KUDAL, J - (1.) THIS is a revision petition against the order of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Shri Ganganagar dated 20th February, 1975, whereby he awarded maintenance allowance of Rs. 250/- per month to the non-petitioner Smt. Rukma Devi.
(2.) THE facts of the case, in brief, relevant for the disposal of this revision petition, are that the applicant was married to Smt. Rukma Devi about 40 years back. Out of this wedlock, two daughters were born to Smt. Rukma Devi. But, as no son was born, the applicant married a second wife Smt. Dakha. Smt Rukma Devi continued to live with the applicant even after his marriage with Smt. Dakha for some time and, then she left living with the petitioner, and started living with her parents. Smt. Rukma Devi then moved an application under Section 488, Cr. P. C. (old) on 16-5-1959, which was allowed and a maintenance allowance of Rs. 200/- per month was fixed. Later on, the petitioner obtained a decree of divorce against Smt. Rukma Devi on 4. 12. 1971. He then applied for cancellation of the order of maintenance on the ground of divorce. THE order regarding the maintenance allowance was, therefore, cancelled on 19-2-1973. After coming into force of the New Criminal Procedure Code, Rukma Devi moved an application under Section 125, Cr. P. C. on 25-6-1974. This application was allowed on 20-2-1975, and a maintenance of Rs. 250/- per month was ordered to be paid by the petitioner to Smt. Rukma Devi. It is against this order that the present revision petition has been filed. On behalf of the petitioner, it was contended that the learned magistrate erred in law in entertaining a second application for grant of maintenance allowance when the previous order of grant of maintenance was annulled on 19-2-73. It was also contended that the New Criminal Procedure Code has no retrospective applicability, and the rights of the parties, which were determined under the Criminal Procedure Code, cannot now be reopened. It was also contended that the principle of res judicata would also apply, in substance, to this case and the second application by Smt. Rukma Devi should not have been entertained at all. It was also contended that the provisions of Sec 125. Cr. P. C. apply only to customary divorces, and not to the divorces secured through judicial proceedings. The learned counsel for the applicant also placed reliance on Section 6 (c) of the General Clauses Act, and contended that all rights and liabilities, which had accrued under the old Criminal Procedure Code, could be decided, continued and determined only in accordance with the provisions of that Code, and the provisions of the New Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be invoked or availed of. On behalf of the respondent Smt. Rukma Devi, it was contended that the provisions of Section 6 (c) of the General Clauses Act, are not attracted in the instant case. It was also contended that no distinction can be drawn between customary divorce and divorce obtained through judicial proceedings. It was further contended that the cause of action for making an application under Sec. 125, Cr. P. C. 1973 arose, for the first time, after 1-4-1974, that is, after the commencement of the New Code of Criminal Procedure, and, as such, the principle of res judicata cannot be held to be applicable. The learned Public Prosecutor practically supported the views of the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1. The contentions of the learned counsel for the parties have been considered and the record of the case perused. In the New Code of Criminal Procedure, provision has been made under Section 125, Cr. P. C. to do better justice to women. Under the old Code, a woman who had been divorced could not claim any maintenance from her ex-husband. The explanation added to section 125, Cr. P. C. clearly indicates that by a legal fiction for the purpose of getting maintenance, even a woman who has been divorced, has been included in the definition of the word "wife". The contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that the new Code of Criminal Procedure cannot have any retrospective applicability, is without any substance with relation to the facts of the present case. As a matter of fact, the provisions of the New Code of Criminal Procedure are not being applied with retrospective effect. The New Code of Criminal Procedure came in to force on 1-4-1974, and the present application was moved on 25. 7. 1974. It his thus, clear that the right was being determined afresh by the learned Magistrate in view of these new provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The present application has, in fact, no relevancy with the past proceedings which culminated under the old Code of Criminal Procedure. As no right, liability or obligation accruing under the old Criminal Procedure Code is being sought to be adjudicated under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the provisions of Sec. 6 (e) of the General Clauses Act have no relevancy whatsoever. The liability to pay maintenance to a divorced wife accrued for the first time after coming into force of the New Code of Criminal Procedure. This liability did not accrue under the old Criminal Procedure Code, and as such, it cannot be held that the liability which accrued under the old Code of Criminal Procedure is sought to be enforced under the provisions of Section 125, Cr. P. C. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that the provisions of Sec. 125, Cr. P. C. shall apply only to customary, divorce and not to divorce obtained through judicial proceeding has no substance. The provisions of Section 125, Cr. P. C. do not make any such distinction. A divorced wife, whether by the process of judicial decree or by customary practice, is a divorced woman for all purposes, as contemplated under Sec. 125, Cr. P. C. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that distinction must be drawn between customary divorce and judicial divorce, has, thus, absolutely no force. If such an interpretation would be made then social justice would be denied to such section of women who have been divorced through judicial proceedings. The law does not envisage any such distinction, and, as such, the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant cannot be accepted. The petitioner having sought to enjoy the luxury of a second wife, should not feel shy in paying the maintenance to the divorced wife who has not yet contracted a second marriage. The logic behind section 125, Cr. P. C. is to ameliorate the conditions of women in general, and the provisions of rendering effective social justice to women, who have been divorced cannot be denied by imaginary interpretations of this type. Under these circumstances, having given my most anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, I find myself unable to agree with them. The revision petition has, thus, no merit and deserves to be dismissed. . ;