- (1.) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court dated 6th July, 1965 passed against the appellant Lachuram in a writ application under Art. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
(2.) THE facts giving rise to the appeal are that in an election contest for the office of Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat Ajitgarh, appellant Lachuram and respondent No. 1 Inderlal stood as rival candidates. THE said election was held on 1. 1. 65 and Inderlal respondent was declared elected. Appellant Lachhuram thereupon filed an election-petition before the Election Tribunal (Civil Judge, Jhunjhunu) challenging the validity of the respondent's improper acceptance of nomination. It was alleged that he was not qualified for election as he was convicted on 13. 11. 62 by a competent Magistrate for an offence under sec. 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act No. 37 of 1954, hereinafter to be referred to as the 'act', read with Rule 50 (1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, which will hereinafter be referred to as the 'central Rules', and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 11/ -. THE argument about disqualification was based on sec. 11 (g) of the Rajasthan Panchayat Act, 1953, which ran as follows - "sec. 11 - Qualification of Panchas - Every person, who is entitled to vote at an election in any panchayat circle or a ward thereof for purpose of this Act, shall be qualified for election or appointment as a Panch unless such person - (a) to (f ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (g) has been convicted by a competent court of an offence involving moral turpitude. (h) to (m ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " THE respondent admitted his conviction and punishment as alleged by the appellant, but contested the election-petition on the ground that the offence of which he was convicted was a technical one and did not involve moral turpitude. After hearing lengthy arguments, the Election Tribunal came to the conclusion that the offence of which the respondent was convicted involved moral turpitude. It was observed by the Tribunal that the Act came into force on 1. 6. 55, that, according to Rule 50 (1) of the Central Rules, no person was permitted to sell certain articles of food except under a licence, that on 11. 2. 62 when the Food Inspector, Jhunjhunu District, inspected the respondent's shop, it was found that he was selling articles mentioned in the said Rule without a licence and, in its opinion, the very fact that the respondent was evading law for the last fifteen years showed that he had no respect for law and that the offence of which he was convicted involved moral turpitude. It, therefore, allowed the election petition and declared the respondent's election to be void. Aggrieved by this decision dated 5. 5. 65, the respondent filed a writ application under Art. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in this Court. THE learned single Judge, who heard the said writ petition, observed that the respondent did not appear to have intended to evade payment of licence fee, that he had applied for the renewal of his licence and deposited the fee for renewal before he was detected exhibiting certain articles for sale without a licence and that he was not to be blamed if action was not taken by the authorities on his application for renewal. In the opinion of the learned Judge, the offence of which the respondent was convicted did not involve moral turpitude. THE writ application was, therefore, allowed, the decision of the Election Tribunal was set aside and the election petition was dismissed. It is against this judgment dated 6. 7. 65 that the present appeal is directed. It is contended by learned counsel for the appellant that the Election Tribunal had recorded a finding that the respondent had not obtained any licence for the last fifteen years, that is, ever since the Act came into force, till 11. 2. 62, when his shop was inspected by the Food Inspector, that the respondent having failed to obtain any licence prior to 11. 2. 62, the question of renewal of licence could not arise, that the copy of the receipt filed by the respondent itself showed that the licence fee of Rs. 12/- was deposited on 30. 3. 62 after the respondent was found to have committed an offence and, therefore, it could be of no avail to him. It is urged that the learned Judge was in error in thinking that the petitioner did not mean to evade the payment of the licence fee, or that he had applied for renewal of licence and he was not to be blamed if the authorities did not grant him licence before that date. It has been vehemently argued that the learned Judge did not appreciate the Tribunal's finding to the effect that it was not a mere lapse on the respondent's part in not obtaining a licence in the year 1962, but that he had deliberately not obtained such a licence for the last fifteen years, that he was thus in the habit of committing that offence year after year and in those circumstances it should not have been held that the offence of which he was convicted did not involve moral turpitude. In reply, it is urged by the respondent's learned counsel that the Election Tribunal ought not to have taken into consideration anything except the judgment of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Jhunjhunu, dated 13. 11. 62, whereby the respondent was convicted, that, according to the said judgment (Ex. 4), the only fact proved against the respondent was that he was found carrying on business without a licence on 11. 2. 62 in breach of Rule 50 (1) of the Central Rules and that he was sentenced to eleven rupees fine. It is contended that from the said judgment it could not be said if the offence of which the respondent was convicted involved moral turpitude. According to learned counsel, the Election Tribunal ought to have simply judged whether the offence itself, of which the respondent was convicted involved moral turpitude, and that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to take into consideration the facts and circumstances in which the offence was committed. In other words, he went on to urge that if the Election Tribunal were to find that the respondent was convicted of an offence like theft or criminal misappropriation which itself involved moral turpitude, he could be held to be disqualified, but the Election Tribunal had no jurisdiction to enquire into the circumstances in which the offence was committed and then to arrive at the conclusion that it involved moral turpitude. In the opinion of the learned counsel, a breach of Rule 50 (1) of the Central Rules by itself could not be said to involve moral turpitude. It would appear from the above narration that it is common ground between the parties that respondent Inderlal was convicted by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Jhunjhunu, on 13. 