- (1.) SHRIMATI Prem Kumari appellant has filed this appeal against the award made by the Deputy Collector, Jagir, Sawai Madhopur, dated the 2nd February, 1962. A preliminary objection was raised by the Government Advocate that this appeal was presented on 17. 9. 1962 against the award dated the 2nd February, 1962 and was obviously time barred. The appeal is filed under sec. 39 of the Jagirs Act against the date of decision. The appellant's counsel was very much present on the date of the hearing of the case on 2nd February, 1962, The counsel for the appellant Prem Kumari urged by saying that the award was not made on 2nd February, 1962. In fact he was informed through Tehsil on 19th June, 1962 and if the limitation is reckoned from that date, the appeal is within 90 days from the date of intimation.
(2.) WE have considered the arguments advanced from both sides under sec. 33 of the Jagirs Act. It is incumbent upon the Jagir Commissioner to communicate his final order under sec. 32, sub-sec. 2 read with sec. 33 of the Jagir Act to the Government, the Jagirdar and every other interested person. There is no doubt that the order dated 2nd February, 1962 mentions that the counsel for the appellant was present on that date, but in fact the award was drawn subsequently and it is not denied' that the final order was communicated on 19. 6. 1962. In view of this the period between the date of the final order and its communication to the claimant Jagirdar will have to be excluded from the date of limitation. If that is done the appeal is very much within the limitation period and the objection of the Government Advocate is over-ruled. The only contention of the counsel for the appellant was that the income from the sale of agricultural land was not allowed to the appellant in computing the compensation of the appellant's jagir claim by the Deputy Collector. He concedes that in view of the decision taken by the Board of Revenue in the case of Hamir Singh vs. State of Rajasthan reported in 1960 RRD 177, this Court cannot permit this income to be considered in the claim, but the appellant would be prepared to seek her remedy before the High Court in its extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction. It was only for this purpose that the appellant desires to present her claim before this Board. Thus there is no force in this contention of the counsel for the appellant and this appeal must fail. Hooja, Member - While I agree with my learned brother that this appeal must fail in view of the decision taken by the Board RRD 1960 p. 177, as regard the point for limitation I am of the view that according to a plain reading of sec. 39 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms & Resumption of Jagirs Act, an appeal lies to the Board of Revenue within 90 days from the date of the decision of the Jagir Commissioner to the Collector as the case may be. Sec. 32, sub-sec. (2) provides for the communication of the provisional award to the Government to the Jagirdars and every other interested person with a view to affording them a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter, before a final order is made by the Jagir Commissioner. This order will then be communicated under Sec. 33 to the Government the Jagirdar and every other interested person. From a perusal of the record in the present case it appears that the counsel for the Jagirdar was present in the Court on 2. 2. 62 when the award was announced by the Dy. Collector Jagir. I am, therefore, of the view that period of limitation should run from 2-2 62 and not 19. 6. 62 as observed by my learned brother. As was held in RLJ 1963 page 25 the proceedings of a Court shall be presumed to have been taken on the date and in the manner they have been shown to have been taken. Simply because of any affidavit by counsel or any party, their validity cannot be doubted. In that case, however, it was found that the judgment had been pronounced in the absence of and without information to the appellant and it was therefore held that the judgment was not in accordance with the prescribed procedure and the date of the judgment could not for the same reason be taken to be the point of start of limitation against the appellant, but from the date he came to learn of the same. In the present case according to the proceedings of 2nd February, 1962 as well as the opening sentence of the judgment, it is more than patent that the decision was made known to the counsel for the Jagirdar on the same day. With due respect, therefore, I beg to differ with my learned brother as regards the point of start of limitation in this case and hold that in the case, appeal is also barred by time. Kakar, Member, on reference - This is a reference made' under orders of the Chairman, Board of Revenue dated 27. 5. 1964 on a difference of opinion between two members, Sarvashri Gajendra Singh and G. B. K. Hooja, who constituted the Division Bench. Though in the final result of the appeal both the Members agreed, but the difference of opinion confined itself only to the question on the point of start of limitation in an appeal preferred under sec. 39 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952. The facts of the case which are relevant for the purposes of this reference, in brief, are that Smt. Prem Kumari, Jagirdar of Gorahar, filed an appeal against the order of the Deputy Collector (Jagir), Sawai Madhopur, dated 2. 2. 1962. As will be clear from the judgment or the learned Deputy Collector (Jagir), on the date the judgment was announced, Shri Sashi Bhushan, counsel for the jagirdar was present in person, and it appears from the order that the same was also announced on 2. 2. 1962. The judgment, however, was communicated to the jagirdar under sec. 33 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, on 19. 6. 1962. My learned colleague, Shri Gajendra Singhji took the view that it was incumbent on the Jagir Commissioner to communicate his final order under sec. 32 (2) read with sec. 43 of the Jagir Act, to the Government, the jagirdar and every other interested person. He further observed that there was no doubt that the order dated 2. 2. 1962 mentioned that the counsel for the appellant was present on that date, but in fact the award was drawn subsequently, and it was denied that the final order was communicated on 19. 6. 1962. In view of this, he thought that the period between the date of the final order and its communication to the claimant Jagirdar will have to be excluded from the date of limitation. Shri G. B. K. Hooja on the other hand, held that in accordance with RLJ 1963 page 25 the proceedings of a Court shall be presumed to have been taken on the date and in the manner they have been shown to have been taken. Simply because of any affidavit by counsel or any party, their validity cannot be doubted. In the present case, according to the proceedings of 2. 2. 