- (1.) THE petitioner has filed the present writ petition challenging his suspension order dated 5. 11. 1995 (Annex. 12) to the writ petition on various grounds.
(2.) I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. M. S. Singhvi at length as well as learned counsel Mr. P. C. Sharma appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 and Mr. R. L. Jangid for respondents No. 2 and 3. An identical question came up for consideration before me in the case of Kishan Singh vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (1) (S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 284 of 1996), decided on 24. 1. 1996, where the interpretation of Rule 13 of the Rajasthan Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 was dealt with. It would be pertinent to quote Paragraph 9 of the said decision for ready reference :- "since suspension of a delinquent officer or an employee pending disciplinary proceedings is not treated as punishment, therefore, a writ petition is entertainable only in rarest of rare cases on the valid grounds evolved by courts of law. For example, if it is found that suspension has not been passed either by the appointing authority or by any other authority empowered to pass such order, a Court in its discretion under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India may entertain a writ petition. Similarly, there may be a case, where suspension order may have been passed validly at initial stage by a competent authority where a disciplinary proceedings against a delinquent officer is contemplated but it is shown before the court that disciplinary authority is guilty of laxness in serving a charge-sheet, a court may exercise its extra-ordinary jurisdiction by enter- taining a writ petition. These examples are merely illustrative and not exhaustive. In the present case, no valid ground exists to entertain a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India at this stage. " In the present case, in my considered opinion, no valid, reasonable and sufficient grounds exist to entertain a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India at this stage. Keeping in view all the facts and circumstances of the case, it would not be proper to make any observation on merits of the case. Suffice it to observe that in the present writ petition, intricate disputed question of facts are involved, which are to be decided in a criminal trial pending against the petitioner in the Court of Special Judge, Anti-corruption Cases, Jodhpur bearing Criminal Original Case No. 32 of 1994. Expression of any opinion by this Court as alleged in the writ petition is likely to cause serious prejudice to the petitioner, therefore, I refrain to discuss the factual controversy alleged in the writ petition. Moreover the Investigating Agency in this case filed a challan against the petitioner and other co-accused persons, which is pendent trial. Admittedly, trial is pending against the petitioner, therefore, he can be validly placed under suspension under Rule 13 (1) (b) of the Rajasthan Civil Service (Classification of Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short `the Rules of 1958'. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention towards the mandatory provisions contemplated under sub-rule (1) of Rule 13 of the Rules of 1958, according to which, a delinquent officer/employee can be placed under suspension by the appointing authority or any authority to which it is sub-ordinate or any other authority empowered by the Government in that behalf. It is urged before me by Mr. M. S. Singhvi, learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of suspension passed against the petitioner is illegal and without jurisdiction. According to him, the appointing authority of the petitioner is Deputy Director, Department of Education but the impugned suspension order has been passed by the Up-Sachiv, Department of Personnel. The Up-Sachiv, Department of Personnel is neither appointing authority nor he is higher authority to the appointing authority, therefore, he cannot be permitted to place the petitioner under suspension.
(3.) I have given my thoughtful consideration to the aforesaid argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In my considered opinion, under sub-rule (1) of Rule 13 of the Rules of 1958, a delinquent officer/employee can be placed under suspension by the appointing authority or any authority to which it is sub-ordinate or any other authority empowered by the Government in that behalf. The aforesaid argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is based on the foundation led at Page 15 of the paper-book under Ground (i) of Paragraph 20 to the writ petition. A close scrutiny of the averments made in the aforesaid paragraph covers only two categories of authorities; firstly, appointing authority and secondly, authority to which it is sub-ordinate but there is no averment about any other authority empowered by the Government in that behalf. Learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously urged before me that whether the suspending authority `up Sachiv', Department of Personnel' has been empowered by the Government, is to be proved by the respondents and not by the petitioner. I am not impressed with the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner, inasmuch as, under illustration (e) of Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act it is clearly provided that the official acts are regularly performed. It is true that the presumption contemplated under illustration (e) of Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act is rebuttable but in the present case, there is no material to rebut the said presumption to the effect that the Up-Sachiv, Department of Personnel has not been authorised by the Government to place the petitioner under suspension. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the instant writ petition is hereby dismissed and the interim stay order passed on 2. 3. 95 is hereby discharged. . ;