- (1.) THIS reference arises out of the objections raised by Shri S. N. Parikh in the above mentioned cases when they came up for hearing before two different Single Benches of this Board. The learned counsel contended that the Board of Revenue as at present composed had not been properly constituted within the meaning of sec. 4 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act inasmuch as the State Govt. had not determined the strength of the Members of the Board of Revenue as required under sec. 4 (2) of the aforesaid Act. It was, further, averred that the State Govt. had also failed to prescribe the qualifications of the persons eligible for appointment as the Chairman and the Members of the Board of Revenue as contemplated in sub-sec. (4 ). It was, therefore, argued that the composition of the Board as existing at present stood vitiated. He also questioned the validity of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act on the ground that the notification No. F. 12 (13) Rev. II/64, dated 12. 6. 1956 was issued by the State Govt. on a date when the State Govt. had no authority to act under the provisions of the aforesaid Act. When this reference came up for consideration before a Larger Bench of this Board earlier, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned Advocate General. It was his contention that the Larger Bench of this Board was not competent to hear and adjudicate upon this reference. Arguments were heard on this preliminary objection and the same was overruled by the order of the Larger Bench dated 24. 3. 1966. The reference has now come up before this Larger Bench for consideration on merit.
(2.) IT is contended by Shri S. N. Parikh that originally the Board of Revenue was constituted under sec. 4 of the Rajasthan Board of Revenue Ordinance, 1949 (XXII of 1949 ). IT was stipulated under sub-sec. (1) of this Section that the Board shall consist of a Chairman and such number of other Members as the Raj-Pramukh may from time to time determine and appoint. IT was, further, stipulated that all appointments made under sub-sec. (1) shall be notified in the Rajasthan Gazette. In pursuance of the provision contained in Sub-sec. (1) referred to above, the State Government issued notification No. 906-VI II/49, dated 26. 10. 1949, whereby the Raj-Pramukh was, pleased to order that the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan shall consist of a Chairman and two other Members. IT is his contention that under the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act also, it is contemplated that Board shall consist of a Chairman and such other Members not less than 3 as the State Govt. may from time to time determine and appoint. But the State Govt. has failed to notify the number of Members who would serve on the Board from time to time, although the appointments made to the Board have been notified in the Gazette as and when they were made. He contends that the failure of the Govt. to notify in the Gazette the strength of the Members of the Board of Revenue from time to time as required under Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 4 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act vitiates their appointment. The Advocate General appearing for the Govt. has sought to repel this contention by stating that all appointments to the Board are made by the Govt. after determining the number of Members required to cope with the volume of work pending in the Board. He contends that it is not necessary to notify in the Gazette the number of Members required to serve on the Board at a particular time. In this connection, he has invited our attention to sub-sec. (3) of sec. 4 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act which requires that all appointments made under Sub-sec. (2) shall be notified in the Rajasthan Gazette. It is his contention that if the Legislature had intended the strength of the Members required to serve on the Board from time to time, also to be notified similarly, it would have so enacted. As the Legislature has specifically laid down that all appointments shall be notified, the obvious corollary would be that it did not require the Government to necessarily notify the strength of the Members required to serve on the Board from time to time. What is obligatory is that the Board shall consist of a Chairman and not less than three Members. The appointment of additional Members is discretionary with the Government depending upon the workload. The appointment of additional Members, which has taken place from time to time, has followed the determination of the strength by the State Govt , as it would be impossible to conceive of an appointment without there being a post duly sanctioned by the Govt. in the Finance Department. As soon as an appointment is made, which is, of course, followed by the process of determination of the strength, it is duly notified in the Rajasthan Gazette, thereby fulfilling the command of the Legislature. As such, there has been no violation of the requirements of the law as laid down in Sub-secs. (2) and (3) of sec. 4 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. This contention must prevail. In support of his arguments, Shri S. N. Parikh has made a reference to the United Commercial Bank Ltd. vs. Their Workmen (AIR 38) 1951 Supreme Court 230 ). In this case, the learned Judges of the Supreme Court had an occasion to examine the import of Secs. 