RAVANI, CJ. - (1.) THE appellant-petitioner challenged the legality and validity of action of termination of his services by filing Writ Petition No. 1490 of 1989. THE learned Single Judge has rejected the Petition. It is against this judgment and order the this Special Appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, has been filed by the appellant workman.
(2.) THE appellant-petitioner was appointed as Lower Division Clerk vide order dated February 29, 1988. His appointment was again extended by subsequent order dated September 8, 1988. In both the orders it is mentioned that the apppointment was for the purposes of maintenance of record and weeding out of the old record. In the preamble part of the order it is stated that his appointment, was for a period of six months. Again in the next paragraph of the order it is stated as follows: Mijksdr fu;qfdr iw. kzr;k vlfkk;h gs rfkk fcuk fdlh lwpuk ds lekir dh tk ldrh gsa** In another order dated September 7, 1988, it is also stated that the appointment is for maintenance of record and weeding out of useless record. In that order the period of appointment has been extended for a period of six months, i. e. upto March 31, 1989 and again it is stated that the appointment was purely temporary and could be terminated at any time without giving any notice. Thereafter when the period of six months came to an end the services were not extended further. Thus on March 31, 1989, services of the petitioner stood terminated. Hence he filed the aforesaid petition praying that his termination of service be held to be illegal and void as provisions under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, were not complied with. It was, inter alia, contended that though there was work and extension of the work was sanctioned, the petitioner has not been continued in service. The petition was resisted by the respondent, inter alia, on the ground that he was not regularly selected in accordance with the rules and that at any rate his appointment was on contract for a fixed period and, therefore, covered by the provisions of Section 2 (oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In short, submission was that services of the workman were terminated on account of the non- renewal of the contract of employment on the expiry of contract of employment. This submission has been accepted by the learned Single Judge and hence the learned Single Judge rejected the petition as per judgment and order dated July 2, 1992. The definition of `retrenchment' is contained in Section 2 (oo) of the Indus- trial Disputes Act. It reads as follows: `` `retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or (b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or (c) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or (d) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of conti-nued ill-health. '' Reliance was placed on behalf of the respondent Jaipur Development Authority on the clause (bb) of the definition. On this basis the employment of workman was by virtue of contract which was not renewed. The contention cannot be accepted. We have referred to the order of appointment dated February 29, 1988 and order of extension dated September 8, 1988 (Annexures I and II of the writ petition ). Stipulation in the order of appointment is that the services of workman were purely temporary and could be terminated even without notice. In the order of appointment it is nowhere stated that on the expiry of the period of six months the employment would automatically come to an end. In fact second order, dated September 8, 1988, was passed wherein also it has been stated that services were purely temporary and could be terminated at any time without notice. It may be noted that the clause (bb) of the definition of the term `retrenchment' has been added by way of Amendment Act, 1984. It is in the nature of exception to the main clause defining the term `retrechment'. Therefore, it has to be construed strictly. In view of the specific condition in the order of appointment that services could be terminated at any time without notice, it cannot be construed as contract of emp- loyment for fixed period. Therefore, in facts of the case, clause (bb) of Section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act is not attracted. It is an undisputed position that the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act have not been complied with before terminating the ser-vices of the workman. Once there is violation of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, the termination of services of workman has got to be held to be illegal and void and the workman is to be reinstated in service with full back wages. It is nowhere indicated that during the interregnum the workman was gainfully employed anywhere. In view of this position, reinstatement is required to be ordered with full back wages. In the result the Appeal is allowed. The judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge is reversed and set aside. The action of termination of services of the workman is held to be illegal and void. The workman shall be reinstated in service immediately. The arrears of back wages shall be paid to the workman on or before May 31, 1996. The amount of back wages shall be calculated on the basis that his services were never terminated and during the interregnum he continued in service and was entitled to all the monetary benefits as if he continued to be in service. The amount so calculated, shall be paid to the workman latest by May 31, 1996. If the amount is not paid by May 31, 1996, it shall carry interest at the rate of 15% per annum from the date of this judgment till the amount is paid. No order as to costs. . ;