11. 62 of an offence under sec. 7/16 of the Act for committing breach of Rule 50 (1) of the Central Rules and was sentenced to fine. The short question for determination before the Court is, whether the said offence involved moral turpitude and whether respondent Inderlal was not qualified to be elected as Sarpanch for that reason. In order to decide the said question, we are confronted with the following two points. The first point is as to what is meant by the term 'moral turpitude'. The next question is whether the Election Tribunal has only to look into the definition of the offence and decide if it involved moral turpitude or whether it is open to the Tribunal to look into the facts and circumstances in which the offence was committed and then to decide if it involved moral turpitude. To begin with the first point, it may be observed that the term 'moral turpitude' has not been clearly defined and, therefore, a certain amount of vagueness is attached to it. Notions about morals and morality differ in certain respects from country to country and they have also been varying from time to time. This term is, therefore, capable of being given different meanings in different countries or at different times in different contexts. Yet, in spite of its capability of being given diverse meanings, the term 'moral turpitude' has generally been taken to mean to be a conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, good character and morals, or contrary to what a man owes to a fellowman or to society in general. There are a number of cases in which this term has been interpreted by eminent Judges in the context of different facts and circumstances. On the basis of those cases, the meaning of the terms 'turpitude' and 'moral turpitude' has been given in Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, as follows - "turpitude - In its ordinary sense, inherent baseness or vileness of principle or action; shameful wickedness; depravity. In its legal sense, everything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. State vs. Anderson, 117 Kan. 117, 230 P. 315, 317 : Hughes vs. State Board of Medical Examiners, 162 Ga. 246. 134 S. E. 42, 46. An action showing gross depravity. Traders & General Ins. Co. vs. Russell. Tax. Civ. App. , 99 S. W. 2-d 1079, 1048," "moral Turpitude - A term of frequent occurrence in statutes, especially those providing that a witness' conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude may be shown as tending to impeach his credibility. In general, it means neither more nor less than "turpitude", i. e. , anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. In re Williams, 64 Okl. 316, 167 P. 1149, 1152; In re Humphrey, 174 Cal. 290, 163 P. 60, 62. Indeed, it is sometimes candidly admitted that the word "moral" in this phrase does not add anything to the meaning of the term other than that emphasis which may result from a tautological expression. Hughes vs. State Board of Medical Examiners. l62 Ga. 246, 134 S. E. 42, 46. It is also commonly defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow man or to society in general, contrary to the accepted customary rule of right and duty between man and man. Moore vs. State, 12 Ala. App. 243, 67 So. 789, 791; United States vs. Uhl C. C. A. N. Y. , 210 F. 860, 862. Although a vague term, it implies something immoral in itself, regardless of its being punishable by law. Pippin vs. State, 197 Ala. 613, 73 So. 340. 342; Coykendall vs. Skrmetta. C. C. A. Ga. , 22 F. 2d 120; Thus excluding unintentional wrong, or an improper act done without unlawful or improper intent. Drazen vs. New Haven Taxi-cab Co. 95 Conn. 500, 111 A. 861, 863. It is also said to be restricted to the gravest offences, consisting of felonies, infamous crimes, and those that are malum in se and disclose a depraved mind. Bartos vs. United States District Court for District of Nebraska, C. C. A. Neb. , 19 F. 2d 722,724. " "an act of baseness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow-men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man" and "conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals". It would appear from the above that the meanings given to the terms 'turpitude' and 'moral turpitude' indicate almost the same type of failing in a man's character or moral make-up. In our view, no absolute standard or no hard and fast rule can be laid down for deciding whether a particular act should be considerd as one involving moral turpitude, because it would mostly depend on the facts and circumstances in which the act or omission is committed whether it involves moral turpitude or not. Now, coming to the second question, learned counsel has urged that in deciding the question whether an offence involves moral turpitude, the Court should confine its consideration only to the nature of the offence and it should not be swayed in its opinion by the facts and circumstances in which it was committed. In support of his contention, he has referred to Buddha Pitai vs. Sub-Divisional Officer, Malihabad, Lucknow (l ). In that case, one Budha Pitai was convicted of an offence of selling sweets coloured with metanil yellow under sec. 16 read with sec. 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, mixture of metanil yellow in food stuff being prohibited. He was sentenced to pay a fine. Subsequently, he stood as a candidate for election to the office of the Pradhan and was elected. His election was sought to be set aside on the ground that he had been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude and was thus disqualified for being nominated or appointed to the office of the Pradhan. Learned counsel for the respondent has drawn our particular attention to the following observation made in that case by Desai C. J.