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, 16 and 38 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, read with the Industrial Disputes Rules, 1949. Sec. 5 lays down that the appropriate Government may as occasion arises by notification in the official gazette constitute a Board of Conciliation. It also lays down that the Board shall consist of a Chairman and two or four other Members as the appropriate Govt. thinks fit. Under Sub-sec. (4) of sec. 5 when a Member of a Board of Conciliation is absent or there is a vacancy the Board is permitted to act notwithstanding such absence, provided there is the prescribed quorum. Sec. 6 authorises the appropriate Govt. to similarly appoint a Court of Enquiry when an occasion arises, and sec. 7 authorises the appropriate Govt. to constitute one or more Industrial Tribunals for the adjudication of Industrial disputes. Rule 5 of the Industrial Disputes Rules provides that the appointment of a Board, Court or Tribunal together with the names of the persons constituting the Board, Court or Tribunal shall be notified in the official gazette. Examining the import of these provisions, it was laid down in this case that it was obligatory on the appropriate Govt. to notify the composition of the Tribunal and also the names of the persons constituting the same. It was observed that in respect of a Tribunal which is entrus-with the work of adjudicating upon disputes between employers and employees, which have not been settled otherwise, this provision is absolutely essential. It cannot be left in doubt to the employers or the employees as to who are the persons authorised to adjudicate upon their disputes. It was, further, observed that this is in accordance with the notifications of appointments of public servants discharging judicial or quasi-judicial functions and the important thing to note is that the member forming the Tribunal and the names of the Members have both to be noticed in the official gazette for the proper and valid constitution of the Tribunal. A perusal of this judgment, however, shows that the ratio decidendi in this case was whether under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 the award of an Industrial Tribunal would be valid or not if the services of one Member ceased to be available for some time and what would be the effect on the validity of the award if the Member rejoined subsequently and influenced the decision of other Members who had carried on the proceedings during his absence. As the responsibility of the Tribunal was joint and all its Members were to make and sign the award, it saw held that the rest of the Members had no right to act as the Tribunal when the services of a Member had ceased to be available and proceeding with the adjudication, in the absence of one Member undermined the basic principle of joint work and responsibility of the Tribunal and all their awards were without jurisdiction and void. This is not the question before us in the present case. Here, the Members of the Board of Revenue exercise their jurisdiction in terms of sec. 10 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act (a) by sitting singly or (b) by sitting in benches consisting of two or more Members. It is in this context that the effect of the failure of the Government to notify the number as well as the qualifications of the Members of the Board of Revenue has to be examined. As stated in the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court, the purpose of notifying the appointments of public servants discharging judicial or quasi-judicial func-tions is to leave the employers or employees in no doubt as to who are the persons authorised to adjudicate upon their disputes. If it had been the argument of the learned counsel that the litigating public had remained in doubt with regard to the persons constituting the Board of Revenue on account of lack of notification, it would have carried a lot of weight, but the failure of the State Government to notify the number of the persons, while at the same time, notifying the names of the persons cannot be deemed to be such a fatal flaw as to invalidate the decisions of such a Board. It would also have been a different matter if the Board of Revenue was required to adjudicate upon and decide matters jointly and if a quorum had been laid for such meetings. This is not so in the present case. We are, therefore, not persuaded that the observations made in the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court regarding the notification of the number of Members of the Industrial Tribunal hit equally fatally a lapse on the part of the State Govt. with regard to the notification of the number of Members required to serve on the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan from time to time. Another authority cited by the learned counsel is the State of Assam vs. Sristikar Dowerah (AIR 1957 S. C. , 414 ). This relates to the constitution of the Assam Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act, 1948. The controversy in this case turned on sec. 296 of the Government of India Act, 1935. This provision debarred a Member of the federal or a provisional legislature from being appointed as a member of any tribunal in British India having jurisdiction to entertain appeals or revise decisions in revenue cases. It, further, stated that if in any province any such jurisdiction as aforesaid was, immediately before the commencement of part III of the above Act, vested in the local Government the Governor shall constitute a Tribunal consisting of such person or persons as he, exercising his individual judgment, may think fit, to exercise the same jurisdiction until other provision in that behalf was made by an Act of the Provincial Legislature. On 5. 4. 1948, a High Court was established for the Province of Assam. On 6. 4. 1948. the Assam Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act, 1948 received the assent of the Governor of Assam. It was published in the official gazette on 8. 4. 