- (1.) THIS petition under sec. 15 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act filed by the Sales Tax Officer, Special Circle, Jaipur, arises out of the orders passed by the Hon'ble Shri S. D. Ujwal, Ex-Chairman of the Board of Revenue in revision No. 270/1963/ Ajmer (M/s. Chaganmal Bastimal of Beawar vs. State of Rajasthan) dated 19-3-1964 under sec. 14 of the aforesaid Act.
(2.) A preliminary objection was raised in that case by the learned Government Advocate that since the order impugned before the learned Member was appealable under sec. 13 of the aforesaid Act, the petitioner should have appealed to the Deputy Commissioner instead of evoking the revisional powers of this court and that this court should not exercise its revisional jurisdiction lightly when the other party has failed to take advantage of the legal remedy open to it. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that under Notification No. F. 405 (MST)63, dated 1-10-63 published in the Rajasthan Gazette, dated 12-12-1963 in Part II-A at p. 288, the jurisdiction of the Sales Tax Officer, Special Circle, Jaipur, had been extended to Ajmer and that it covered the cases of dealers of the categories mentioned in column No. 3 of the schedule appended thereto, whereby the case of the applicant who fell in that category had come under the jurisdiction of the Sales Tax Officer, Special Circle, Jaipur. It was, therefore, argued that the Sales Tax Officer, Ajmer, had no jurisdiction over the assessee after 10-10-1963 on which date the said Notification came into effect. It was, further, stated that the Sales Tax Officer, Special Circle had already initiated action in the matter and that a notice had also been issued to the assessee by him and that inspite of this, the Sales Tax Officer, Ajmer, had insisted on passing orders ignoring the fact that he had no jurisdiction. It was, further, averred that the Sales Tax Officer, Ajmer, had required the party to deposit the tax within 24 hours which showed that he was prejudicially inclined towards him. It was urged that while interpreting sec. 14 of the aforesaid Act, the provisions of sec. 115 of the Cr. P. C. and sec. 230 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act should be kept in view, as the Board was the highest court having jurisdiction in the matter and should exercise its revisional power in suitable cases, despite the fact that other remedies lay open to the petitioner. Reliance was sought on Motilal vs. State of Rajasthan (1963 RRD 140) a D. B. ruling of this Board, wherein it has been held that once the revision has been entertained by the Board and the question involved is about the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts, it is not necessary or proper to reject the revision only on the ground that a second appeal should have been preferred before the competent authority, in accordance with law, particularly when the very basis of the proceedings in the lower courts is challanged in revision. It was observed therein that in such cases, in order not to prolong litigation unnecessarily and to avoid harassment to the parties, revisional jurisdiction should be exercised. Similarly, the learned counsel for the petitioner cited Gangla vs. Mangal Singh (1962 RRD 136 ). In this case, a question arose whether a revision could not be heard under sec, 84 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act against an order which was appealable Under sec. 76 (b) when no appeal had been filed against that order. While making it clear, that it was not the intention of the court to convey that in every case, the parties were free to by-pass the appellate authority and bring a revision directly, the learned Member held that it was not an inflexible rule of law and the Board, could examine a case brought to it, if it so deemed fit. Observing that this had been the practice of the Board, the learned Member proceeded to examine the revision application in that case. Another case which was cited before the learned Member is Chetan Das vs. Bhura (1962 RRD 206) which is a Full Bench Authority. Examining the scope of sec. 84 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, it was held in that case that the Board of Revenue has full powers to hear any revision against any order passed by any subordinate officer or court, subject to the provisions contained in the aforesaid section. Under this section, the Board may call for the record of any case of judicial nature or connected with settlement in which no appeal lies to the Board, if the court or officer by whom the case was decided appears to have exercised jurisdiction not vested in it or him by law, or to have failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested or to have acted in the exercise of its or his jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity and may pass such order as it thinks fit. In that case it was contended by the learned counsel for the opposite party that the applicant should have moved under sec. 65 (2) of the Act within 30 days of the date of the dismissal of the application in default, to have the order set aside as provided therein and that he could not come in revision without first taking resort to that course which was open to him in law. On this basis, it was urged that as an appeal lay to the Board, revisional jurisdiction could not be exercised. This objection was rejected by the Full Bench, with the observation that the applicant's request to invoke the jurisdiction of the Board could not be lightly turned down in the circumstances of the case. It was, further, observed that the Board had been in the