LODHA, J. - (1.) RAJASTHAN Khadi Sangh, Chomu has preferred this appeal dissatisfied with the order dated 22. 11. 1996 passed by the Single Judge dismissing the writ petition challenging the order of the Labour Court, Jaipur dated 18. 10. 1994.
(2.) THE brief necessary facts for decision in this appeal are thus: (a) That an industrial dispute under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was referred by the State Government for adjudication to the effect inter alia whether 14 temporary workers who have not been made permanent are entitled to medical and house rent allowances like the permanent employees; not less than Rs. 20/- towards medical allowance and the house rent allowance @ 20% of the wages. (b) That the Industrial Tribunal adjudicated the aforesaid industrial dispute vide award dated 8. 6. 1983 holding therein that 14 employees mentioned in the list were entitled to medical allowance as is being paid to the regular employees. THE said award dated 8. 6. 1983 attained finality. (c) That on 21. 2. 1984, an application was made under Section 33c (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act on behalf of 14 employees for direction to the present appellant to pay the due amount towards medical allowance and the house rent allowance in addition to other claims. (d) THE claim of 14 employees for medical allowance and the house rent allowance related to different period from the year 1975 until October, 1983. (e) That in response to the application under Section 33c (2), the present appellant-employer inter-alia raised the objection that the award dated 8. 6. 1983 becomes enforceable on expiry of one month from the date of its publication in the official gazette and that until September, 1983, the said award has not been published and, therefore, the application under Section 33 (C) (2) was liable to be dismissed. (f) That the parties led evidence before the Labour Court in support of their rival case. (g) That the Labour Court disposed of the application under Section 33c (2) vide its order dated 18. 10. 1994 over-ruling the objection that the award has not become enforceable. THE Labour Court on the other hand held that the benefits to which the employees are entitled are from the date it became due and not after the award had become enforceable. (h) That the Single Judge was not convinced with the submission of the employer. He held that the award dated 8. 6. 1983 has bestowed upon the 14 workers, the right to get medical allowance and the house-rent allowance and in this view of the matter, the consideration of the application by the Labour Court did not suffer from any illegality. In the award dated 8. 6. 1983, the finding of the Industrial Tribunal with regard to medical allowance is thus: *** With regard to the claim for house-rent allowance, the Industrial Tribunal in the award dated 8. 6. 1983 held thus: *** A close look at the aforesaid findings of the award dated 8. 6. 1993 leaves no manner of doubt that the Industrial Tribunal declared that the concerned 14 employees are entitled to the medical allowance and house rent allowance as being paid to the permanent employees. The Industrial Tribunal further directed the employer to pay the medical allowance with the daily wages and also make payment of house rent allowance @ 7%. The award does not specify any date for its operation. For want of any specific date for its operation stated in the award, obviously, the operation of such award cannot be retrospective. For a better consideration of the matter, we immediately advert to Section 17a of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 17a reads thus: 17a. Commencement of the award (a) An award (including an arbitration award) shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under Section 17: Provided that (a) if the appropriate government is of opinion, in any case where the award has been given by a Labour Court or Tribunal in relation to an industrial dispute to which it is a party; or (b) if the Central Government is of opinion, in any case where the award has been given by a National Tribunal, that it will be in expedient on public grounds affecting national economy or social justice to give effect to the whole or any part of the award, the appropriate government, or as the case may be, the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare that the award shall not become enforceable on the expiry of the said period of thirty days. (2) Where any declaration has been made in relation to an award under the proviso to sub-section (1), the appropriate Government or the Central Government may, within ninety days from the date of publication of the award under Section 17, make an order rejecting or modifying the award, and shall, on the first available opportunity, lay the award together with a copy of the order before the Legislature of the State, if the order has been made by a State Government, or before Parliament, if the order has been made by the Central Government. (3) Where any award as rejected or modified by an order made under sub-section (2) is laid before the Legislature of a State or before Parliament, such award shall become enforceable on the expiry of fifteen days from the date on which it is so laid; and where no order under sub-section (2) is made in pursuance of a declaration under the proviso to sub-section (1), the award shall become enforceable on the expiry of the period of ninety days referred to in sub-sec. (2) (4) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (1) and sub- section (3) regarding the enforceability of an award, the award shall come into operation with effect from such date as may be specified therein but where no date is so specified, it shall come into operation on the date when the award becomes enforceable under sub-section (1) or sub-section (3), as the case may be. Sub-section (1) of Section 17a, thus, provides that an award becomes enforceable on expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under Section 17. Sub-section (4), inter alia, subject to the provisions of sub-section (1), provides that the award shall come into operation with effect from such date as may be specified therein, but where no date is specified, it shall come into operation on the date when the award becomes enforceable under sub-section (1 ). That `enforceability of the award' and `coming into operation of the award' are different concepts bearing different connotation admit of no doubt and ambiguity. According to sub-section (1) of Section 17a, an award becomes enforceable after expiry of thirty days from the date of publication under Section 17, but its operation may be specified in the award. If a specific date of its operation is mentioned, the operation of the award is effective from the date of the operation so mentioned. On the other hand, non-specification of the date in the award concerning its operation would mean that it comes into operation when it becomes enforceable.