- "sec. 5-A speaks of "an offence involving moral turpitude" and suggests that what is to be seen in the nature of the offence which is made punishable by the statutory provision and not that of the act which is brought within its ambit. It must be the offence, i. e. the ingredients of the offence prescribed by the statutory provision, and not the act actually done, which must involve moral turpitude. The stress is on the abstract, not on the concrete facts. " From this observation learned counsel has built up an argument that the offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act does not necessarily involve 'moral turpitude' as in the case of theft, criminal misappropriation etc. and hence the Election Tribunal ought not to have looked into other circumstances. We have given due consideration to this argument and we find ourselves unable to accept it. In the first instance, it may be pointed out that other learned Judges in the case cited above did not agree with the observation made by Desai C. . J. and Beg J. gave a dissenting judgment in that case. Even Sharma J. , who agreed with Desai C. J. in the result of the case, made the following observation - "whether an offence involves moral turpitude will depend on its nature and the circumstances in which it is committed. An offence of a certain class may generally be considered to involve moral turpitude but it may not be so if committed in particular circumstances, for example, an offence of murder may ordinarily involve moral turpitude but if it is committed in a spirit of patriotism or with a laudable object, it may not shock the public conscience and instead of being decried by the public, the offender may be considered a hero. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Again, an offence of theft will generally be considered mean, vile and anti-social and a thief would be simply scorned at. However, if a starving and emaciated person steals food is caught, prosecuted and convicted, people will take a charitable and sympathetic view of the offender's conduct and his offence may not be considered as involving moral turpitude. Thus the case of every offence will have to be judged in the light of the circumstances in which it is committed. It is not the gravity of the offence or the quantum of punishment imposed on a person which will determime such question. " In Mangali vs. Ghhakkilal (2), on which the learned single Judge has relied in the present case, it was observed as follows - "from consideration of the dictionary meaning the words 'moral' and 'turpitude' as well as the real ratio decidendi of the cases the principle which emerges appear to be that the question whether a certain offence involves moral turpitude or not will necessarily depend on the circumstances in which the offence: is committed. " It is thus clear that the argument raised by the respondent's learned counsel does not find support from the majority view of the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court. We agree with the learned counsel to the extent that there are certain offences like theft, extortion, robbery, dacoity, criminal misappropriation, criminal breach of trust, cheating, rape etc. and if a person is convicted of any one or more of them, the natural presumption, unless it is rebutted, would be that the offence involved moral turpitude. It may be possible to make two lists and say generally that certain offences would involve moral turpitude, while others will not involve moral turpitude, but such a list cannot hold good in all circumstances. For instance, as pointed out by Sharma, J. in Budha Pitai vs. S. D. O. Malihabad (1), referred to above, an offence of theft would normally involve moral turpitude, but if a social worker finds that certain persons are dying of hunger and he lakes the courage of stealing or even looting some bags of wheat from a hoarder's or miser's shop and distributes that stuff to the starving people to save them from death, then although the person may be technically guilty of that offence, yet it would be difficult to hold that the offence involved moral turpitude. Conversely, a. person may be convicted of a technical offence not involving moral turpitude, but if it is found later on that he is repeating such offence and has no regard for law on account of baseness of character, it may be held that it involves moral turpitude. An offence is an act or omission punishable by law. Every offence certainly does not involve moral turpitude and the question whether a particular offence involves moral turpitude will have to be judged by the circumstances in which it is committed. We have now to see whether the offence of which the respondent was convicted involved moral turpitude or not. The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was enacted in 1954 to check and root out the widespread evil of adulteration in food articles. It cannot be gainsaid that in spite of the promulgation of this Act the malady is on the increase due to degrading morals, and several other factors, one of them being that the Act is not enforced effectively. It is true that every offence under this Act would not involve moral turpitude. At the same time, it cannot be denied that certain offences under the Act do involve moral turpitude and they should not be treated lightly. It appears from the judgment of the learned single Judge that he formed an impression that the respondent had deposited the fee for renewal before he was detected exhibiting certain articles for sale without a licence and so he thought that the respondent did not mean to evade the payment of a licence and so he thought that the respondent did not mean to evade the payment of a licence fee and that he was guilty only of a technical offence on account of the delay in issuing the licence. The perusal of the judgment of the Election Tribunal, however, shows that its findings were very different. According to the Tribunal, the respondent was carrying on business in articles of food for the last fifteen years and although the Act came into force in 1955, he did not care to obtain the licence in any year. It also found that the question of renewal of licence did not arise in the present case; as the respondent had not obtained any licence in the past. For the first time, he deposited the fee in March 1962, i. e. , after he was detected by the Food Inspector on 11. 