- (1.) THE petitioner Jethu Singh working as a driver with the respondent No. 1, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation for short R. S. R. T. C. was charge sheeted along with the conductor of the bus for carrying 48 passengers out of 60 passengers travelling in the bus without tickets. In the domestic enquiry both the petitioner driver as well as the conductor were found guilty and, therefore, both of them were removed from service. THE petitioner was removed from service by an order dated 18. 5. 87 immediately on that date i. e. on 18. 5. 87 an application was made by the Corporation before the Tribunal for granting approval to its order. THE application was also made in case of conductor. It is stated by the petitioner in S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 837/88 that the petitioner was hopeful that he will hear from the Tribunal about this but as he had not heard from the Tribunal for a reasonable time, therefore, he approached this court by way of this petition. It is further stated that the petitioner preferred a departmental appeal before the appellate authority on the legal advice, which came to be dismissed on 11. 1. 1988. It is further stated that, thereafter, the petitioner was adviced to enquire from the office of the Tribunal about the fate of the application filed by the Corporation for granting approval to its order, but his counsel Shri S. K. Jain adviced him that it was not possible for him to get any information in this behalf and therefore, there was a delay in filing the writ petition which was filed in April 1988. Thus the delay of one year in filing the writ petition was sought to be explained. In para No. 14 a categorical statement made on oath that the petitioner has got no other equal efficacious, alternative and speedy remedy available except to appro- ach this Hon'ble Court in its extra ordinary jurisdiction. This statement made on oath is on the face of it is false. Infact the learned counsel for the petitioner conceeds that the petitioner had better efficacious and alternative remedy available before the Labour Court. THErefore, this petition is also required to be dismissed on the ground of false statement made on oath.
(2.) THIS petition is also required to be dismissed on the ground of delay because the delay has not been satisfactorily explained. This petition is also required to be dismissed as the petitioner has filed subsequent petition after the Tribunal has granted approval in 1994 to the order of removal which has been challenged by the petitioner in S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5223/94 and also challenging the order of removal as well as the order of appellate authority dismissing his appeal. It is also to be stated that the second petition was admitted by this Court on 10. 11. 1994 and both the matters are ordered to be heard together. Hence, both these writ petitions are disposed of by this common order. In view of what has been stated above, the S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 837/ 88 is required to be dismissed mainly on four grounds: (1) For making false statement on oath by the petitioner in his petition that he has got no other alternative remedy though he had better alternative and efficacious remedy before the Labour Court, (2) On the ground of delay of almost one year in filing the petition, which is not at all properly explained, (3) The order of removal, which was con- firmed in appeal has become final, after the Tribunal gave its approval in 1994, and (4) Disputed question of facts are involved in this petition. As this court cannot go into the question of facts and decide against the finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal in this writ petition. The petitioner ought to have approached the Labour Court, which is the only competent court. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Mridul argued both the petitioners at great length and submitted that this Court should decide both the petitions on merits and submitted that they cannot be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy as the matters are admitted and pending before this Court since long. In support of this contention he relied upon the judgment of Division Bench of this Court rendered in Deepak Kumar Khivsara vs. Oil India Limited and Ors. decide on 17th April, 1996 (1 ). Wherein, the Division Bench has explained the judgment of the Full Bench of Five Judges of this Court and held that the pending writ petitions cannot be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. He also tried to argue both the petitions on facts also. I am afraid this Court cannot go into the question of facts in a writ petition. In second petition being S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5223/94 Mr. Mridul has argued one more point namely that the Tribunal has erred in granting its approval to the termination order. He submitted that the Tribunal has not granted its approval in case of conductor and, therefore, the grant of approval by the Tribunal in case of petitioner Driver is clearly bad and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This can also very well be decided by the Labour Court as this Court cannot go into the question of propriety in granting approval by the Tribunal to the removal order.
(3.) SECONDLY, each case has to be decided on its own facts. The order passed by the Tribunal not granting approval in case of conductor was not produced before me. It was only orally submitted that the Tribunal refused to grant approval on the ground that the conductor was not given one month's salary. On consideration of the facts before it, if the Tribunal thought it fit to grant approval and reject the con- contention of the petitioner regarding not paying one month's salary to the petitioner driver then this Court cannot exercise its powers under Art. 226 or 227 of the Constitution, as no jurisdictional error was committed by the Tribunal. The only competent court is Labour Court to appreciate this question as it is a question of fact. Therefore, keeping in mind the Judgment of Full Bench of Five Hon'ble Judges of this Court reported in 1995 (2) W. L. C. page 1 (2) and the un-reported recent judgment of Division Bench decided on 17th April, 1996 (supra ). I am of the view that this is not the case in which this Court should exercise its powers under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India when there is better alternative and efficacious remedy available to the petitioner before the Labour Court. It is true that this Court has wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, but as observed by the Division Bench also in its judgment that it has to be exercised sparingly. Both these petitions were argued at great length for hours together by Mr. Mridul yesterday and today by Mr. Saluja for Mr. Mridul as Mr. Mridul was busy in other admission matters before other Courts. In view of the above discussion I do not think fit to exercise my powers either under Art. 226 or 227 of the Constitution. Therefore, for the aforesaid reasons recorded in the judgment both these petitions are dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of these cases special order of cost would have been passed, but considering the fact that the petitioner is a petty driver I think that no order as to costs, would be proper. Both the petitions fail and are dismissed with no order as to costs. . ;