past entertaining revisions even when an effective remedy open to an appli-cant had been lost. Taking these authorities into consideration, and also the fact that the jurisdiction in the case had been conferred upon the Sales Tax Officer Special Circle, Jaipur, by the aforesaid Notification, the learned Member came to the conclusion that this was a fit case in which the revisional jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue should be exercised. The argument advanced on behalf of the Govt. Advocate in this reference petition is based on the proviso to sec. 14 (2) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act. It provides that no revision under this sub-section shall be entertained upon the application of a dealer if he could have appealed under sec. 13 and no appeal has been filed by him. It is his contention that no revision lies unless the remedy of appeal has been exhausted. In support of this contention, he has cited a D. B. authority of this Board M/s. Brahmdutt Gupta vs. The State of Rajasthan File No. 10/62 (Sikar) decided on 10-5-1962. In this case, the learned Members held the view that the revision filed by the assessee was not maintainable as he had not appealed under sec. 13 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, It may be stated here that this question came up before me for examination in Nathulal vs. The State of Rajasthan. The case of Chhaganmal Bastilal vs. The State of Rajasthan was also cited before me in those proceedings, along with the authorities relied upon by the learned Member in coming to the decision that under certain circumstances, the revisional jurisdiction of this Board could be exercised even if the remedy of appeal had not been exhausted by the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner, in that case, had drawn my attention to the Supreme Court authority laid down in Major S. S. Khanna vs. Brig F. J. Dillon (1964 AIR S. G. 497 ). This authority lays down the law in connection with the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court.
(3.) IT was observed by the learned Judges that the expression "case" could not be interpreted to mean an entire proceeding only. Not to include a part of proceeding in this expression would be to impose a restriction upon the exercise of the powers of superintendence to which the jurisdiction to issue writs, and the supervisory jurisdiction are not subject, and may result in certain cases in denying relief to an aggrieved litigant where it is most needed, and may result in the perpetration of gross injustice. Their Lordships proceeded to observe that once it was granted that the expression "case" included a part of a case, there was no escape from the conclusion that revisional jurisdiction of the High Court might be exercised irrespective of the question whether an appeal lay from the ultimate decree or order passed in the suit. Any other view would impute to the Legislature an intention to restrict the exercise of this salutary jurisdiction to those comparatively unimportant suits and proceedings in which the appellate jurisdiction of the High Courts is excluded for reasons of public policy. IT was, further, observed that he expression in which no appeal lies thereto" is not susceptible of the interpretation that it excludes the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction when an appeal may be competent to the final order. IT was held that if an appeal lies against the adjudication directly to the High Court or to another court from the decision of which an appeal lies to High Court, it has no power to exercise its revisional jurisdiction, but where the decision itself is not appealable to the High Court directly or indirectly, exercise of the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court would not be deemed excluded. In view of these authorities referred to earlier, I came to the conclusion that, in suitable cases, where the orders of the subordinate courts suffer from lack of jurisdiction, supervisory courts cannot be debarred from interfering at an earlier stage, even if an appeal lies in such cases, so as to avoid prolonged litigation and harassment to the subjects. I held the view that the extra-ordinary powers of revision are vested in a supervisory court to administer speedy justice and to protect an aggrieved litigant from the perpetration of uncalled for and avoidable mischief. Having heard the arguments advanced by both the counsel in this reference petition, I see no reason to alter my earlier views. The tenor of the above authorities is that in suitable cases, the Board may exercise its revisional jurisdiction, even if the appellate remedy has not been exhausted by the petitioner, so as to avoid protracted litigation and consequential harassment to him. Of course, it does not mean that the parties are free to by-pass the appellate authority. Nevertheless, it is not an inflexible rule of law and once the matter is brought before the Board in its revisional jurisdiction, the powers of the Board cannot be hampered by such technical considerations. The revision is the right of the court and not of the party and if it appears to the Board that the subordinate court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has failed to exercise the jurisdiction so vested or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the powers of the Board to pass such orders as it thinks fit are unhampered, as the failure to exercise these powers may lead to protracted litigation and harassment of the subject. Under the circumstances, I find no force in this reference petition and hereby reject the same. .;