- (1.) THIS is a special appeal against the order of Shri Gajendra Singh, Member, Board of Revenue dated 30-9-64 in Revision No. 4/chittorgarh/1963 whereby he accepted the revision of the respondent and directed the release of the land in question and further ordered that the income collected by the Forest Department during the period of unlawful possession by them be refunded after deducting the collection charges, to the respondent.
(2.) THE learned counsel for the respondent has raised a preliminary objection that this special appeal is not maintainable as the matter arises out of proceedings under the Rajasthan Forest Act, 1953 and by virtue of the provisions of S. 18 (4) of the said Act, the order of the revisional court is final and cannot be questioned in a special appeal. He has argued that the provisions of sec. 10 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, under which there is a provision for special appeal, are not applicable to the present case. THE Forest Act is a special enactment while the Land Revenue Act is a general law regulating the procedure of Revenue Courts and Chapter II deals with the constitution of the Board of Revenue and the manner of the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Board. He has argued that originally the power of revision under the Forest Act vested in the State Government under S. 22 of the Forest Act and that it was by the insertion of sub-sec. (2) in sec. 22 of the above Act, that the State Government was empowered to delegate its power under the said section to the Board of Revenue or to any other authority to be named in the notification. It is urged that the State Govt. has delegated its power to the Revenue Board to hear these revisions vide; notification No. F. 7 (141) Rev. A/59, dated 24-2-62, and therefore, the member, Board of Revenue was persona designata while exercising the powers of revision under the Forest Act and. therefore, his order could not be challenged in a special appeal. He has further contended that the authority, hearing the revision application, had to hear the case in a quasi judicial manner and was, therefore, quasi judicial tribunal. He has tried to distinguish the decision reported in M/s Bawa Glass & Crockeries Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Rajasthan (RRD 1965 p. 82) wherein it was held in a Sales Tax case, that the Sales Tax Act does not prohibit the special appeal under sec. 10 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act and a special appeal against an order passed by a member sitting singly in revision application, under the Sales Tax Act, was competent before a Division Bench. He has also referred to the provisions of secs. 222, 223, 224 and 225 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, which have been examined in Bachan Singh vs. Bheru (RRD 1963 p. 135) and M/s Madho Behari, Mohan Behari vs. State of Rajasthan (RRD 1963 p. 318 ). His submission is that the provisions of the said sections are not similar to the provisions of the Forest Act and do not contain any provisions equivalent to sec. 18 (4) of the Forest Act. He has further referred to the provisions or secs. 74, 75 and 76 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, and has argued that these enactments do not contain any provision rendering finality to the decision of the Board to Revenue or other Courts. In support of his contention he has referred to a number of authorities as mentioned below - The first case cited by the learned counsel is the Temple of Banketeshawer Balaji of the Collector, Ajmer (1963 RLW p. 608 ). This is a case under the Ajmer Abolition of Intermediaries & Land Reforms Act. It was observed therein that the provision contained in sec. 18 of the Ordinance (Rajasthan High Court Ordinance 1949) was a general one governing the matter of appeals within the High Court itself and such a general provision could not over ride a provision governing a right of appeal in the aforesaid Act out of which the proceeding in question had come up to the High Court and but for which the proceeding need not have come up to that Court at all. That being so, after a litigant had exercised his right of one appeal to the High Court in accordance with sec. 66 (3), of the Abolition of Intermediaries & Land Reforms Act, 1955, he could not lay any claim to a further right of appeal by virtue of any general provisions contained in the Ordinance in the face of the special provision enacted in sec. 66 (3) by virtue of which alone he was enabled to go to that Court. Their lordships came to this conclusion in view of the plain reading of S. 66 (3) of the Ajmer Abolition of Intermediaries & Land Reforms Act, which clearly lays