1948 and was brought into force on the same day by a notification issued by the Provincial Government. In exercise of the powers conferred on it by sec. 3 (3) of the 1948 Act, the Provincial Govern ment from time to time issued notifications appointing persons to exercise the powers of the Appellate Authority. At first, the Revenue Secretary was appointed as the Appellate Authority. Subsequently, the Minister of Excise to the Govt. of Assam was appointed as the Appellate Authority. This was challenged as a flagrant violation of the provisions of sec. 296 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935 and was declared to be invalid by the Assam High Court. Thereafter, fresh notifications were issued and a new post called the Commissioner of Hill Divisions and Appeals was created and he was appointed as the Appellate Authority. In the litigation that followed the challenging of the orders of the authority by the aggrieved parties, the High Court of Assam issued writs, quashing the said orders and held that sec. 3 (3) of the 1948 Act, by virtue of which the authority appointed by the order of the Government was empowered to exercise such jurisdiction to entertain appeals and revise decisions in matters arising under the provisions of enactments specified in Schedule B as was being exercised then by the Revenue Tribunal and was vested in the Provincial Government before 1. 4. 1937, was void on the ground that sec. 3 (3) of the 1948 Act was (a) repugnant to sec. 296 (2) and (b) it conferred essential legislative power on the Provincial Government and amounted to excessive delegation of legislative power. It was also held that the notification of 5. 7. 1955 whereby the Commissioner of Hill Divisions and Appeals was appointed as the Appellate Authority was invalid. In the result, all its decisions were declared to be nullities. In appeal, however, the Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the High Court and restored those of the Appellate Authority holding that the purpose of sec. 296 (2) was to authorise the Governors of certain Provinces to constitute a Tribunal and to prescribe a time limit upto which the Tribunal so constituted by him was to exercise the appellate jurisdiction. This section did not indicate any qualification for the eligibility of the persons to be appointed as Members of the Tribunal. It was, however, clear that the Tribunal was to sit in appeal over the decision of the Excise Commissioner and that by itself gave some indication that the person or persons to be appointed to the Tribunal should have the requisite capacity and competency to deal with appeals from such officials. It could not, therefore, be considered that there had been an excessive delegation of legislative power. As a result, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that sec. 3 (3) of the 1948 Act could not be held to be bad. Similarly, it held that the view of the High Court regarding the invalidity of the notification of 5. 7. 1955 was also not justified. We have not been able to appreciate how this authority can be of any help to the learned counsel for the petitioners. The ratio decidendi in this case has no relevance to the issues under consideration before us. The authority next cited by the learned counsel is Harla vs. the State of Rajasthan (AIR 38 of 1951, Supreme Court 467 ). It relates to the necessity of the proper promulgation and publication of laws whereby the subject of a State is liable to punishment or penalty in case of violation thereof. It lays down that natural justice requires that before a law can become operative, it must be promul-gated or published, in some recognisable way so that all men may know what it is. It was observed that a law cannot come into being by merely passing a resolution without promulgation or publication in the gazette or by other means. Distinguishing between an order and an Act, it was stated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the Acts of the Parliament are publicly enacted. The debates are open to the public and the Acts are passed by the accredited representatives of the people who can be trusted to see that their constituents know what has been done. They also receive wide publicity in papers and over the wireless. Not so the proclamations and the orders of appropriate authorities. There must, therefore, be promulgation and publication in their cases. To our mind, this authority, also, is not relevant to the present issue. In the first place, it lays down the rule in respect of substantive laws, for the breach of which a citizen may render himself liable to punishment or penalty, while the present controversy relates to the constitution of a Tribunal, and as has been laid down in the Industrial Disputes Act case, what is incumbent upon the State in such a case is to notify the persons who will be called upon to decide and adjudicate upon the disputes arising between the litigants regarding matters falling within its jurisdiction, and if this object has been substantially achieved, it should fulfil the requirements of natural justice, and would not invalidate the decisions of such a Tribunal. The learned counsel next referred to Ajaib Singh Lehna Singh vs. The State of Punjab and another (AIR 1952 Punjab 309) whereby the constitution of a Tribunal under the Abducted Persons (Recovery and Restoration) Act, 1949 was held to be invalid as there was no notification regarding the appointment of the Pakistan Member to the Tribunal. This rule was eventually upheld by the Supreme Court also in AIR 1953 Supreme Court 10. It may be observed that the aforesaid Punjab Authority was referred to the Larger Bench hearing the preliminary objection raised by the learned Advocate General earlier in this case by Shri S. N. Parikh. On the strength of this and other authorities, the Larger Bench came to the conclusion that it must proceed to decide the question of the validity of the constitution of the Board of Revenue, itself. We, therefore, find this citation only to be repetitive and not of any help in the determination of the question whether the failure of the State Govt. to notify the number of Members who were appointed to the Board of Revenue from time to time must be held to be fatal to the functioning of the Boards rendering their decisions and judgments void and inoperative. Shri S. N. Parikh next cited Rajalakshmi Motor Service, Kozhikode vs. Govt. of Kerala and others (AIR 1960 Kerala 229 ). In this case, the State Govt. had issued a notification on 7. 