- (1.) THIS order will dispose of preliminary objection raised by the respondent in special appeal filed u/s 101 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act against the decision of the Single Member of the Board dated 29-10-65. The facts of the case in brief, which are relevant for the purposes of disposal of this preliminary objection, are that in a suit for division of holdings u/s 53 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act filed by the Respondent Rameshchandra, a receiver was appointed by the trial court. An appeal was filed against this order before the Revenue Appellate Authority but without success. A revision petition was filed in the Board but was rejected on 29-11-65. A special appeal was filed against this order which came up for hearing on 2nd September, 1966.
(2.) A preliminary objection was raised by the counsel for the respondent that no special appeal lies in such a case. Two grounds were taken in support of this contention. Firstly, u/s 222 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act non appeal shall lie from any decree or order passed by any revenue court except as provided in the Act. Section 223 & 224 detail the appeals which have been provided in the Act. It was contended that special appeal as provided u/s 10 of the Land Revenue Act against order of Single Member of the Board is not countenanced u/s 222 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, and as the Rajasthan Tenancy Act is a special Act, its provisions will override those of the Land Revenue Act, and any special appeal under this Act against the order in revision of the Single Member of the Board would be incompetent. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the respondent brought to our notice two rulings of the Rajasthan High Court (Mohd. Umar vs. Ahmed, RLW 1965 Page 458) & Temple of Shri Bankateshwar Balaji vs. The Collector, Ajmer, wherein a special appeal u/s 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance was held to be incompetent. We have given careful consideration to the learned counsel. The question whether special appeal lies against decision of a single member where revisional powers are not exercised properly, in cases under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, has already been considered in Kalyan Vs. Ram Shahi (R. R. D. 1962 Page 213) & R. R. D. 1963 Page 135. It was held therein "what is prohibited by the provisions or Sec. 222 of the Tenancy Act and for that matter Sec. 74 of the Revenue Act is "the appeal" and not "the revision". The revision is provided by Sec. 230 of the Tenancy Act as well as Sec. 84 of the Revenue Act. The revising power has been vested by virtue of Sec. 10 (1) read with Paras 8 & 9 of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts Manual in a Single Member also, but not completely, and only partially e. g. , only for dismissing a revision petition and not for accepting it. The power of accepting a revision petition has been kept reserved only to a Division Bench of the Board. The revising powers with which the Board has been invested vide Sec. 230 of the Tenancy Act and Sec. 84 of the Revenue Act are, therefore, not exercised completely so long as revision is not heard by a Division Bench of the Board. This being the case, the special appeal does not in any way become in contravention of the provisions of Sec. 222 of the Tenancy Act or for that matter Sec. 74 of the Revenue Act. " The law has since been amended, and now under the Rules a Single Member of the Board has been empowered not only to reject the revision but also to accept it. The party aggrieved by a decision of a single member has the right to make a special appeal to a bench, consisting of two or more members of the Board, within one month form the date of the decision of the single member. This change in law, where under a single member has also been empowered to accept the revision does not make any change in the argument that this special appeal is not in contravention of the provision of Sec. 222 As we have seen before Sec. 222 of the R. Tenancy Act relates to appeals under the said Act. Sec. 230 empowers the Board to call for the record of any case and pass such orders as it deems fit in cases mentioned therein. Now there are two aspects in the hearing of appeals as well as of revisions, namely; (1) jurisdiction to hear appeals and (2) manner in which that jurisdiction has to be exercised. Sec. 222 confers jurisdiction on the Board to hear second appeals. How those appeals are to be heard is provided u/s 10 (0) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. Similarly sec. 230 empowers the Board to call for records of cases and pass orders. How those orders are to be passed is again given in Sec. 10 (1) of the Land Revenue Act and the Rules made there under, which envisage that a revision may be heard by a Single Member, but any one aggrieved by a decision of the Single Member may make a Special appeal to a Bench consisting of two or more members of the Board. This special appeal obviously, is a complement to the revisionary powers exercised by a Single Member of the Board. This special appeal is not an appeal in the ordinary sense. It is only an appeal against the order in revision. The appeal will have to be restricted to the three specific points mentioned in sec. 230 of the Rajasthan Tenancy, Act, namely, (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) failure to exercise jurisdiction and (3) exercise of jurisdiction with material irregularity. This special appeal unlike an ordinary appeal will not open the flood gates of all the points in controversy in a suit or proceedings. Special appeal is only incidental to the revisionary jurisdictions, and in our opinion, in no way, in contravention of sec. 222 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. We have carefully gone through the two High Court authorities cited before us. One was based on a case under the Ajmer Abolition of Intermediaries and Land Reforms Act, 1955 and the other on a case under the Municipalities Act. The main reason why the special appeal in both cases was not held to be competent was that both, the Ajmer Abolition of Intermediaries and Land Reforms Act, and Municipalities Act, have specifically stated that orders impugned in appeal would be final and conclusive. Thus sec. 66 (3) of the Ajmer Abolition of Intermediaries and Land Reforms Act lays down: "the State Government or any person aggrieved by an order of the Compensation Commissioner under this Act may within 90 days from the date of communication of such order appeal to the Judicial Commissioner, Ajmer whose decision shall be final. "sec. 48 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act lay down. The decision of the High Court on an appeal under Sec. 48 and subject only to such decision the order of the Judge u/s. 44 shall be final and conclusive. "it was, therefore, held that the legislature knowingly introduced the finality of the orders in the statute and, therefore, any further appeal u/s. 