K.S.LODHA, J. - (1.) THIS is a tenant's revision against the order of the learned District Judge, Bhilwara dated 7.11.83 dismissing his appeal against the order of the learned Munsif, Bhilwara dated 2.8.83 by which he refused to extend the time for deposit of rent for the month of August, 1982 and striking out his defence against eviction under Section 13(5) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Acts').
(2.) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The plaintiff's suit was inter alia based on the ground of default. The rent was determined under Section 13(3) of the Act upto 31.7.82 on 28.8.82 and the tenant was granted time of three months to deposit the same and this amount was deposited on 25.11.82. The rent of the month of August, 1982 fell due for deposit on 15.9.82 but was not deposited by that day but was deposited on 17.9.82 that is, two days late. The ground put forward for condonation of delay of these two days was that the tenant had filed an appeal against the order dated 28.8.82 determining the rent and that appeal was pending and the tenant was under the hope that it will be accepted. The first date fixed in that appeal was not heard on that day and it was adjourned to 23.9.82 and therefore, on 17.9.82 itself the rent for the month of August, 82 was deposited. The learned Munsif did not accepted this ground for condonation of delay holding that there had been a default in the deposit of the rent of the month of August, 82, the tenant had incurred the liability of his defence against eviction being struck off and he accordingly struck off the defence. It is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant that the provisions of Sections 13(4) and (5) should be construed very liberally and in favour of the tenant keeping in view the purpose for which these provisions have been made as these beneficial legislations are for the tenant and a hypertechnical view should not have been taken by the Munsif and upheld by the learned District Judge. In support of his contention he has placed reliance upon Lalchand v. Sant Ram, 1978 R.L.W. 119. and Jagannath v. Jodha Ram, 1984 R.L.W. 42. On the other hand, the landlord non-petitioner supported the orders of the Courts below.
(3.) I have given my careful consideration to the real contentions. It is true that these provisions have to be given a liberal meaning and if there are sufficient grounds for condonation of the delay, the Court should lean towards extending the time for the deposit of the rent. However, it does not mean that even if there is no sufficient or reasonable ground the Court should always condone the delay merely because it has the power to condone the delay by 15 days so far as the deposit of the monthly rent under Section 13(4) of the Act is concerned. In the present case the ground put forward by the tenant was that since his appeal was pending against the order dated 28.8.82 and he was hopeful of the appeal, he did not deposit the rent for the month of August, 82 by 15th of September, 1982. This ground did not weigh with the learned Munsif and the learned District Judge and I do not see any reason to take a different view. It may be noted that the tenant had filed the appeal against the order dated 28.8.82 was the first date for the hearing of the appeal. There was no certainty that the appeal would be heard on that very day because the service of the respondent and the receipt of the record were conditions precedent for the hearing of the appeal on that day and, therefore, the tenant could not have been under any bonafide belief the appeal would be heard on 17.9.82. His ground that he was hopeful that the appeal to be the reasonable ground for his not depositing the rent by the 15th of September, 1982, because if that was so he would not have deposited the rent on 17.9.82, also because on 17.9.82 the appeal was adjourned to 23.9.82 when there was every likelihood of the appeal being heard. In these circumstances when the Court below did not find bonafides on the part of the tenant in not depositing the rent in time and refused to extend the time this Court sitting in revision would not be justified in interfering with that order. The authorities relied upon by the learned counsel do not appear to be at all applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. In Lal Chand's case (supra) the Court interfered because the application for extension of time was refused only on the ground that it had been filed after the period of 15 days had already expired and in the opinion of this Court the trial Court had not become functus officio and could have exercised its power of extension of time even after the expiry of the original period.;