Vineet Kothari, J. - (1.) THIS second appeal arises out of the concurrent judgments of the two Courts below in a rent eviction case. Learned trial Court allowed the plaintiff 's suit for eviction of the suit shop situated at Village Niwai on the ground of personal bonafide necessity of the plaintiff -landlord, Smt. Munni Devi.
(2.) THE trial Court while deciding issue Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 relating to personal bonafide necessity, comparative hardship and partial eviction held in favour of the plaintiff after recording the evidence of both the sides and discussing the case laws as many as 12 of them including the various judgments of the Hon 'ble Supreme Court held in a judgment running into 24 pages that the plaintiff 's husband has no other alternative shop to carry on his business whereas the defendant had as many as five shops out of which two shops allotted in his favour in 1986 were sub -let by him and since the shop owned and possessed by the plaintiff was only of 6 -7 feet of width whereas the disputed shop was of a width of 10 feet and was in three portions. Therefore, these issues were decided in favour of the plaintiff and the suit was decreed. The first appeal filed by the defendant -tenant also failed and the same was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge (Fast Track), No. 4, Tonk on 18.04.2007. The said appellate order also runs into 15 pages and has been delivered after discussing the entire facts, evidence and case laws. While arguing the present second appeal, Mr. Shiv Charan Gupta, learned Counsel for the appellants relied upon a judgment of the Hon 'ble Supreme Court in Deena Nath v. : [2001]3SCR925 and submitted that the learned appellate Court had wrongly noted in para 13 that the shop owned and possessed by the plaintiff was only 6 -7 feet of width whereas the suit shop was 10 feet of width as according to the plaintiff 's own evidence, the plaintiff 's shop was 8 feet of width. He further submitted that shop Nos. 11 and 12 were not sub -let by the defendant to other persons and in fact these two shops were allotted by the Panchayat Samiti directly to these persons, namely, Rameshchand and Kunjbihari. He has also filed an application under Order 47R.27 C.P.C. purporting to bring on record the notices issued by the Panchayat Samiti in the year 1999 to these persons in respect of these shops. He, therefore, submitted that both the Courts below wrongly ordered eviction of the tenant and the appellants deserve to be given protection by this Court.
(3.) AS against this, Mr. Nitin Jain, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent, submitted that in a recent judgment of the Hon 'ble Supreme Court in Gurdev Kaur and Ors. v. Kaki and Ors., AIR 2006 SCW 2404, the Hon 'ble Supreme Court after discussing the entire spectrum of case law of Section 100 C.P.C. regarding maintainability of the second appeal, discussing the case law prior to amendment of Section 100 C.P.C. in the year 1976 and discussing as many as 24 judgments right from 1889 Privy Council to : AIR2006SC1144 , has strongly deprecated the practice of interfering in concurrent findings of two Courts below by the High Courts even after amendment of Section 100 C.P.C. in 1976. The said case pertained to validity of a Will under the Indian Succession Act, 1925. Paras 80 & 81 of the said judgment of the Hon 'ble Supreme Court are quoted below for ready reference: 80. Despite repeated declarations of law by the judgments of this Court and the Privy Council for over a century, still the scope of Section 100 has not been correctly appreciated and applied by the High Courts in a large number of cases. In the facts and circumstances of this case the High Court interfered with the pure findings of fact even after the amendment of Section 100 C.P.C. in 1976. The High Court would not have been justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact in this case even prior to the amendment of Section 100 C.P.C. The judgment of the High Court is clearly against the provisions of Section 100 and in no uncertain terms clearly violates the legislative intention. 81. In view of the clear legislative mandate crystallized by a series of judgments of the Privy Council and this Court ranging from 1890 to 2006, the High Court in law could not have interfered with pure findings of facts arrived at by the Courts below. Consequently, the impugned judgment is set aside and this appeal is allowed with costs.;