1962 as well as the opening sentence of the judgment, the decision was made known to the counsel for the jagirdar on the same date. The period of limitation should therefore run from the date of the decision. As this is mainly a legal issue, I shall examine the law on the point in a fuller detail. A similar question came up for consideration of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court O. A. O. A. M. Muthiah Chettiar vs. The Commissioner of Incometax, Madras (AIR 1961 Mad. 204 ). The question for determination there was whether the one year mentioned in the the Income Tax Act had to be computed from the date when the order was signed by the IT. Officer, or the date when it was communicated to the petitioner, or the date if there was any, on which the petitioner, had the opportunity of coming to know of the order. Referring to a catena of decisions of the Madras High Court which support the view that the date of the order does not mean the date when the officer passed the order, but date when such order was either communicated to the party, or the date when it was pronounced or published in such a manner that the party must be deemed to have had notice of it. or the date of such pronouncement or publication, their Lordships have taken the view "if a person is given a right to resort to the remedy to get rid of an adverse order within a prescribed time, the limitation should not be computed from a date earlier than that on which the party aggrieved actually knew of the order, or had an opportunity of knowing the order and therefore must be presumed to have had knowledge of the order. " This rule therefore, clearly lays down the proposition that the date of the order or the date of the decision as used in sec. 39 of the Jagir Act, should be the date when the aggrieved party actually knew of the order or had an opportunity of knowing the order, and therefore, must be presumed to have had knowledge of the order. In other words, if the party was present at the time the order under sec. 32 (2; was passed, or had prior intimation of the date when the order was pronounced, and was actually pronounced, the limitation period must run from the date of such pronouncement. In a case where the party was not present when the order was pronounced or no date for pronouncing the order was given, or the order pronounced was not a complete order, so that an aggrieved party could file an appeal against it, in accordance with the general principles of law, the date of the decision would be the date when the party actually came to know of the order. The scope of secs. 33 and 39 of the Jagirs Act with reference to the limitation period prescribed under sec. 39 was examined by the Rajasthan High Court in Bajrang Singh vs. The State of Rajasthan (RRD 1964 page 327 ). The point raised there was similar to the point involved in the present case. The facts of that case briefly were that the Deputy Collector (Jagir) decided the compensation to be given on 30. 8. 1958. The decision was communicated under sec. 33 to the Government and it reached the Government on 3. 10. 1958. An appeal was preferred on 1. 12. 58. The respondent urged in that appeal that the appeal as time-barred as under Sec. 39 of the Act 90 days time was provided for filing an appeal from the date of the decision. This argument prevailed in the Board of Revenue and they dismissed the appeal. A review petition was filed in the same Court and it was urged there, that the last date of hearing was 16. 6. 1958 and thereafter the case was adjourned without giving another date. The decision was pronounced by the Deputy Collector (Jagir) on 30. 8. 1958, when none of the parties was present as they were not informed about it. On the basis of these facts, it was contended that the period of limitation should have been computed from 30. 10. 1958. This argument was accepted, and a writ petition against the Board's order was filed in the High Court. Discussing the import of sec. 33 and 39 of the Jagirs Act, their Lordships observed that the bare perusal of sec. 33 will show that it certainly makes it incumbent upon the Jagir Commissioner to communicate his final order as soon as practicable to the Government, the Jagirdar and every other interested person. Sec. 39 provides ninety days' period for filing an appeal from the date of the decision. There is no express provision in the Act as to what would happen if the Jagir Commissioner fails to communicate his order to the parties as envisaged in sec. 33 within ninety days from the date of his decision. It would be absurd to suggest that in such a case no appeal would lie. Their Lordships further observed "as we have already pointed out above, it could not have been contemplated by the legislature while providing sec. 39 of the Act that even if a party is not informed by the Jagir Commissioner of his decision for ninety days, he would have no right of appeal. In our opinion, this section would apply in terms in cases where the Jagir Commissioner pronounces his decision before the parties, or if he has adjourned his decision to some other date, then the parties or their pleaders are informed of that date. In a case where the parties are not informed of the date of the decision, sec. 33 of the Act would come into play and the period of limitation would commence from the date the communication about the decision is received by the party under sec. 33 of the Act. " In view of the aforesaid observation of the Rajasthan High Court, the law on the point admits of no doubt. The period of ninety days from the date of decision under sec. 32 (2) of the Jagirs Act will count from the date of the decision if the party preferring an appeal against that decision was either present on the date the decision was made, or had a prior intimation of the date of the decision; but if that was not so, the period of limitation will run from the date of communication of the decision under sec. 33 of the Act. In the present case, as we have seen above, the counsel for the party was present on the date when the decision was pronounced, and there is no reason to believe that the decision was not pronounced on the date on which is said to have been announced. The period of limitation will obviously run from the date of the decision.
(3.) IT appears from a perusal of the observations made by my learned colleague Shri Gajendra Singhji, though he has not specifically so stated, that the period of limitation under sec. 39 should run from the date of drawal of the final award. With due respects, it may be submitted that there is no warrant in law for such a proposition. The decision referred to in sec. 39 of the Jagir Act is a decision taken under sec. 32 (2) as has been specifically mentioned in that section. The drawal of a final award is either a ministerial job or made under sec. 35, sub-secs. (1) and (2) of the Act. Sub sec (1) and (2) of sec. 35 are not appealable. As a matter of fact, the impugned order has finally determined the amount payable to the jagirdar and nothing remained to be done thereafter. For the reasons given above, I am inclined to agree with my learned colleague Shri G. B. K. Hooja, that period of limitation in this case would run from the date of the decision i. e. 2. 2. 1962 as the counsel for the appellant was present on that date. .;