MAHESHWARI, J. - (1.) THIS writ petition and the connected writ petitions shown in the Schedule appended to this order involving common questions of law and facts have been heard together and are taken up for disposal by this common order.
(2.) IN sum and substance, all these petitions relate to the question of operation and applicability of rule 7 A (iii) of the Rajasthan Employment of the Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2000 ('the Rules of 2000') for the purpose of selections to the post of Teacher Gr. lll under the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Rules, 1996 ('the Rules of 1996' ). The factual aspects of the matter are not much in controversy and for the purpose of reference, the averments as taken in CWP No. 210/2007 may be noticed. The respondent No. 2 issued an advertisement for appointment to the post of Teacher Gr. lll on 30. 10. 2006; and the petitioners considering themselves eligible, applied in response to the said advertisement. It has been averred that the Government of Rajasthan issued a notification dated 1. 8. 2005 making amendment to the Rules of 2000 whereby Rule 7a was inserted which provides for concessions to the disabled persons. ; that sub-rule (iii) of Rule 7a provides that the condition or desirability of training/test/experience wherever prescribed shall not apply to the disabled persons for temporary appointment; that where a particular training is essential for appointment to a post, the disabled person may be required to receive such training within two years of his appointment. The petitioners have averred that they are disabled persons and are entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the Rules of 2000 but, while issuing advertisement, the concession as provided under rule 7a of the Rules of 2000 has not been extended to the disabled persons inasmuch as the concession in relation to the condition of teachers' training for the purpose of the said selections has not been allowed. The petitioners submit that they are entitled for such concession in relation to the eligibility condition regarding possessing of certificate, diploma or degree of B. S. T. C. /b. Ed. etc. and, if selected, they will get the required training within a period of two years from the date of appointment as provided under the Rules of 2000. It may be pointed out that the petitioner in CWP No. 5629/2005 applied in pursuance of similar nature advertisement issued in the year 2004 and appeared in the competitive examination; but could not obtain requisite qualification of B. Ed, before the cut-off date i. e. 5. 1. 2005 and hence his candidature was rejected by the letter dated 23. 7. 2005. The petitioner then filed the said writ petition with the similar nature claim that in view of amendment to the Rules of 2000, precondition of training/test/experience shall not apply to the petitioner who is a disabled person. Though the candidature of the said writ petitioner had been cancelled even prior to the said amendment to the Rules of 2000 on 1. 8. 2005, and such amendment hardly applies to said petitioner, however, leaving such aspect aside, the said matter has also been examined on the merits of the contentions. According to the respondents, the entire claim on the basis of new Rule 7a of the Rules of 2000 is wholly misconceived and untenable; and the petitioners are misconstruing the implication of the amended Rule 7a. It has been averred that Clause (iii) of Rule 7a clearly shows that the condition or desirability of training/test/experience wherever prescribed shall not apply to the disabled persons who are to be appointed temporarily and thus, this clause shall be attracted only in the matter of temporary appointment and not for permanent appointment; that had there been any intention of the legislature to provide such relaxation to substantive/permanent employment, there was no need to use the words "temporary appointment". It has further been averred that there are two types of appointments: (i) temporary/adhoc appointment; and (ii) substantive/permanent appointment; that so far as the appointments to be made pursuant to the advertisement (Annex. 1) are concerned, all such appointments are substantive/permanent in nature and they cannot be said to be "temporary appointment". It has been reiterated that such relaxation is available only with regard to appointment on temporary basis and not in the matter of direct recruitment through competitive examination on permanent posts. Therefore, according to the respondents, the relaxation as contained in clause (iii) of rule 7a is not at all attracted to the instant cases. Regarding construction of the provision of rule 7a (iii), the respondents have averred that the requirement of B. S. T. C. and/or B. Ed, is that of basic qualification for the post of Teacher Gr. lll as prescribed under the Rules of 1996; and the basic qualifications required for the teaching purposes are determined by an expert statutory body i. e. , NCTE and especially in the matter of teachers education, for all courses NCTE is the controlling authority; that so far the post of Teacher Gr. lll is concerned, the mandatory basic qualification laid down by the NCTE and/or under the relevant service Rules, in addition to necessary educational qualification, is that of B. S. T. C. and/or B. Ed; therefore, for the purposes of seeking employment on the post of Teacher Gr. lll one has to possess this basic qualification. The respondents contend that the petitioners are erroneously equating the training/test and experience with the basic eligibility qualification; that rule 7a (Hi) does not grant relaxation in the matter of possession of necessary qualification to hold a post; that B. Ed. /b. S. T. C. cannot be said to be mere training/test or experience but is an essential qualification for being eligible for recruitment to the post of Teacher Gr. lll and, therefore, the petitioners are not entitled to claim relaxation from basic qualification to hold a post by virtue of rule 7a (iii) of the Rules of 2000. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners have strenuously pressed for consideration the submissions that rule 7a (iii) is clearly framed in two parts. While the first part deals with the condition or desirability of any training/test/experience in relation to temporary appointments and says that such condition or desirability shall not apply in case of a disabled person eligible under the Rules for the purpose of temporary appointment; but, according to the learned counsel, the second part of rule 7a (iii) refers to the situation where any particular training is required for appointment to any post and in that relation it is provided that such particular training, if being essential, could be expected to be completed within two years of appointment of such disabled person. It has been strenuously contended that B. S. T. C. /b. Ed. etc. are only of such training that might be considered essential and are referable to the second clause of rule 7a (iii) and could, thus, be completed within two years of appointment. Hence, according to learned counsel applicability of rule 7 A (iii) could not be denied to the persons like the petitioners. Learned counsel would press on the submissions that the petitioners are not running away from the training and they could be asked to complete the same within two years. It has also been contended on behalf of the petitioners with reference to a decision of this Court in Hardayal Singh Chahar Vs. State of Rajasthan & others: 1998 WLC (UC) 593 that the expression "a post" is equivalent to the expression "any post"; and second clause of rule 7a (iii) comprehensively covers every post to which the appointments are made and there being nothing to the contrary in the enactment, there is no reason to hold that the said concession is not intended to be applicable to the appointments in question. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the qualifications provided under rule 266 of the Rules of 1996 could effectively be bifurcated into two parts. While the first part providing for Senior Secondary or Intermediate is that of essential basic educational qualification, the second part of B. S. T. C. or B. L. Ed, or B. Ed, is only towards the training to which rule 7a (iii) of the Rules of 2000 is referable to. Learned counsel for the petitioner also pointed out from the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Shyamlal Joshi; AIR 1994 SC 1409 and State of Rajasthan Vs. Kulwant Kaur: Appeal (Civil) No. 694- 695 of 2005, decided on 25. 4. 2006, that B. S. T. C. course is only a training course and has been understood so by the respondent- State itself, as asserted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that B. S. T. C. course is a two years training course wherein training is given in various subjects. Learned counsel submitted that purposive interpretation in the matter is that the petitioners are entitled for relaxation as provided under rule 7a (iii) of the Rules subject to the condition that they would complete the training of B. S. T. C. within two years of appointment and there is no reason to deny them the concession available under rule 7a (iii ).
(3.) PER contra, it has been emphasized on behalf of the respondents that rule 7a (iii) as a whole applies only to temporary appointments and has got nothing to do with permanent appointments to which the present selections are concerned with. Learned counsel for the respondents would urge that even if rule 7a (iii) has been framed apparently in two different parts, the same is intended to deal only with one single situation that is, regarding a temporary appointment; and the provision contained in the 'second part' is nothing but in the nature of an exception or proviso to the 'first part' to the extent that even in case of temporary appointment, irrespective of the provision contained in the first part that the requirement of training might be relaxed, if such training be an 'essential one', it shall have to be undergone and completed within two years. Learned counsel submit that this interpretation alone remains that of true meaning and import of rule 7a (iii) and not of reading it in two separate clauses as suggested by the petitioners. Learned counsel stressed on the submissions that if the so-called second part was intended to deal with any appointment in contradistinction to temporary appointment, the words would have been definitely deployed conveying and signifying such meaning; and absence of any such expression like permanent appointment in the so-called second part effectively takes away the argument that such second part is a separate provision in itself. Learned counsel for the respondents have further submitted that B. S. T. C. / B. LI. Ed. /b. Ed. are all of basic qualifications as laid down by NCTE in its Regulations of 2001 and are not of a mere training that could be dispensed with. Learned counsel submitted that the aforesaid are the courses undergone by taking admission thereto on the basis of comparative merit or entrance test and are not of training simplicitor. Learned counsel further submitted that in the context of Panchayati Raj Rules of 1996 and particularly for the appointments under rule 266 thereof, rule 7a (iii) of the Rules of 2000 has no application at all. Learned counsel further submitted that B. LI. Ed. and B. Ed, are not mere trainings but they are graduation courses and a person could even opt for post graduation courses thereafter; and that, similarly, B. S. T. C. is also a specific course and even if a certificate is granted on completion of the course, it cannot be equated with a mere training. Learned counsel for the petitioners rejoined with the submissions that B. S. T. C. is only a training and has been understood in that sense only. Learned counsel referred to the dictionary meaning of the word "training" signifying some practical education in any provision, art or handicraft and submitted that mere calling it a 'training course' does not alter its basic character as that of a training for the purpose of teaching; and for the purpose of operation of rule 7a (iii) that is incorporated in a beneficial legislation for physically handicapped persons, the word "training" is required to be given its true and practical meaning. Learned counsel submitted that the word "course" for the purpose of a training course could only signify the duration of such training; that course is only the process of undertaking the training and that is how the expression "training course" is required to be understood and applied. Learned counsel also submitted that a temporary appointment is not beyond one year and, therefore, it is not correct a suggestion that second part of rule 7a (iii) refers to temporary appointments. Learned counsel for the petitioners have also referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Sartaj and another Vs. State of UP. and others: (2006) 2 SCC 315 to submit that B. S. T. C. etc. are merely of training course and cannot be equated with basic educational qualification. ;