5. 1957 with regard to the constitution of a State Transport Authority for the whole State and a Regional Transport Authority for each of the Revenue Distts. of the State in exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 44 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It also issued a separate notification on the same date under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 44. This notification was subsequently replaced by a notification dated 23. 8. 1957, whereby the term of the Members of the Regional Transport Authorities was prescribed as one year. The State Govt. , however, forgot about the time limit embodied in this notification and nothing was done till 23. 12. 1958, on which date the State Govt. issued a notification sanctioning the continuance of the State Transport Authority as well as the Regional Transport Authorities (except R. T. A. Eranakulam) as on 1. 8. 58 from dates of expiry of their term till the successors were appointed. The High Court of Kerala held that the appointment of the Members of the Transport Authority constituted under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 44 was in pursuance of a power conferred by the Legislature and was not in pursuance of the executive power of the State under the Constitution. It was observed that the power to constitute the Transport Authority was derived from sub-sec. (1); this was in the realms of a delegated statutory power and in such cases there was no right to retroactive action unless the legislature by express words or necessary intendment had authorised the same. It was, therefore,, held that the retroactive operation of the notification dated 23. 12. 1958 of the Kerala Govt. under Sub-Sections (1) and (2) sec. 44 sanctioning "the continuance of the State Transport Authorities and the Regional Transport Authorities as on 1. 8. 1958 from the dates of expiry of their term till their successors are appointed," was of no effect and as a result there was no Regional Transport Authority in existence on 13. 11. 1958 and if the authority was non-existent, there could have been no de facto Members of that Authority. The ratio decidendi in this case, too, has no relevance to the matter in issue before us and we fail to see how the same falls within the compass of this authority. As stated above, we are called upon to examine the effect of the failure of the State Govt. to notify the determination of the number of Members constituting the Board of Revenue from time to time in the official gazette, as was done in pursuance of the Board of Revenue Ordinance of 1949. The question is whether this failure vitiates the appointments made to the Board from time to time. We find sufficient force in the argument of the learned Advocate General that no appointment could be made to the Board without the prior determination of the strength required to cope with the work-load thereof. In fact, it is imperative before an Officer is called upon to serve not only on the Board of Revenue but for the matter of that on any Government assignment that his post should be properly created and sanctioned by the State Government. Unless this is done, he will not be able to draw his salary. It is not. the case of the learned counsel for the petitioners that this was not done. Thus it can safely be inferred that so far as the Govt. is concerned it duly undertook the process of determining from time to time the number of Members required to serve on the Board in addition to the Chairman and the three Members as laid down in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 4 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. As has been rightly pointed out by the learned Advocate General, sub-sec. (3) requires all appointments to be made under sub-sec. (2) to be notified in the Rajasthan Gazette. It is not the case of the learned counsel for the applicants that the State Government has defaulted in this respect. Reading the two sub sections together, we are inclined to hold that what was incumbent upon the State Government was to notify the appointments in the Rajasthan Gazette so that the litigants would know who were the persons appointed to decide and adjudicate upon their disputes. If it had been the intention of the Legislature to require the State Government to notify additional number of Members deputed to serve on the Board of Revenue, from time to time, in excess of the number prescribed in the Act, there was nothing to prevent the Legislature from saying so in sub-section (3 ). The irresistible conclusion, therefore is that the failure of the State Government to notify the number of such Members cannot be held to be fatal to the functioning of the Board. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting this objection of the learned counsel for the petitioners. Now, we come to the effect of the State Government to prescribe the qualifications of the persons who may be eligible for appointment as Chairman and Members of the Board as required in sub-sec. (4 ). The learned Government Advocate concedes that no such qualifications have been prescribed. The question arises whether the provisions of sub-sec. (4) are mandatory and should the failure to prescribe qualifications invalidate the appointments. Shri S. N. Parikh has referred to sec. 3 (ii) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, according to which prescribed means prescribed by this Act or by rules made thereunder. He has also referred to sec, 261 (2) (i) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, which lays down that the State Government may make rules consistent with the provisions of this Act, prescribing the qualifications of persons eligible for appointment as Chairman and Members of the Board under sec. 4 and has argued that this is an obligatory