- (1.) THIS is Smt. Sajan Kanwar and others, appellants' appeal under Sec. 39 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952, against the order of the Jagir Commissioner, dated 31-3-64.
(2.) THE appeal was filed against the order on 12-10-1964. THE counsel for the appellants filed an application under Sec. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, duly supported by an affidavit with a view to getting the appeal declared to have been filed within limitation as well as the condonation of the period over-spent in filing this appeal. His contention was that on 25-2-1964 the counsel for the appellants, Lalchand, was required to be present, but as he missed the train he could not be present on that day. THE case was heard in his absence and judgment was pronounced on 31-3-1964. THE award was communicated under sec. 33 of the Jagirs Act to the appellants on 16-7-1964. It was only on the basis of the communication of this award that they applied for the copy on 17-7-1964, which copy was given on 18-8-1964, and the appeal was filed on 12-10-1964. He, therefore, urged that the date of the knowledge of the award in the absence of the appellant's counsel on 31-3-1964. should be reckoned from the communication of the award under Sec. 33 of the Act, and he cited two rulings in support of Bajrang Singh versus State of Rajasthan ( R. R. D. 1964 page 324 ) and Nanulal vs. Shyam Beharilal ( R. R. D. 1965 page 119. ). , THE Government Advocate's reply was that admittedly the appellants' counsel had notice to appear on 25-2-1964. THE case was adjourned to 31-3-1964 for final judgment. It was his duty to take notice of the adjourned date and appear on that date. THE appellants' counsel was thus negligent and the period of limitation started running from the date of the judgment and not from the date of the communication. In support he cited R. R. D. 1965 page 87 ( State v/s Bhagirath Singh), wherein the benefit of Sec. 33 of the date of communication of the judgment under the Jagirs Act could only be given if the claimant or the counsel had no notice of the issue of the final award. We have considered the arguments advanced on both sides and perused the record. The law on the subject is quite clear. Ordinarily, the limitation runs from the date on which the judgment is to be pronounced. If the case has been adjourned without notice to the parties to appear on the date on which the judgment is pronounced, it is the duty of the parties to take notice of the dates, and if they are negligent then the limitation would not run from the date of communication of the order, unless a good case for condoning the delay is made out under sec. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act for sufficient reasons. The benefit of sec. 33 of the Jagirs Act by which the Jagir Commissioner is bound to communicate his award to the parties concerned and the Government could only be given where the party or the Government was not bound to appear on the date of hearing the judgment and that no notice was given. In this case, it is admitted by the appellants that counsel for the appellants was required to be present on 25-2-1964 and the case was adjourned to 31-3-1964 for final orders. In the order dated 25-2-1964, the Jagir Commissioner himself has mentioned that the counsel for the claimant was not present as he had missed the train, which is also the fact pleaded in the application under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act by the appellants. It was the duty of the counsel for the appellants if he was present on 25-2-1964 to take notice of the date of 31-3-1964 or seen afterwards and should have applied for the copy of the award in stead of awaiting for the communication from the Jagir Commissioner for about four months till 16-7-1964. The counsel for the appellants has been clearly negligent in this matter. It was possible to have condoned a reasonable delay, but this delay of nearly four months cannot be condoned to the disadvantage of the opposite party. It is for the negligence of the counsel that for the client must suffer, and the benefit of sec. 33 of the Jagirs Act cannot be given to the appellants for reckoning the limitation from the date of the communication of award. Thus reckoned from 31-3-1964, the present appeal was filed clearly time-barred on 12-10-1964, and it is rejected as such. .;