions of Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 (hereinafter shall be referred to as 'the Act, 1855' ). Briefly stated the facts of the case are that plaintiffs- appellants filed a suit for compensation on 24. 2. 2004 under the provisions of the Act, 1855, against the defendants in the trial Court, wherein it was pleaded that the defendant No. 3 Chhotu Singh S/o Gheesa Singh had an electricity connection at his well from the defendants No. 1 and 2. In the night of 17. 3. 2000, one Mangi Lal went to the well of defendant No. 3 to bring water therefrom in his tanker, and there he received electric-shock and died. It was also pleaded that the incident took place because of negligence on the part of the employees of defendants No. 1 and 2. A First Information Report No. 46/2000 was also lodged at Police Station Bhinaya. The police, after completion of investigation, filed a challan against defendant No. 3. At the time of his death, the deceased was 25 years of age and was a skilled driver earning Rs. 4000/- per month with daily allowance of Rs. 50/ -. The plaintiffs No. 1 and 2 are parents and plaintiff No. 3 is younger minor brother of deceased. The plaintiffs claimed total compensation of twenty-two lacs with interest at the rate of 18% per annum. The defendants No. 1 and 2 filed their written statement pleading therein that the defendant No. 3 did not apply for electricity-connection and he had an illegal electricity- connection at his well and, therefore, the defendants No. 1 and 2 cannot be held responsible for the alleged accident causing death of Mangi Lal. The defendants also raised a plea that the trial Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. It was also prayed that the suit is barred by limitation and the same is liable to be dismissed. The defendant No. 3 also filed his written-statement and pleaded that deceased Mangi Lal and Roop Chand had gone to his well to fetch water in their tanker/tractor illegally and the deceased died due to his own negligence. Thus, the suit of the plaintiffs is liable to be dismissed. The trial Court framed nine issues. The plaintiff examined PW-1 Shaitan and also produced documentary evidence Exhibit-1 to Exhibit-10. The defendants examined DW-1 Subbe Singh Rao.
(3.) THE learned trial Court, while deciding Issue No. 6, recorded a finding that the incident took place on 17. 3. 2000 and the plaintiffs filed the suit on 24. 2. 2004 i. e. after the delay of three-year-and-eleven-month whereas, as per Article 82 of the Part VI of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, 'the Act, 1963') the limitation prescribed for compensation under the Act, 1855 is only 2 years, therefore, the suit was barred by limitation and thus decided the said issue against the plaintiffs. THE trial Court also decided the other issues, but, in view of the finding in respect of Issue No. 6, the trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs being barred by limitation. Hence the plaintiffs have preferred this appeal. The only contention of Shri Jai Prakash Gupta, the learned counsel for the appellants, is that the present matter is for compensation for the death of Mangi Lal, who died due to electric-shock and the trial Court rejected the suit on the ground of limitation, which is not proper and justified in the eyes of law. He contended that earlier there was a period prescribed for limitation under the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act for filing an application for compensation in respect of accident arising out of motor vehicle, but subsequently the Parliament, in its wisdom, deleted the provisions prescribing limitation for filing application for compensation in respect of accident arising out of motor vehicle, therefore, the same analogy may be drawn in the present case relating to compensation under the provisions of the Act, 1855. He, therefore, contended that the impugned judgment passed by the trial Court be set-aside and the case be remanded back to the trial Court for decision on merits. I have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the appellants and examined the impugned judgment passed by the trial Court. ;