JAGAT NARAYAN, J. - (1.) THIS is a writ petition by one Rangraj, a resident of Village Birami within the jurisdiction of Sumerpur Panchayat Samiti, challenging the validity of tax imposed on money lenders at the rate of Rs. 100/- per year authorised under sec. 33 (2) (i) read with item 4 of the Schedule to the Rajasthan Panchayat Samitis Taxation Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules ). The petition has been contested on behalf of the Panchayat Samiti.
(2.) THE Panchayat Samiti passed a resolution on 28. 4. 62 proposing to impose certain taxes including the impugned tax. On 1. 5. 62 a notice was issued (annexure 1) for general information inviting objections to the imposition of the taxes. A copy of this notice was affixed to the notice board of the Panchayat Samiti on 1. 5. 62 and objections were required to be filed by 1. 6. 62 in the office of the Vikas Adhikari of the Panchayat Samiti. Two copies of this notice were sent to the Gram Panchayat Birami. THEy were received there on 7. 5. 62 and were affixed on the notice board of the Gram Panchayat on 9. 5. 62. THEreafter a final resolution imposing the impugned tax was passed. The first contention on behalf of the petitioner is that the impugned tax is void as the petitioner did not have a period of not less than one month for filing objections because the notice inviting objections was affixed to the notice board of the Gram Panchayat Birami on 9. 5. 62. Rules 4 and 5 run as follows : - "r. 4. Inviting Objections - (1) The Panchayat Samiti shall issue a notice of the said resolution, for general information inviting objections to the imposition of such a tax or taxes. (2) A copy of the above notice shall be affixed on the Notice Board of the Panchayat Samiti at its office, and copies of the same shall be forwarded to all the Panchayats falling within the jurisdiction of that Panchayat Samiti. The Panchayats shall also affix a copy of the said notice at their respective offices for general information. " "r. 5. Period of objection - A period of not less than one month from the date of such notice shall be allowed for filing objections. " The contention on behalf of the Panchayat Samiti is that the publication of notice on the notice boards of panchayats is directory. Reliance was placed on a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in R. D. Sugar Co. vs. Rampur Municipality (1 ). Their Lordships were considering the provision of Sec. 131 (3) of the Municipalities Act, which ran as follows - "the Board shall, thereupon publish in the manner prescribed in sec. 94 the proposals framed under sub-sec. (1) and the draft rules framed under sub-sec. (2) along with a notice in the form set forth in Schedule III. " Sec. 94 (3) which provided for the manner of publication read thus - "every resolution passed by a board at a meeting, shall, as soon thereafter as may be, be published in a local paper published in Hindi and where there is no such local paper, in such manner as the State Government may, by general or special order, direct. " There was a local paper published in Hindi, but the resolution was published in an Urdu paper, though the actual publication of the resolution was in Hindi. The majority held that sec. 131 (3) could be divided into two parts. The first part lays down that the board shall publish proposals and draft rules along with a notice inviting objections to the proposals or the draft rules so published within a fortnight from the publication of the notice. The second part provides for the manner of publication. The first part is mandatory and it is necessary to comply with it strictly before any tax can be imposed, the intention of the Legislature obviously being that no tax would be imposed without hearing tax payers. There is no serious inconvenience or injustice to any one if this part of the provision is held to be mandatory. On the other hand it will be unjust to tax payers if this part of the provision is held to be directory, inasmuch as the disregard of it would deprive them of the opportunity to make objections to the proposals, and the draft rules. It was held that the second part which provided for the manner of publication was directory and that so long as publication was made in substantial compliance with the manner provided in sec. 94 (3), that would serve the purpose of the mandatory provision which provided for publication. The question whether a particular provision of a statute which on the face of it appears mandatory inasmuch as it uses the word 'shall' or is merely directory cannot be resolved by laying down any general rule and depends upon the facts of each case and for that purpose the object of the statute in making the provision is the determining factor. In my opinion the provision with regard to a month's notice is mandatory. The Legislature intended to give sufficient opportunity to the affected people to make objections to the proposals. The manner of publication by affixing a copy of the resolution on the notice board of the Pancha-yat Samiti is also mandatory in my opinion. Holding it to be directory would lead to the consequence that the inhabitants of the area of the Panchayat Samiti would be left in doubt as to how a particular proposal was going to be published. The provision regarding the publication of the notice on the notice board of the Panchayats must be held to be directory. The consequence of holding it to be mandatory will cause great inconvenience inasmuch as a particular Panchayat may be against the imposition of a tax and may not publish the notice on its notice board in accordance with the directions of the Panchayat Samiti. The first contention of the petitioner has therefore no force as the notice was published on the notice board of the Panchayat Samiti on 1. 5. 62 and time was granted upto 1. 6. 62 to file objections. The next contention is that a uniform tax of Rs. 100/- on every money lender irrespective of the volume of his business is arbitrary and therefore discriminatory. In Shah Hansa vs. The State of Rajasthan & Another (S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 93 of 1965, decided on April 5, 1965) a uniform tax at the rate of Rs. 50/- per annum on money lenders was held to be valid. In that case it was contended that a tax on money lenders at a flat rate of Rs. 50/- irrespective of the income from business was discriminatory on account of lack of classification, and such lack of classification creates inequality. Reliance was placed on the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in K. T. Moopil Nair vs. State of Kerala (2 ). In that case a tax at a flat rate of Rs. 2/- per acre was imposed on the petitioner. The total tax assessed on him at this rate amounted to Rs. 50,000/- per annum. The Act did not take into consideration whether or not the land was capable of yielding any income. It was in these circumstances that the tax was struck down. In the present case the petitioner has not been able to show that there are any money lenders within the jurisdiction of the Panchayat Samiti for whom the annual tax at the rate of Rs. 100/- is excessive when compared with their income from money lending. In V. M. Syed Mohammad & Co. vs. State of An. dhra (3) it was held that there is a strong presumption in favour of the validity of legislative classification and it is for those who challenge it as unconstitutional to allege and prove beyond all doubt that the legislation arbitrarily discriminates between different persons similarly circumstanced. As was held in Khandige Sham Bhat vs. Agricultural. Income-tax Officer (4) the Court cannot meticulously scrutinize the impact of the taxation statute on different persons or interests and must permit a larger discretion to the Legislature in the matter of classification. Lastly it was contended that the procedure prescribed in rule 12 for the preparation of demand was not carried and so the tax is invalid. If a tax on money lenders has been validly imposed at a uniform rate then the failure to follow the procedure prescribed under rule 12 cannot make it invalid. It is not the case of the petitioner that he did not carry on the business of money lending in any particular year. If that were his case then he could have preferred an appeal under rule 36 against the order of assessment. For reasons stated above the writ petition is dismissed, In the circumstances of the case I leave the parties to bear their own costs of this writ petiion. . ;