duty cast on the State and the failure of the State to carry out this mandatory provision of law vitiates the constitution of the Board of Revenue. He has quoted from Caries on Statute Law to the effect that the act permitted by an absolute enactment is lawful only if done in accordance with the conditions annexed to the statutory permission. If an absolute enactment is neglected or contravened, a Court of law will treat the thing which is being done as invalid and altogether void, but if an enactment is directory it is immaterial so far as it relates to the validity of the thing which is being done, whether it is complied with or not. So far as this statement is concerned, there can be no quarrel about it. As stated above, the question before us is whether the provisions contained in sub sec. (4) of sec. 4 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act are mandatory or not. Shri S. N. Parikh, further quoting from Caries, has argued that as a general rule, statutes which enable persons to take legal proceedings under certain specified circumstances must be accurately obeyed notwithstanding the fact that their provisions may be expressed in merely affirmative language. It is inferred by Shri S. N. Parikh from this that the command of the Legislature contained in sub-sec. (4) is mandatory. Caries, however, goes on to explain this statement by referring to sec. 2 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1857 under which after the hearing by a Justice of the Peace of any summary information, either party could, if dissatisfied, apply in writing within three days to the said Justice to state and sign a case setting forth the facts. In Edwards vs. Roberts, the appellant neglected to get the case stated within the three days prescribed, and it was held, in consequence, that the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Caries proceeds to state that according to this rule when a statute confers jurisdiction upon a tribunal of limited authority and statutory origin, the conditions and qualifications annexed to the grant must be strictly complied with. Evidently, the provision of law under consi-deration by us does not in any manner annex any conditions to the authority vested in the Board of Revenue nor does it relate to the conferment of any legal rights or imposition of any limitations on the citizen subject to the existence of any such qualification. On the other hand, it relates to a duty cast on the State by the Legislature, and therefore, this citation from Caries cannot be of much help to the learned counsel for the petitioners in this case. A reference has also been made to Maxwell in this connection. Maxwell poses the question of the intention of the Legislature thus ; when a statute requires that something shall be done, or done in a particular manner or form without expressly declaring what shall be the consequences of non-compliance the question often arises, what intention is to be attributed by inference to the Legislature. According to him, where, the whole aim and object of the Legislature would be plainly defeated if the command to do the thing in a particular manner and not imply a prohibition to do it in any other, no doubt could be entertained as to the intention. He goes on to say that the reports are full of cases dealing with statutory provisions which are devoid of indication of intention regarding the effect of noncompliance with them. In some of them, the conditions, forms or other attendant circumstances, prescribed by the statute have been regarded as essential to the Act or thing regulated by it and their omission has been held fatal to its validity. In others, such prescriptions have been considered as merely directory, the neglect of which did not affect its validity. It has been said that no rule can be laid down lor determining whether the command is to be considered as a mere direction or instruction involving no invalidating consequences in its disregard, or as imperative, with an implied nullification for disobedience, beyond the fundamental one that it depends on the scope and object of the enactment. He adds that it may perhaps be found generally correct to say that nullification is the natural and usual consequence of disobedience, but the question is in the main governed by considerations of convenience and justice, and when that result would involve general inconvenience or injustice to innocent persons, or advantage to those guilty of the neglect, without promoting the real aim and object of the enactment, such an in-tention is not to be attributed to the Legislature. The whole scope and purpose of the statute under consideration must be regarded. The general rule is, that an absolute enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly, but it is sufficient if a directory enactment be obeyed or fulfilled substantially.
(3.) MAXWELL then proceeds to draw a line of distinction where the prescriptions of the Act affect the performance of a duty and where they relate to a privilege or power. He states that where powers, rights or immunities are granted with a direction that certain regulations, formalities or conditions shall be complied with, it seems neither unjust nor inconvenient to exact a rigorous observance of them as essential to the acquisition of the right or authority conferred, and it is therefore, probable that such was the intention of the Legislature. But when a public duty is imposed and the statute requires that it shall be performed in a certain manner, or within a certain time, or under other specified conditions, such prescriptions may well be regarded as intended to be directory only in cases when injustice or inconvenience to others who have no control over those exercising the duty would result if such requirements were essential and imperative. As an illustration, Maxwell cites the case of the designers of prints who failed to engrave the day of publication with the