(3.) IN the case of Hindustan Times Ltd. , New Delhi vs. Their Workmen- 1963 (6) FLR 313, on examination of Section 17a of the INdustrial Disputes act, the Supreme Court held thus: There remains for consideration the question of retrospective operation of the award. Under Section 17-A of the INdustrial Disputes Act, 1947, an award shall come into operation with effect from such date as may be specified therein but where no date is so specified it shall come into operation on the date when the award becomes enforceable. Even without a specific reference being made on this question it is open to an industrial tribunal to fix in its discretion a date, a date from which it shall come into operation. The reference, in the present case, included as a matter in dispute the question of retrospective effect in these words:-      " Whether all the above demands should be made applicable retrospectively with effect from April 1, 1956 and what directions are necessary in this respect?" The Tribunal rejected the workmen's claim for giving effect to its award from April, 1956. Wherever however the Tribunal has given relief the Tribunal has directed that the award should come into effect from the date of reference, i. e. January 23, 1958. On behalf of the Company Mr. Pathak contends that there is no reason why the award should be given effect to from any date prior to the date of its pronouncement. We are not impressed by this argument. No general formula can be laid down as to the date from which a Tribunal should make its award effective. That question has to be decided by the Tribunal on a consideration of circumstances of each case. There have been cases where this Court has made an award effective from the date when the demand was first made. There are other cases where the orders of the Tribunal directing the award to the made effective from the date of the award has not been interfered with. It is true that in some cases this Court has modified the Tribunal's award in such a case. But it does not appear however that any general principles have been laid down. INdeed, it is difficult and not even desirable that this Court should try to lay down general principles on such matters that require careful consideration of the peculiar circumstances of each case for the exercise of discretion. In other words, what the Supreme court has held with reference to Section 17a of the Industrial Disputes Act is that an award shall come into operation with effect from such date as may be specified therein but when no date is so specified it shall come into operation on the date when the award becomes enforceable. If the Tribunal chooses not to give retrospective operation to its award specifically and expressly, in our considered view, the operation of such award is the date when which the award becomes enforceable. The retrospective operation of the award is ordinarily not to be inferred in the absence of any specific statement to that effect in the award. The aforesaid legal position also gets supported from the decision of the Supreme court in the case of The Management of Wenger and Co. and others vs. Their Workmen- AIR 1964 SC 864. In paragraph 28 of the report, the Supreme Court ruled thus: The last point urged by Mr. Pathak is in regard to what he characterised as retrospective operation of the award. It appears that the present demands were made by the employees on October 1, 1958 and the references were made on September 9, 1959 and December 12, 1959 respectively. The award was pronounced on March 16, 1962 and it has directed that its directions should take effect from January 1, 1961. Technically speaking, this direction cannot be said to be retrospective because it takes effect from a date subsequent to the date of the reference. Under S. 17a (4) of the Industrial Disputes act, 1947 (No. 14 of 1947), it is open to the Industrial Tribunal thinks that it is fair and just that its award should come into force from a date prior to the date of reference, it is authorised to issue such direction. When such a direction is issued, it may be said appropriately that the award takes effect retrospectively. Apart from this technical aspect of the matter, if, in the circumstances of this case, the Tribunal held that the award should take effect not from the date of reference but from a later date which was January 1, 1961, we see no reason why we should interfere with its direction. ;