- (1.) THIS is a special appeal under Sec. 10 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act against the order dated 3. 12. 1962 passed by Shri R. N. Hawa, Member accepting the review petition No. 2/sawai Madhopur/1960 against the judgment of the Board of Revenue dated 9. 1. 1960 passed by the D. B. consisting of Shri Kanwar Bahadur and Shri R. N. Hawa.
(2.) THE first contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the single Member had no jurisdiction to review an order passed by the D. B. As stated above, the order dated 9. 1. 1960 was passed by Shri Kanwar Bahadur and Shri R. N. Hawa. THE review filed against the order of the Board dated 9. 1. 1960 was heard and disposed of by Shri Hawa as by that time Shri Kanwar Bahadur had retired. This contention of the learned counsel cannot be accepted in view of the larger Bench decision of the Board of Revenue in Gunwant Singh vs. THE State (2/63/udaipur) decided on 11. 5. 66. It was held therein that if the order sought to be reviewed has been passed by two Members and both of them continue to be attached to the Board and/or are not precluded by reason of absence or other cause for a period of six months next after the application from hearing the review petition, they alone and no other Member or Members shall hear and decide the review petition. If one of the two Members ceases to be attached to the Board, and the other Member continues to be attached to the Board and/or is not precluded for a period of six months next after the application for review from hearing it, he alone will be competent to hear and pass orders on the application for review. This would also be the position if the order sought to be reviewed has been passed by more than two Members, that is to say, the remaining Member or Members alone would be competent to dispose of the application for review if they are not precluded from hearing it for a period of six months next after the application for review by absence or other cause. It is not necessary that the remaining Member or Members must hear and decide the application for review within a period of six months next after the application has been made. THE only condition to be satisfied is that the remaining Member or Members are not precluded from hearing an application for review by absence or other cause for a period of six months after the application for review has been presented. Under the circumstances, we find no substance in this contention and hereby reject the same. The learned counsel for the appellants has next argued that there is no ground for accepting the review on merits. While accepting the review petition Shri Hawa observed as follows : "i have gone through the judgment under review. I do not find that anywhere it has been found as to how the non-petitioners had been able to establish the relationship of tenants with the petitioners. The judgment has also been based on re-appreciation of evidence of Shri Ram Sukha which could not be the function of a second appellate court. The learned counsel for the non-petitioner has not been able to repal how they were not errors apparent on the face of the record. " It is contended that these grounds do not fall within the orbit of O. 47, R. 1 C. P. C. . The learned counsel for the appellant has cited Bisheswar Pratap Sahi vs. Parath Nath (AIR 1934 P. C, p. 213) wherein it was held by their lordships of the Privy Council that R. 1, O. 47 must be read as in itself definitive of the limits within which review is permitted and the words "any other sufficient reason" must be taken as meaning "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogues to those specified immediately previously. " Apparently no such ground has been made out in this case. As regards the appreciation of evidence in second appeal a reference may be made to Birkeshwar Narain Singh and another versus Ganesh Prasad Singh and another (AIR 1933 Patna 433) in which it was held that going into evidence in second appeal is not an error apparent on the face of the record within the meaning of Order 47, Rule 1. The learned counsel also referred to Dev Krishna and another vs. Dhani Ram Saligrarn (AIR. 1959 MP 217) wherein it was held that if the court has entered into a discussion of the pros and cons and has justified one of the two alternative views then certainly the mistake, if any, is not apparent or patent and a review does not lie even if the decision is erroneous. The same view was taken in Shree Narain Sinha vs. University of Bihar (AIR. 1966 Patna page 47) wherein it was held that if there are two views and the pros and cons have been considered and even if the erroneous view has been taken, the error cannot be held to be apparent on the face of the record. In Syed Mohd. Ismail vs. Janaki Saran Singh and others (AIR 1932 Patna 275) also it was held that faulty logic and error of law is no ground for review. In view of these authorities, it is difficult to sustain the impugned order. While accepting the review petition the learned Single Member has sought to reopen the question of the appreciation of evidence adduced by both the parties and he has also held that the D. B. which heard the appeal fell into an error in re-appreciating the evidence of Ram Sukha. This is clearly beyond the scope of a review petitioner as will be obvious from the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellants. A review petition lies only on the grounds mentioned in rule 1, of O. 47 viz. (a) the discovery of new and important matter or evidence, which alter the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of or could not be produced by the applicant at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or (b) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or (c) for any other sufficient reason. None of these conditions is available in the present case. We are therefore unable to support the impugned order, and have no hesitation in accepting this appeal. The learned counsel for the respondents has contended that the special appeal does not lie as the order of Shri R. N. Hawa is not an order of a single bench but should be deemed to be an order of a D. B. by legal fiction because Shri R. N. Hawa had reviewed the order of the D. B. as one of the Members, Shri Kanwar Bahadur had retired by the time. He has not been able to produce any authority in support of his contention. The learned counsel for the appellant has repelled this contention by referring to Sec. 10 (1) Rajasthan Land Revenue Act which leaves no room for ambiguity. It reads as follows : "10. Jurisdiction of Board how exercised: - (1 ). Except as otherwise provided by or under this Act by or any other law or enactment for the time being in force in the whole or any part of Rajasthan and subject to any rules made in that behalf, the jurisdiction of the Board may be exercised - (a) by the Chairman or any other member of the Board sitting singly, or (b) by a Bench of the Board, consisting of two or more members : Provided that a party aggrieved by a decision of a single member shall have the right to make a special appeal to a bench consisting of two or more members of the Board within one month from the date of the decision of the single member if the member who passed the judgment declares that the case is fit one for appeal. Under the circumstances, we have no hesitation in rejecting this contention of the learned counsel for the respondents as without foundation. The result of the foregoing discussion is that this special appeal must be accepted in view of the finding that the order of Shri R. N. Hawa accepting the review petition travels beyond the scope of Order 47, Rule 1 C. P. C. As such the same is hereby quashed. .;