down that the decision of the Judicial Commissioner (High Court) shall be final. As will be seen hereafter, in this case, finality attaches to the judgment of the Court envisaged under the Forest Act, subject to revision by the Government (Board of Revenue ). We do not, therefore, think that this case has any applicability to the matter in issue before us. The next case cited by the learned counsel is the Union of India vs. The Mohindra Supply Co. (Supreme Court AIR 1962 P. 257 ). It is a case under sec. 39 (2) of the Indian Arbitration Act. It was observed that sec, 39 (2) of the Arbitration Act expressly prohibits a second appeal from an order passed in appeal under sec. 39 (1) except an appeal to the Supreme Court. It was therefore held that where a single judge of the Punjab High Court disposes of an appeal under sec. 39 (1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 there is no further right of appeal under cl. 10 of the letters patent of the High Court against the order of the single Judge. He also cited Collector of Rangoon vs. Chandrama (AIR 1915 Lower Burmah p. 94) which is a case under the Land Acquisition Act. It was observed therein that an order of the Single Judge of the High Court could not be questioned by way of appeal under the letters patent. Further, he referred to Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. versus The Chief Revenue Authority of Bombay (AIR 1923 Privy Council page 148 ). It is a case under the Income-Tax Act and it was observed therein that the jurisdiction exercised under sec. 51 of the Income-Tax Act could not be challenged in Letters Patent before a Division Bench. A reference was also made to the Rangoon Botatoung Co. Ltd. vs. The Collector, Rangoon (16 Indian Cases Page 188 ). It was observed there in by their lordships of the Privy Council that an appeal against the order of the Chief Court of Lower Burmah was not maintainable before the Privy Council. The learned counsel was asked to show how these cases were in pari materia with the case before us. But he has failed to do so. He next referred to the decision of the Rajasthan High Court reported in Bhanu Pratap Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (RRD 1964 page 110) for the proposition that the Member, Board of Revenue was a persona designata, for the purposes of the Forest Act and was acting in a quasi judicial manner, while dealing with this case, and therefore, no special appeal lay against his order which was in the nature of an order passed by a Tribunal acting as a persona designata. We have not been able to read this meaning in that authority. It defines the status of Jagir Commissioner and lays down the manner in which the Jagir Commissioner has to act in discharge of his duties, but it does not define the status of the Board of Revenue vis-a-vis the Forest Act. In support of his contention, the learned counsel further sought reliance on the Dargah Committee Ajmer vs. the State of Rajasthan (AIR 1962 Supreme Court page 574), which is a case under the Ajmer Merwara Municipality Regulation. It was held therein that a Magistrate acting under S. 234 of the said Regulation does not act as an inferior criminal court to the High Court within the meaning of S. 439 Cr. P. C. and his order was not subject to revision, as in the ordinary channel of criminal courts. He also referred to Ladu Ram vs. Sheo Karan (RRD 1964 page 242) which is a case under the Rajasthan Colonisation Act wherein it was held that the Board was not vested with revisional powers u/s. 83 of the Land Revenue Act and as the matter was of a non-judicial nature, revisional powers were to be exercised by the Government under sec. 83 of the Land Revenue Act. Abdul Rahman vs. Abdul Rahman (AIR 1925 Allahabad page 380) was cited to establish that the term Civil Courts used in the letters patent clause 11 does not cover a tribunal created under a particular statute for a particular purpose. Karimmiya Hamdumiya Soniwala vs. Jafar Ali Bawarniya (AIR 1942 Bombay page 279) was cited to show that an order passed by a District Court under the Muslim Wakf Act was not appealable to the High Court as the order was a final one. The learned counsel next cited Kartar Singh vs. Administrator General of Bihar (AIR 1959 Patna page 349) wherein it was observed in a case under sec. 28 of the Administrator Generals Act that such an order was not liable to be questioned under the Letters Patent. He also cited Shankerlal Poddar vs. Govinda Prosad Bath (AIR 1959 Calcutta page 324) which was an order under sec. 202 of the Companies Act. It was observed therein that the order passed under sec. 202 of the Companies Act was not appealable under sec. 15 of the Latters Patent.
