RAFIQ, J. - (1.) AGGRIEVED by the impugned order dated 24. 6. 2005 passed by the District Collector, Jaipur, the aforesaid two writ petitions have been filed by petitioner Ranjeet Singh questioning non-renewal of his arms licence. In the first Writ Petition No. 3513/2004, challenge has been made to the letter dated 22. 4. 2004 by which the authorised arms dealer, M/s Jindal and Company, Panch Batti, M. I. Road, Jaipur, with whom the petitioner had deposited his licensed arm viz. one 12 Bore DBBL Gun No. 75623 and. 32 Bore Revolver No. B-1872 at the time of election, was directed not to return these weapons to the petitioner without prior permission of the Police Station, Mahesh Nagar. Under challenge in the second Writ Petition No. 5635/2005 however is the order of the District Collector dated 24. 6. 2005 whereby he cancelled the licence of the petitioner with regard to the aforesaid two weapons and ordered their forfeiture. Since in both the writ petitions, dispute pertains to the same person and with regard to the same weapons, they have been heard together and are being decided by this common judgment.
(2.) IN the first writ petition, the petitioner has inter alia contended that he being a Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat of village Lambakala in Panchayat Samiti Todarai Singh of District Tonk, is a prominent figure of the society and therefore requires arms for his self defence and security of his family. He applied for and was granted two licenses on which basis he purchased one 12 Bore DBBL Gun No. 75623 by Bharat Small Arms - Made in INdia and one. 32 Bore Revolver No. B-1872 by IOF. These licenses were granted to him in the year 1993 and were valid upto December, 2005. During Parliament Elections of 2004, SHO, Police Station, Mahesh Nagar, Jaipur required him to deposit these two arms with the authorised arms dealer and accordingly the petitioner deposited them with M/s Jindal & Company, Panch Batti, MI Road, Jaipur on 5. 4. 2004. Even before the petitioner could recollect the weapons after the election, SHO, Mahesh Nagar, Jaipur vide communication dated 22. 4. 2004 directed the aforesaid arms dealer not to return them back to the petitioner. When the petitioner approached the arms dealer on 11. 5. 2004, he was informed about the aforesaid letter. The second writ petition was filed after the order of cancellation of licenses and forfeiture weapons was passed by the District Collector. I have heard Shri B. L. Sharma, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Chandra Shekhar Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri H. V. Nandwana, learned Dy. Government Advocate. Shri B. L. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that when show cause notice was served upon the petitioner, the District Collector had merely indicated about filing of the two criminal cases against the petitioner - one lodged as FIR No. 142/90 at Police Station Bajaj Nagar for the offence under section 453 IPC and another in FIR No. 143/90 at Police Station Bajaj Nagar for offence under section 3/25 of the Arms Act and that the petitioner concealing the fact about the chargesheets having been filed against him in these cases, obtained the arms licence and further that he also concealed his real identity in that while his correct name was Radhey Shyam Daroga but he presented himself as Ranjeet Singh and obtained licence in that name. When however final order of cancellation of the arms licences was passed, the District Collector referred to as many as thirteen criminal cases having been filed against him. The petitioner was acquitted in both the cases referred to in the show cause notice vide judgments dated 20. 8. 96 and 3. 7. 2001. Shri B. L. Sharma, further argued that much more than what was indicated in the show cause notice to elicit response from the petitioner, was made basis for cancellation of licence which amounted to denying reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Impugned order was therefore contrary to the provision of section 17 of the Arms Act as also against the principle of natural justice. He in this connection relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corporation v/s Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai & Ors.- JT 1998 (7) SC 243. Shri B. L. Sharma argued that most of the cases referred to in the impugned order were stale and the petitioner has been acquitted in them. The District Collector in his order has referred to the fact that the Police Station, Mahesh Nagar, even opened history sheet against the petitioner but did not take into consideration the fact that the proposal of the Police Station, Mahesh Nagar was disapproved by the District administration itself. Though a notice dated 12. 5. 2004 was served on the petitioner by the Additional District Magistrate for initiating proceedings against him u/s 110 Cr. P. C. But when he explained that out of three cases referred to in the notice, he had already been acquitted in two cases, the Additional District Magistrate being convinced, decided to drop the proceedings u/s 110 Cr. P. C. by his order dated 18. 8. 2004. This fact however has been completely ignored by the learned District Magistrate in his order. The petitioner also denied the charge of impersonation and to deny the charge, produced copies of his driving licence, marriage card, domicile certificate, election certificate of Sarpanch and copy of Rajasthan Gazette changing his original name Radhey Shyam Daroga. As regards the individual cases, Shri B. L. Sharma learned counsel for the petitioner cited the copies of the judgments passed in Cr. Case No. 142/90 for offence u/s 3/25 of Arms Act, Cr. Case No. 725/97 for offence under sections 448, 453, 468 and 471 IPC, Cr. Case No. 727/97 for offences under sections 448, 453, 467, 468 and 471 IPC and Cr. Case No. 237/95 for offences under sections 323, 341 and 307 IPC in all of which the petitioner was acquitted. Yet the learned District Magistrate has made them basis for passing the order of cancellation of the arms licenses of the petitioner. Besides these, he submitted that Cr. Case No. 182/03 for offences under sections 420, 418, 424 and 120-B, IPC was still pending trial. In Cr. Case No. 94/04 for offences under sections 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 474 and 120-B, IPC, the police upon investigation did not find proof and therefore submitted final report. In Cr. Case No. 237/95 for offences under sections 323, 341 and 307 IPC, charges against the petitioner were dropped vide order of the court dated 27. 