name of the proprietor on each plate. It was held that the neglect to comply with the provisions of the Engraving Copyright Act, 1734, which gave to the designers of the prints the sole right of printing them for 14 years after the day of publication was fatal to the copyright. Similarly, the inn keeper whose common law liability for the goods on his guests was limited if he posted up a notice as required by the Inn-keepers' Liability Act, 1863, did not obtain the exoneration if his notice was inaccurate in any material particular. It will be seen that these illustrations relate to the cases of individuals who suffered because they failed to fulfil the requirements of the law granting them the privileges or immunities claimed by them and thus they can be of no avail to the present applicants, in this case, in which the failure is on the part of the Government to carry out a specific provision of law with regard to the constitution of a tribunal, affecting the rights and privileges of thousands of subjects who had no control over the Officers entrusted with the duty. In fact, in the present case, the sanction of Maxwell may well be invoked for the opposite view that such prescription may be regarded as intended to be directory as it would lead to injustice or inconvenience to those who had ho control over those exercising the duty if. such requirements were held to be essential and imperative. Shri S. N. Parikh has also referred to Maxwell where he says that the enactments regulating the procedure in courts seem usually to be imperative and not merely directory. An illustration cited by Maxwell relates to the disposal of an appeal from a decision, the appeal being subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions, such as giving the notice of appeal and entring into recognizance or transmitting documents in a certain time. It was held that the failure to comply with such conditions would be fatal. Maxwell says that this imperative effect would seem in general to be intended even where the observance of the formalities is not a condition exacted from the party seeking the benefit by the statute, but a duty imposed on a Court or public officer in the exercise of the power conferred on him,, when no general inconvenience or injustice calls for a different construction. This last clause would in fact, seem to take the weight out of the arguments of the learned counsel for the applicants. It is well settled that the fundamental test is to examine the subject matter and to consider the importance of the provision which has been disregarded and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act. As Bindra puts it, there are three tests which are often applied in the determination of the question whether a provision of law is imperative or directory. They are based on considerations of (i) the scope and object, some times called the scheme and the purpose of the enactment, (ii) justice and balance of convenience and (iii) the nature of the particular provision, namely, whether it affects the performance of a public duty or relates to a right, privilege or power. Finding his support from Maxwell, he states that a statutory provision which pertains to an official action is generally construed as directory rather than mandatory. He, further, proceeds to quote Crawford. On Statutory Construction, as follows - "as a general rule, a statute which regulates the manner in which public officials shall exercise the power vested in them, will be construed as directory rather than mandatory, especially where such regulation pertains to uniformity, order and convenience and neither public nor private rights will be injured or impaired thereby. If the statute is negative in form or if nothing is stated regarding the consequences or effect of non-compliance, the indication is all the stronger that it should not be considered mandatory. But, if the public interest or private rights call for the exercise of the power vested in a public official, the language used, though permissive or directory in form, is in fact per-emptory or mandatory, as a general rule. "crawford, then, cited the example of the statute which declared that Board of Supervisors, "may, if deemed advisable" levy a special tax to pay certain debts when their current revenue was insufficient to pay. It was held in this case, that the statute was mandatory, as the power vested in the officer was not for his benefit but for the benefit of the public and a duty was imposed upon the Officer rather than a privilege. Crawford, then, goes on to say that "conversely, where the statute simply regulates the manner in which (he public officers shall exercise the power vested in them in order to promote uniformity, order and convenience, the statute is predominantly intended for the benefit of the Officers. Moreover, words mandatory in form should be construed to be permissive, even where a statute regulating the exercise of powers by public officials is concerned, if the permissive construction will effect justice or save a proceeding from invalidity, provided, however, that such a construction does not destroy or impair the rights of the public or of any member thereof, in other words, whether a statutory requirement which relates to official action shall be considered mandatory or permissible depends upon the effect the suggested construction has upon public and private rights. If the requirement of the statute must be regarded as mandatory in order to promote justice, it should be so construed ; and if a mandatory construction operates mis- chievously, then the statute should be given a permissible construction. " Bindra then proceeds to quote from Corpus Juris which also enunciates a similar proposition. It states, "generally, statutes directing the mode of proceeding by public officers, designed to promote method, system, uniformity and despatch in such proceeding, will be regarded as directory if a disregard