(3.) HE next referred to M. V. Rajwada I. A. S. Distt. Magistrate vs. Dr. S. M. Hassan (AIR 1954 Nagpur page 71) in which it was held that the Commissioner under Commissions of Inquiry Act is a Civil Court for a limited purpose. From this the learned counsel sought to infer that the powers of a court as envisaged in the Forest Act are not akin to the powers of a court under the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. The test according to his contention, is that the member, Board of Revenue, hearing a rivision application was to be guided by the procedure as provided in the Forest Act and in doing so, he ramains a persona designata and a qasi-judicial tribunal for the purpose of the Forest Act. As stated above, these rulings can not be held to be relevant to the present issue unless it is found that the laws which they seek to interpret are in pari materia with the law relating to the present inquiry. This the learned counsel has not been able to establish. We therefore do not see how these authorities can help him. He further cited Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh vs. the State of Vindhya Pradesh (AIR 1953 Supreme Court page 394) in which it was observed that the court should not imply a right of appeal which is not specifically provided. A reference was also made to J & K Cotton Spinning Mills Co. Ltd. , vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1961 Supreme Court page 1170) wherein it was observed that the rule that general provisions should yield to specific provisions is not an arbitrary principle made by lawyers and Judges but springs from the common understanding of men and women that when the same person gives two directions, one covering a large number of matters in general and another only some of them, his intention is that these latter directions should prevail as regards these, while as regards all the rest, the earlier direction should have effect. In this connection he also referred to Pretty vs. Solly, (1859-53 ER 1032) quoted in Craies on Statute Law at P. 206, 6th Edition, wherein Romily M. R. , mentioned the rule thus - The rule is that whenever there is a particular enactment and a general enactment in the same statute and the latter, taken in its most comprehensive sense, would overrule the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to effect only the other parts of the statute to which it may properly apply. These authorities no doubt, are based on in controvertible principle of jurisprudence but we do not see how they can help the learned counsel for the respondent in the face of the clear provision of the Forest Act, which is the subject of enquiry now before us. As has been rightly argued by the learned Government Advocate, the interpretation sought to be placed by the learned counsel for the respondent on sec. 18 (4) is not in accordance with its plain meaning. According to sec. 18 (4) the order passed by an appellate court is final, subject to revision by the Board of Revenue. This is not the same thing as saying that the order passed in revision by a single member of the Board is final. For a better appreciation of the law it would be desirable to reproduce sub sec. (4) of sec. 18 which reads as follows: - " (4) The order passed on appeal by such officer or court or by the majority of the members of such court, as the case may be shall, subject only to revision by the Government, be final. " The plain reading of this sub section is that the order passed in appeal is final, subject to revision by the Government (now the Board of Revenue ). This cannot be considered to mean that the order passed by a single member of the Board, is final. It only means that the order passed by the appellate authority is final, if no revision is filed. In case a revision is filed, the order shall naturally be reopened and will be subject to the order passed in revision. In view of this plain grammatical interpretation of the aforesaid section, the authorities so laboriously cited by the learned counsel for the respondent lose their applicability as stated above. Those authorities obviously relate to the cases where finality has been expressly attached to the orders under appeal and therefore, the High Courts refused to interfere with the appellate orders which had been declared by law to be final. No such finality has been scribed to an order of the single Member passed in revision, under sec. 18 (4) of the Forest Act. In this connection, the learned counsel for the appellant made a pertinent reference to the Sindhi Co-operative vs. Nanakram (Revision No. 8/61/jaipur ). In this case, the Board did not accept, the argument that a revision was barred under Sec. 65 of the Co-operative Societies Act wherein the orders passed under secs. 61 and 64 were declared as final and conclusive, in view of sec. 76 which provides for a revision against the orders passed by the subordinate officers. The present case stands on a stronger footing than Nanakram's case. The learned Government Advocate has also rightly argued that it would not be correct to hold the Board of Revenue to be persona designata and therefore, a quasi-judicial tribunal, while it sits to hear a revision petition against the appellate order, under sec. 18 (4) of the Forest Act. The manner of the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Board is laid down in sec. 10 of the Land Revenue Act. It lays down that except as otherwise provided by or under this Act or by any other law or enactment for the time being in force, and subject to any rules laid in that behalf, the jurisdiction of the Board may be exercised by the Chairman or any other Member of the Board, sitting singly, or by a bench of the Board consisting of two or more Members, provided that a party aggrieved by a decision of the single Member shall have a right to make special appeal to a bench consisting of two or more Members of the Board. As was held in Kalyan vs. Ramshai (RRD 1962 p. 212) the provision of special appeal is intended to provide an opportunity to the aggrieved party to have it examined whether the learned Member sitting singly has exercised the jurisdiction of revision vesting in the Board properly or not. In other words, it would not be an appeal as provided by the enactment under which the case lies, but it would only be a continuation of the process of revision heard by a single Member of the Board of Revenue. This view was endorsed in Bawa Glass & Crockeries Pr. Ltd. (RRD 1965 p. 82) to which one of us was a party, and it was held that the implication of the proviso which is appended to sec. 10 (1) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act is that the Board has not exhausted its revisional remedies until a special appeal has been heard It cannot of course, be denied that the provision of sec. 10 (1) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act are subject to the provisions, not only of that Act but of any other Act, in force for the time being, as well as the rules made in that behalf. But unless there is a specific provision of law impinging on sec. 10 (1), the provisions of this section shall continue to govern the manner in which the jurisdiction vested in the Board has to be exercised. In this view of the matter, we come to the conclusion that there is no force in this preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondent and we, therefore, overrule the same. . ;