KHAN, J. - (1.) M/s Sambhar Salt Ltd. (Respondent No. 1) is a company registered under Companies Act,1956 manufacturing and selling iodised salts at Sambhar Lake, Distt. Jaipur. It is a Rajasthan Government undertaking and has its registered office at Lal Niwas 21, Sawai Ram Singh Road, Jaipur. It is a subsidiary company of M/s Hindustan Salts Ltd. which has its registered office at above men- tioned address but which is owned by the Central Government, State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur Branch Office at S. M. S. Highway, Jaipur works as Banker to the Respondents Company.
(2.) M/s Aashirwad Enterprises (salts merchants) Dharam Shala Road, Seharsa, Bihar, the accused petitioner is a proprietorship concemed of Smt. Renu Devi, who is accused No. 2 in the complaint but not a party to this petition. This concern deals in salt at Dharamshala Road, Bihar. On July 20,1993 the Respondent company, through its Senior Manager (Commercial) Shri Sudhir Bohra, who was stated to be duly authorised person to file a complaint for and on behalf of the Respondent company, filed a complaint against the petitioner and its sole- proprietor, Smt. Renu Devi, aforementioned, in the court of Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate No. 5, Jaipur City, Jaipur with the allegations that in January 1993 the petitioner negotiated with the Respondent company for purchase of salt and on negotiations being successful the Respondent company consigned 42 wagons load of salt in February 1993 and 50 wagons load in March 1993 to the petitioner, that towards the payment of the price of the afore-mentioned quantity of salt Smt. Renu Devi, the sole- proprietor of the petitioner sent to the Respondent company a cheque for Rs. 3. 00 lakhs being No. QQX 607755 dated 3. 4. 93 drawn on Punjab National Bank, Seharsa, Bihar in favour of the Respondent company, that as per request of petitioners proprietor the cheque was delivered after the expiry of one month's period from the date of issue thereof to its Banker,state Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur, Jaipur , for collecting the cheque amount from petitioners banker at Seharsa, that by its Memo dated 18. 5. 93 petitioner banker at Seharsa returned the cheque with the endorsement ``insufficient funds as on date as well as on 3. 4. 93'', that banker thereupon informed the Respon- dent accordingly, that thereafter the Respondent company delivered a notice U/s 138 (b) of the Act to the petitioner through Regd. Post requiring its proprietor to make payment of Rs. 3 lacs within 15 days of the receipt of the notice, that the said notice was received by Smt. Renu on 8. 6. 93 but since no payment was made by her the complaint was being filed. The learned Magistrate conducted necessary enquiry and examined Sh. Sudhir Bohra U/s 202 Cr. P. C. After coisdering the statement of Sh. Bohra and the documents proved by him as Exp. 1 to Exp. 19 the learned Magistrate came to hold the opinion that the evidence placed before him prima facie discloses the commission of the offence U/s 138 of the Act by the petitioner and its proprietor Smt. Renu Devi, he therefore, directed issuance of summons against them accordingly vide his order dated 16. 8. 93. Instead of putting in appearance through its proprietor or though its duly authorised representative, before the Court of the learned Magistrate in compliance of the summons issued by him and thus challenging the justification of issuing process U/s 204 Cr. P. C. against them the petitioner chose to invoke the inherent powers to this Court U/s 482 Cr. P. C. on the ground of the proceedings initiated by the learned Magistrate vide his order dated 16. 8. 93 amounting to gross abuse of the process of his court. Nothing that the petitioner is simply the trade name of the sole-proprietorship business being run by Smt. Renu Devi and thus, legally speaking lacks the characteristics of a legal personality capable to sue and being sued the Bench enquired of the learned counsel for the petitioner as to whether Smt. Renu Devi, who is the main and for all purposes, the real and only accused in the criminal case has accepted the impugned order as she is neither stated to have preferred similar petition separately nor was she made a party to this petition. Mr. Garg, the learned counsel for the petitioner was fair enough to state that this petition has in fact been presented by Smt. Renu Devi on her own behalf as well as on behalf of her proprietorship business and that any decision given herein by this court would be a decision in respect of Smt. Renudevi's grievance also. In view of such frank submission by Mr. Garg and with a new to avoid possible multiple pro- ceedings of the same nature subsequently in the name of Smt. Renu Devi it is hereby made clear that this petition is treated as having been filed by both the accused,as arranged in the complaint and as summoned by the learned Magistrate vide his impugned order. At the very outset it needs mention that the learned counsel for the Res- pondents, making reference to the observations of the Apex Court in Sh. P. V. Narsimha Rao's case, as reported in press, submitted that in view of the basic character of the impugned order being that of an exparte order, liable to recalled and cancelled by the Magistrate himself, on sufficient cause being shown to him to do so, all the points raised in this petition can be agitated before and decided by the learned Magistrate and, therefore, this petition deserves to be decided with such directions. However, Mr. Garg vehemently opposed the adoption of such a course for disposal of the petition. The learned counsel urged with much industry that the right of an accused to challenge the justification of criminal proceedings which amount to abuse of the process of a court cannot be defeated by such argu- ment. He emphasised that the objections relating to jurisdiction of the Magistrate to take cognizance of offence U/s 138 of the Act in the facts and circumstances of this case, continuance of the cause of action to prosecute the petitioner and competency of the person filing the complaint were such as could not have been decided by the learned Magistrate. Mr. Garg insisted that this court could decide such objections finally here and now and should not leave them for the decision by the learned Magistrate.
(3.) ORDINARILY I would not have felt persuaded to decide the objections as raised by Mr. Garg as they all, in my opinion can very well be decided by the learned Magistrate at his level but looking to the too much insistence of Mr. Garg and to the pains taken by him arguing this petition for days together and with a view to shorten the life of this already prolonged litigation which may further be unnecessarily enlarged by raising the same arguments before the learned Magistrate. I have considered it proper to decide the objections raised by Mr. Garg. The first objection raised by Mr. Garg against Magistrate's action of taking cognizance of offence U/s 138 of the Act is that the learned Magistrate had no territorial jurisdiction in the matter in as much as the goods purchased was re- ceived, the payment therefore, was intended to be made and received through pe- titioners banker and the cheque was drawn and delivered to Respondent's agent/ servant at Seharsa (Bihar ). It was submitted that in view of the provisions contained in Sec. 177 Cr. P. C. a competent court of Magistrate at Seharsa in Bihar and not in Jaipur in Rajasthan had the jurisdiction U/s 142 of the Act to entertain the complaint. This argument was sought to be supported with the decision of the Kerala High Court in Muraleedharan Vs. Pareed (1 ). The argument advanced is totally misconceive and deserve to be dismissed outrightly. The general rule founded in Sec. 177 Cr. P. C. is that every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. This general rule is based on the common law principle of England that all crimes are local and justifiable by local courts only within whose jurisdiction they are committed. But the scheme of Chapter XIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 exhibits enlargement of this principle and the ambit of the situs as much as possible. This intention has been made clear by the Indian Legislature by enacting in Sec. 179 Cr. P. C. that (a) where it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or (b) when an offence is commi- tted partly in one local area and partly in one another, or (c) where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed on more local areas than one or where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be enquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. The ambit of situs so enlarged by sec. 178 Cr. P. C. was extending by providing in Sec. 179 that when an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be enquired in to or tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued. A combined reading conveys the message that the situs for trial of an offence is not confined to a particular transaction. It is related to the acc- rual of cause of action which is a bundle of facts and may well extend over the territorial jurisdiction of more than one courts. Therefore, the venue of enquiry or trial of a case has to be determined by the averments made in the relevant complaint. ;