2. 62. The correctness of the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal was not challenged in the writ application. Learned counsel for the appellant has taken us through the writ petition and we find that it was not asserted by the respondent if he had obtained any licence in the past or that he had deposited the requisite fee for obtaining the licence before his shop was checked by the Food Inspector on 11. 2. 62. We gave a chance to the respondent's learned counsel to find out from his client it he had obtained licence in the past or he had deposited the fee before his shop was checked and to produce necessary documents if they were in his possession but he has not produced any such document before us. The receipt of the fee which was deposited by his client shows that the challan for deposit was filed on 30. 3. 62. is thus clear that the fee was sought to be deposited more than a month and a half after his shop was checked by the Food Inspector. His readiness to obtain a licence after he was found committing the offence was of no avail to him. It is contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that even if his client did not obtain any licence in the past, it would not show any moral turpitude on his part, because the Act itself did not lay down that it was necessary to obtain a licence before selling certain food articles. According to learned counsel, the condition for obtaining a licence was imposed by the Central Rules only lor statistical purposes, so that the Government could know the number and place of the licenced vendors. In his opinion, although adulteration in food articles would involve moral turpitude, merely failure to obtain a licence would not. We do not agree with the learned counsel's argument that since the condition for licence has been prescribed in the Central Rules and not in the Act, that by itself would show that the offence does not involve moral turpitude. The Central Rules were made in exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 23 of the Act and the breach of the Rules is as much an offence as the breach of any provision of the Act itself. The question whether an offence involves moral turpitude would not depend on whether the breach is one of the provisions of the Act or that of the Rules. Similarly, we do not agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that the conditions for licence have been imposed only for statistical purposes. Rule 50 (1) of the Central Rules lays down that no person shall manufacture, sell, stock, distribute or exhibit for sale any of the articles of food mentioned therein except under a licence. The main purpose of this Rule is to put an effective check on adulteration of food articles noted therein. It debars every person from manufacturing, selling, distributing or exhibiting for sale certain articles of food unless he holds a licence, so that all those who indulge in trade without a licence may be punished for that reason alone. It makes it easy for the Food Inspectors to check the licenced vendors and to that the food articles stocked by them for sale are not adulterated. At the same time, it gives certain amount of assurance to the consumers that if they purchase articles of food from the licenced-vendors, those articles would be free from adulteration. When a shop-keeper exhibits the articles (mentioned in the Rule) for sale, the consumer naturally thinks that he must be holding a licence because without it, he is not permitted to sell, stock, distribute or exhibit them for sale. Therefore, if a person who indulges in the sale of such articles, does it without a licence, he deceives not only the State, but a so the people in general, because if people were to know that he is selling such articles without a licence, then those who are careful about not purchasing adulterated food articles, will never go to such a shop. In our opinion, it would not be proper to treat this requisite of law very lightly and hold its subversion as a mere breach of technical rule. In a case like the present one, where it is found that a person is committing the breach of Rule 50 year after year, it would be difficult to hold that he was committing only a technical offence which did not involve moral turpitude. On the contrary, we are inclined to hold that such a person should be considered morally deficient because he was committing a breach of this Rule and also breach of his legal, moral and social duties to the society in general for a number of years although he was detected only in 1962. He was not only evading payment of fee deliberately but was also deceiving his customers by posing himself as a vendor authorised to sell food articles even though he was not holding a licence. If he did not care about the initial requirements of obtaining a licence before selling articles of food, what regard he could have for the purity of articles. A Sar Panch has to perform certain duties and he also exercises fairly large powers as mentioned in sec. 16 of the Rajasthan Panchayat Act. It is for this reason that sec. 11 of the said Act lays down certain necessary qualifications for the Panchas including a Sarpanch. It is pertinent to note that under sec. 11 if a person has been dismissed from the State Government service for misconduct involving moral turpitude and has been declared to be disqualified for employment in the public service, he is also disqualified to be a Sarpanch. The term 'moral turpitude' appearing there would have the same meaning as the term appearing in cl. (g) of sec. 11 of "the Rajasthan Panchayat Act. A person who has such a scant regard of law and who has no qualms of conscience can hardly be fit to hold the responsible office of a Sarpanch. In our opinion, the offence committed by Inderlal, respondent No. 1, viewed in the circumstances found by the Election Tribunal, did involve moral turpitude and he was rightly held disqualified. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the judgment of the learned single Judge is set aside and that of that Election Tribunal is restored. In the circumstances of the case, the appellant will receive costs in this Court. . ;