thereof will not injure the rights of the parties, and the statute does not declare what result shall follow in non-compliance therewith, nor contain negative words importing prohibition of any other mode of proceeding them that prescribed. Especially is this true when to hold void acts done in violation of the statute would work serious inconvenience, or would cause injustice to persons having no control over those entrusted with the duty enjoined, and at the same time would not promote the main object of the statute. " If these principles are applied to the question in issue before us, it will clearly have to be held that this provision of law should be regarded as directory, for if it is held to be mandatory, it would cause serious inconvenience and injustice to persons who have appeared before the bar of the Board of Revenue during the last several years and who had no control over the officers of the Government whose duty it was to comply with this provision. Apart from causing inconvenience and injustice, it would not, in any way, promote the main object of the statute, which was to provide for a tribunal to adjudicate upon revenue disputes arising between subject and subject or between the subject and the State. The weight of the authorities cited above is heavily in favour of the proposition that where the prescription of an Act; relates to the performance of a duty by a public Officer, the breach of such prescription when it does not cause any real injustice, does not invalidate the act done under the Act and, therefore, such prescriptions are merely directory. Public policy often requires that minor omissions and failures of officials should not make void all their proceedings otherwise, Government in affected sectors might come to a standstill and thus chaos and confusion might ensue. It cannot be gain said! that this would certainly be the result if the provisions of sub-sec. (4) are held to be mandatory and all the acts of the Board of Revenue performed, hithertofore are invalidated as being without jurisdiction. In further support of the view that this provision is directory and not mandatory, Shri P. D. Kudal has invited our attention to the parallel provisions of the Constitution of India, Jo wit, Articles 214, 216 and 217. Art. 214 provides for the Constitution of a High Court for each State even as sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 4 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act provides for the constitution of the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan. Art. 216 relates to the strength of the High Court, as does sub-sec. (2) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, with the difference that there is no minimum prescribed for the number of Judges constituting a High Court. Art. 217 prescribes the manner of appointment and conditions of the office of a Judge of a High Court. Sub-sec. (4) of sec. 4 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act may be considered as running parallel to it. Sub-clauses (2) of this Article lays down that a person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court unless he is a citizen of India and : (a) has for atleast 10 years held a judicial office in the territory of India; or (b) has for atleast 10 years been an Advocate of a High Court in any State specified in the First Schedule or of two or more such Courts in succession. A comparison of the provisions contained in the Constitution of India regarding the appointment of the Judges of a High Court or those of the Supreme Court with the similar provisions laid down for the appointment of the Members of the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan clearly shows that in the case of the appointment of the Judges of the High Court it was the intention of the Constitution makers that minimum qualification should be prescribed for these appointments and those who did not fulfil these minimum qualifications should be debarred from presiding over these high offices, but evidently, this was not the intendment of the Legislature, when it laid down the provisions regarding the appointment of the Chairman and the Members of the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan. If such had been the intention, the Rajasthan Legislature could also have introduced some such conditions. It is pertinent to note here that the Madhya Pradesh Legislature has prescribed that a person shall not be qualified for appointment as Member of Board of Revenue unless, he (a) is eligible for appointment as a judge of the High Court: or (b) has been a revenue officer and has held for atleast five years an office, not lower in rank than that of a Collector. No such provision was made in the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act although judicial notice may be taken of the fact that the Government has been very circumspect in making appointments to the Board of Revenue, and perhaps, no case can be cited in which a person has been appointed as a Member of the Board of Revenue, who had not held, for atleast five years, an office not lower in rank than that of a Collector, prior to his becoming a Member of the Board of Revenue. There may be instances where a Member of the Board of Revenue may not have served as a Collector for five years, but even in such cases, the officer did hold an office equivalent to that of a Collector for at least five years before he became eligible for the super time scale, which was, in all cases, deemed to be the minimum condition precedent, for appointment as Member, Board of Revenue by the State Government. The fact that the Legislature did not use prohibitive or negative words would show that the command of the Legislature was not per-emptory. Moreover, the noncompliance by the State Government of this provision has, as stated above, in no manner, frustrated the purpose of the legislation. By this test also, the provision must be deemed to be directory. ;