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance was barred. The Rajasthan Tenancy Act contains no provision in which finality has been given when orders are passed by a Member. As we have seen sec. 222 & 223 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act regulate the mode of appeals under the Act. The mode of revision has not been regulated u/s 230 and the manner in which revisionary jurisdiction has to be exercised is laid down in sec. 10 (1 ). The two authorities cited above are therefore, clearly distinguished from the facts of the present case. We have thus no hesitation in holding that the special appeal as provided in sec. 10 (1) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act is no where in contravention of sec. 222 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The second objection taken against the maintainability of the appeal was that the order of appointment of receiver does not determine right of parties and, therefore, was not a decision within the meaning of sec. 10. A number of authorities were cited such as "tagore's Law Lecture Series on Law of Receivers 1964 Edition Page "61" and "kerr on Receivers 1963 Edition Page 132 Chapter VI" to show that the rights of parties were not affected by the order appointing a Receiver. Various rulings were also cited such as A. I. R. 1953 Allahabad Page 647, A. I. R. 1947 Nagpur Page 149. The question for decision before us is what is the meaning of the word decision' used in proviso to sec. 10 (1) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. As this provision is analogous to the Letter Patent Appeals, provided u/s 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, we were referred to a number of authorities on the point of what constituted a 'judgment' against which appeals have been provided. As remarked by Mootham C. J. who delivered judgment in Standard Glass Beads Factory vs. Shri Dhar and others respondents. (A. I. R. 1960 Allahabad Page 692) "the meaning which should be given to the word 'judgment" in clause 10 of the Letters Patent of this Court and in the corresponding Clause of the Letters Patent of the other High Courts has engaged the minds of Judges for close on a hundred years and has given rise to a divergence of opinion which can only be resolved by the Supreme Court. " The question what constituted a judgment was also considered by the Rajasthan High Court in Rajputana Cold Storage and Refrigeration Co. Ltd. vs. Rani Ajitkunverba (Indian Law Reports Vol. V. 1955 Page 418 ). While quoting the following observation of Kania, C. J. , in A. I. R. 1949 F. C. Page 1: "the definitions given in the Code are, however, for the purposes of the Code only, In our opinion the decisions of the Courts in India show that the word 'judgment' as in England, means the determination of the rights of the parties in the matter brought before the court. " Their Lordships observed that the observations were with regard to sec. 109 of the Code of the Civil Procedure, and section 205 of the Govt. of India Act, but the observations were equally applicable to the interpretation of the word 'judgment' as used in sec. 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, for the word 'judgment' was not qualified by the word 'final' in either case. They further observed, "the question has been directly dealt with in Dayabhai vs. Murugappa where the entire case law has been fully discussed and it has been held that: "the word 'judgment in the Letters Patent of the High Courts means and is a decree in a suit by which the rights of the parties at issue in the suit are determined, and the term 'suit' in the Letters Patent includes suit instituted by a plaint or by originating summons in the manner prescribed under the rules of the Court. " These observations of the Rajasthan High Court clearly indicate that the Hon'ble Court holds that 'judgment' would mean "an adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of the parties and does not include a mere interlocutory order passed in a pending case. "this being the view of the Rajasthan High Court we do not think any purpose will be served by looking to any authorities of other High Courts as we have to respectfully submit to this view. The word used in sec. 10 is, however, not judgment but decision. The next point for determination which arises, is whether this 'decision' is synonymous with 'judgment. This point incidentally came for discussion in a previous Bench of the Board in case Ghanshyam vs. Mehant Ram Charandas, 1964 R. R. D Page 214. In this case one of the members discussing the various authorities on the point observed, that the three leading cases, namely, (1) Justices of the Peace for Calcutta Versus Oriental Gas Company, (2) Tuljaram vs. Alagappa & 3. A. I. R. 1935 Rangoon, page 267 were discussed by their Lordships in the Supreme Court in A. I. R. 1953 S. G. 198, in which G. J. Couch held that every judicial pronouncement on a right or liability between the parties cannot be regarded as judgment, for in case there would be any number of judgment in the course of a suit or proceedings, each one of which could be challenged by way of appeal. The judgment must be the final pronouncement which puts an end to the proceedings so far as the court dealing with it is concerned. It was further held that since a special appeal from the decisions of a single Member u/s 10 (1) of the Land Revenue Act was parallel to a Letters Patent appeal in the High Court, the expression 'decision' has to be construed in the light of the definition given to the expression "judgment" occurring in the provisions of the Letters Patent. We see no reason to differ from this view. The learned counsel for the applicant contended before us that the word 'decision' should be interpreted in its literary sense as a matter finally disposed of. Therefore, so far as the Single member of the Board was concerned he had finally disposed of the matter regarding appointment of receiver. The learned counsel further drew our attention of the definition given in interpretation by Bindra at p. 731, 4th Ed. 1965 which shows that 'decision' is popular and not technical word and means little more than concluded opinion. It was further pointed out to us that there may be different decisions such as administrative decisions and judicial decisions and they should be distinguished accordingly. The word 'decision' used in sec. 10 of the Land Revenue Act is obviously, a judicial decision and in the context in which it is used in sec. 10 (1 ). , We have no hesitation in endorsing the view taken by the Board in 1964 RRD page 213 that it is synonymous with judgment'. The next question which has to be determined is whether the question of appointment of a receiver can be said to be a decision or not. As held in number of authorities cited above, the appointment of a receiver determines no right whatsoever between the parties. It is only a step towards the finalisation of the case as it only provides a remedy to protect the property during the pendency of the case. Such an order at the most can be said to be an interlocutory judgment and would not be decision in the sense in which 'judgment has been interpreted by the Rajasthan High Court in I. L. R. 1955 page 418 for purposes of special appeal u/s 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance. For the reasons given above we uphold the preliminary objection raised by the counsel for the respondent, on the second ground that this special appeal is not maintainable and reject the same. .;