CHAUHAN, J. - (1.) A dialogue spoken in a courtroom scene of the movie Ram Jaane has, ironically, brought its protagonist, Shah Rukh Khan, a popular Bollywood thespian, as a Petitioner to this Court. The Petitioner has challenged the order, dated 28-1- 1998, passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Kota, whereby the learned Magistrate had rejected the Petitioner's application, filed under Section 245 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code ('the Code', for short), for discharge from the criminal offences allegedly committed by him.
(2.) IN a nutshell, the facts of the case are that, in 1996, under the direction of Mr. Rajiv Mehra, a Hindi film Ram Jaane was released for public viewing after due certification by the Central Board of Certification ('the Board', for short ). The Petitioner played the role of the protagonist in the film. IN the later part of the film, the hero is tried for triple murders. IN the courtroom scene, the defense lawyer gets up to defend the hero who is, however, bent upon confessing his crime. He, therefore, questions the conduct of the lawyer and says: *** (This lawyer well knows that I have killed the three persons, yet he tries to save me. Why? For the sake of money, no? For the sake of money, he sells his morals. He sells the laws. By selling the laws, you people have turned life into a misery.) (English translation of the Hindi dialogue) According to the respondents Nos. 2 to 7, the said movie was released in Kota as well. When they went to see the movie, they found the above-noted dialogue as defamatory against the community of lawyers practicing in India. They claim that because of the said dialogue, the respondents were subjected to ridicule and anger from those who were sitting in the movie theater. They also allege that their neighbours ridiculed them as well. Hence, the respondents Nos. 2 to 7 filed a criminal complaint against Mr. Shah Rukh Khan (the Petitioner), Mr. Rajiv Mehra (the director), Mr. Pravesh Mehra (the producer), Mr. Shrikant Sharma (the co-scriptwriter), Ms. Juhi Chawla (the heroine), and M/s Vinayak Film Industries (the distributors in Rajasthan), and M/s Unkown Distributors (distributors for India) alleging defamation and criminal conspiracy, offences under Sections 500, 501 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code ('ipc', for short), before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, No. 1, Kota. On 20-1-1996, the learned Magistrate recorded the statements of the Complainants under Section 200 of the Code. Vide his order dated 22-1-1996, the learned Magistrate took cognizance of offences under the aforementioned provisions of IPC. The Petitioner challenged the cognizance order before this Court, by filing a Miscellaneous Petition, registered as S. B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 443/1996. However, vide order dated 2-5-1997, this Court, while disposing of the said petition, directed the Petitioner to file before the learned Magistrate, within a period of one month, an application, under Section 245 (2) of the Code, for discharging him. Since the said application could not be filed within the stipulated period, the said period was extended by another six months. Thereupon, on 13-4- 1998, the petitioner filed the said application before the learned Magistrate. But, vide his order 29-4-1998, the learned Magistrate dismissed the said application. Hence, this petition before this Court. Mr. Maneesh Sharma, the learned counsel for the Petitioner, has raised a number of contentions before this court: Firstly, that the learned Magistrate has not appreciated the scope and ambit of Section 245 (2) of the Code. In deliberating whether to discharge the accused person, the learned court should have considered the existence of the ingredients of the offence. In the present case, the learned Magistrate has ignored the fact that the essential ingredients of the offence of defamation are non-existent here. The offence of defamation, like any other, requires an element of intention. But in a dramatic situation, when an actor speaks out a dialogue according to the script and under a direction, the actor can not be said to be speaking in his own capacity. He is merely parroting an imaginary character. Moreover, the learned trial court should have also examined if there were any legal bars or impediments, which created hurdles for the continuation of the trial. The learned court has failed to examine this aspect of the case, according to the learned counsel. Secondly, although according to Section 499, Explanation (2) IPC, the offence of defamation can be committed against a company, or 'a collection of persons', such a 'collection of persons' has to be identifiable, specific, and definite. The offence cannot be committed against a class, the identity of whose members remains general and unspecific.
(3.) THIRDLY, Section 199 of the Code deals with prosecution for defamation. It imposes a bar on the power of the court to take cognizance except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence. Section 199 (6) permits the person, against whom the offence is alleged to have been committed, to make a complaint in respect of that offence. But, the complainant has to show that he was the target of defamation. According to the learned counsel, such a complaint from a member of an indefinite class of persons is nonmaintainable. In order to buttress his contention, the learned counsel has relied upon the case of G. Narasimhan & Ors vs. T. vs. Chokkappa (1972) 2 Supreme Court Cases 680. Fourthly, Section 79 IPC creates an exception in favor of the Petitioner. The learned Magistrate has failed to recognize the benefit of Section 79 IPC available to the Petitioner. Fifthly, once the Board certifies the film for public viewing, the producer, the director, the actor, the actress, and others associated with the film are protected from prosecution under Section 5 A of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 ('the Act of 1952', for short ). In order to support this contention, the learned counsel has relied upon the case of Raj Kapoor vs. Laxman (AIR 1980 SC 605 ). ;