7. 2001. So far as Cr. Case No. 252/97 for offences under sections 147, 341, 323 IPC read with section 3 of the Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is concerned, the petitioner has not even been named in the said FIR as would be evident from the copy thereof which has been placed on record. Now only one criminal case is pending investigation being FIR No. 182. 03 at Police Station Jyoti Nagar, Jaipur for offences under sections 420, 418, 424 and 120-B, IPC. In view of these facts, it cannot be said that the petitioner has become a threat to the peace and tranquility of the society so as to justify cancellation of his arms licenses. Shri B. L. Sharma argued that the petitioner had to file writ petition directly before this court bypassing the remedy of appeal because there was utter failure of the principle of natural justice in passing of the impugned order and therefore the remedy of appeal in the circumstances of the case cannot be taken as absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition. Alternative remedy cannot come as a bar for entertaining a writ petition where there has been whole some violation of principle of natural justice, as has been held by their lordships of the Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corporation v/s Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others (1998) 8 SCC 1. It was therefore prayed that the impugned orders be quashed and set aside and the respondents be directed to restore the arms licenses originally granted to the petitioner. Per contra, Shri H. V. Nandwana, learned Deputy Government Advocate argued that the writ petition is not maintainable because the petitioner has the remedy of appeal under section 18 of the Arms Act before Home Commissioner, therefore the writ petition be dismissed on this ground alone. It was argued that when the petitioner obtained the arms licence, he was required to specifically declare about the number of criminal cases registered against him and even if he has been acquitted therein later, the fact remains that the petitioner procured the arms licence by concealing all this material information. It is the factum of the petitioners involvement in number of criminal cases which is important and not that such cases ultimately resulted in acquittal. There were in all thirteen criminal cases registered against the petitioner and chargesheet was also filed against him in all except one. The learned District Magistrate on receiving complaint from the Police Station, Mahesh Nagar, called for the report from the Additional Superintendent of Police, Jaipur City, Jaipur (South ). Taking into consideration the entire circumstances, the District Magistrate considered it necessary for the security of public peace and public safety to cancel the licenses earlier granted. Impugned order was passed after giving show cause notice to the petitioner and after considering reply submitted by him. It was therefore submitted that the impugned order does not suffer from any legal infirmity and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.
(3.) I have given my earnest consideration to the rival arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties and scrutinised the material on record. Even though, the remedy of appeal is available to the petitioner against the impugned order before the Home Commissioner u/s. 18 of the Arms Act but the petitioner had approached this court even prior to passing of the order of revocation/cancellation of licence and this court vide interim order dated 2. 9. 2004 directed that even if any order was passed during the pendency of the writ petition, the same shall remain subject to decision of this writ petition. When therefore his arms licenses were cancelled during the pendency of the first writ petition, the petitioner filed second writ petition impugning the order of cancellation. These writ petitions have remained pending ever since and the petitioner has documented them very well by producing certified copies of the judgments in almost all the cases which were made basis for revocation/cancellation of his arms licenses. In view of all these facts and particularly when I have heard the arguments on merits of the case also, it would be in the interest of justice to decide the writ petitions on merits rather then relegating the petitioner to the remedy of appeal at this stage. I therefore proceed to examine the matter on merit. First argument which the learned counsel for the petitioner has raised is that when only two criminal cases were referred to in the show cause notice, the learned District Magistrate erred in law in basing his order on as many as thirteen criminal cases which are said to have been lodged against the petitioner. Owing to this reason, he was denied reasonable opportunity of hearing inasmuch as this amounted to violation of the principles of natural justice. In the absence of notice, the petitioner could not present his side of the story. This argument, when examined on the facts of the case, it is found that apart from the fact about the impersonation made by the petitioner, only two criminal cases were mentioned in the show cause notice. Argument is that if the petitioner was granted the opportunity to explain about all thirteen cases referred to in the impugned order, he would have clarified his position. This argument implies that although opportunity of hearing was given but it was not proper opportunity of hearing. It also implies that the petitioner does not deny the factum of the criminal cases having been registered against him but given the chance, he would have clarified that in almost all of them he had been acquitted and that in some of them he was not even chargesheeted or even the charges framed against him were dropped. Case of the petitioner in substance thus is that he has not received a fair deal at the hands of the respondents. ;